

## Contributing Paper

# The Experience with Dams and Resettlement in Africa

Chris de Wet

Department of Anthropology, Rhodes University,  
South Africa

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Displacement, Resettlement, rehabilitation, reparation and  
development

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World Commission on Dams  
5<sup>th</sup> Floor, Hycastle House  
58 Loop Street  
PO Box 16002  
Vlaeberg, Cape Town  
8018, SOUTH AFRICA  
Telephone: +27 21 426 4000  
Fax: +27 21 426 0036  
Email: [info@dams.org](mailto:info@dams.org)  
<http://www.dams.org>

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 LOCATING SUCCESSFUL RESETTLEMENT

The construction of large dams has resulted in the displacement or resettlement of many millions of people across the world. While a number of those dams may be seen to have achieved the main goals for which they were constructed (such as the provision of hydro-electricity, or irrigation), they have also been instrumental in causing severe socio-economic hardship for those people who have had to move to make way for those dams. They have been seen as ‘people in the way of progress’.

The key set of questions to which this thematic study addresses itself relates to whether such people who have to move for the dam could not become ‘people who are part of progress’, whether they could not possibly become direct beneficiaries of the fruits of a large investment such as a dam complex - rather than being ‘in the way of progress’, or in the words of an official on the Volta River Project, ‘the fly in the ointment’.

The thematic study thus asks how we should decide what could be held to be a successful development - with - resettlement programme, where success would involve the resettlers as beneficiaries of the overall project. Our understanding of success should be informed from two sources : firstly, ‘best practice’ as it emerges from cases of existing resettlement programmes, and secondly, ‘best principles’, which should guide our thinking about future resettlement policy. Having thought about what might constitute success, we then need to direct our attention to ways in which such success might best be achieved, and the requirements of this.

This report will focus on selected resettlement projects that have taken place in Africa, and its findings will at a later stage be synthesized with other regional reports that are focussing on South America and on South-East Asia.

For purposes of orientation, resettlement may provisionally be defined as a situation in which

- a development intervention, such as the construction of a dam, is taking place
- people who are in the path of the dam are either moved away, or are allowed to move away by themselves
- provision is made for the fact that they have to move, by way of provision of compensation, new houses, new lands, services etc.
- the move is effectively permanent, in the sense that the area where people used to live has been transformed by the dam.

Such a definition distinguishes resettlement from other types of displacement, such as simple expulsion from an area, or people being taken from one area to another, but with no provision being made for them.

Resettlement involves displacement, in the sense that people are constrained to move, but it is displacement with (at least some) attempt to rehabilitate the moved people, and to provide reparation for the losses that they have incurred.

Development undertakings, such as the construction of dams or other large infrastructure, should ideally provide affected people with an enhancement of:

- their material circumstances
- their range of options or choices
- their control over their day to day affairs.

The obvious question then becomes : development for whom?

Who are to be the beneficiaries? There are usually competing sets of interests, and there are often ‘winners and losers’ in relation to development projects. Resettlement brings the question of winners and losers sharply into focus. Whereas the construction of a dam may create benefits for certain categories of people, such as urban consumers, or commercial farmers, it often creates negative consequences for other parties. People have to move (resettlers); this in turn creates problems for the people who are already living in the area into which they have to move (hosts); people below the dam have their flood-irrigation cultivation cycles disrupted by the altered flood-regime imposed by the dam (downstreamers). Whereas development projects open out options for beneficiaries, they constrain other affected parties, as illustrated above.

This raises the familiar dilemma : if somebody has to lose, how are we to choose who that is to be? This takes us to the heart of some of the key issues in the debate around large dams. Is it acceptable to argue that it is necessary that some should sacrifice for the benefit of the greater good? Indeed, is this a false formulation of the problem: is there any good reason why all affected parties should not be beneficiaries? What role are issues of equity to play in deciding what the balance of benefits is to be?

Many dams in Africa have been built in terms of a set of national goals and programmes, and it has been assumed that it is unfortunate, but unavoidable, that ‘the few’ such as resettlers, should suffer in the process. Fahim points to the tensions around this issue when he argues that, while the resettlers have clearly undergone significant suffering as a result of the dam at Aswan, one also needs to keep a wider national perspective in mind when evaluating the overall success of the Aswan High Dam Project (Fahim 1981:45,46)

While acknowledging that there will always be trade-offs, this report takes a particular stand in this regard. It starts with the position and interests of what may perhaps be termed the ‘constrained parties’, such as resettlers, hosts and downstreamers. It argues that it should not automatically be accepted that they have to lose out. Such a position is not simply unrealistic moral posturing, although it does take the moral standpoint that we must start from the assumption that constrained parties should be seen as potential beneficiaries, and that this should be built into the project planning and implementation process as a non-negotiable element, on a par with things such as construction schedules. This report thus argues for a PAP (Project-Affected Person) view of development effectiveness.

The question therefore arises: what, from the PAP position, would constitute a successful resettlement programme, and how could it be achieved?

-\*The issue of voluntary or involuntary resettlement needs to be dealt with at the onset, as it can also function as a potential red herring, or distraction. One position is that only cases where people wish to move can be regarded as successful, and that therefore, by definition, all cases involving involuntary resettlement, must necessarily be regarded as unsuccessful. But what then are we to make of a case where resettlers were satisfied with their post-resettlement situation, in the sense that they saw themselves as better off in almost all respects - except that they had to move against their will? If we do not allow for that situation to be seen as successful, we are allowing a determining priority for one variable (the voluntary/involuntary nature of the move) in our definition of success.

A decade after resettlement, many Egyptian Nubians were still feeling unsettled in their new areas, and longing for home (Fahim 1983:116) A decade or so after that, a number of the initial agricultural and service provision problems had been sorted out, and the resettlement experience had led to positive developments in Nubian perception of themselves as a group (Fernea and Fernea 1991:ch17; Fernea 1998).

What seemed to have been an unsuccessful situation - in which the perception of involuntary resettlement featured significantly - had changed, for the better, regardless of the involuntary nature of the move at the time.

While resettlement should always in principle be voluntary wherever possible, what other criteria for successful resettlement do we need to take into account?

I would suggest that a model of successful resettlement<sup>1</sup> should embody two kinds of factors

- Processual elements, i.e. elements which are (or should be) an inherent part of the resettlement process, and the way in which it unfolds
- Sustainable outcomes, resulting from the process.
- Processual Elements

The outcomes of a resettlement programme are determined not only by what is specifically planned for and implemented, but also by the very manner in which that planing and implementation takes place, i.e. by the nature of the resettlement process. An integral component of this process is (or should be), the participation of all affected parties.

Given that resettlement overwhelmingly tends to have negative consequences for the 'constrained' parties, the starting point of the process should be to seek to find alternatives to resettlement. Where this is not possible without aborting an initiative which will serve the 'public purpose', all effort must be made to minimise resettlement.

All alternatives to resettlement must have been seriously considered and agreed upon by all the interested parties as the only viable option in the circumstances.

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<sup>1</sup> I have found Scudder (1999) very useful in arriving at this model.

For this to happen, the state and implementing agencies need to have demonstrated the necessity i.e. the public purpose, of the larger construction project in the first place, and that there was in fact no alternative means of achieving the same desired outcomes. But the project needs to be viable not only for the state, but also for the resettlers, and they need to be persuaded that resettlement will take place in such a manner as to leave them materially better off, and socially not worse off, than before.

For resettlement to be agreed on in this manner, at least two enabling conditions are necessary.

i. *Resettlers and other PAPS must have been involved in the entire decision-making process relating to the development project* –including whether it should take place, and whether and how resettlement should take place. For this, they need to be able to secure effective participation, for which necessary legal protections and procedures may need to be put in place to secure ongoing participation and protection of PAPS.

- The other requirement for resettlement to have been fairly decided upon, is *a free flow of information to all interested parties throughout the project cycle*. This again highlights the need for meaningful participation in all fora where information is exchanged.
- *Compensation packages* should be designed in such a way as to create options and new sources of income for people, and should therefore be negotiated. This is necessary because resettlement usually restrains options and leaves people worse off because of deferred investment and loss of access to productive resources for a period of up to several years both before and after actual relocation. Compensation should thus be designed not simply as reparation, but rather as a development programme directed towards PAPS. It is important that all PAPS affected by the dam, and not only resettlers, should be compensated, and that compensation should also be made available at the time of relocation, unless it is in the form of an annuity. This again highlights the need for participation and free flow of information.

ii. Often seen as part of the compensation package, are the *provision of new houses and new fields in the resettlement area*. It is essential for settling in and re-establishment, that these are both ready and transferred to their users by no later than the time of relocation, and preferably earlier.

iii. *Monitoring of the entire project cycle*, and particularly of its resettlement-related aspects, is essential if the process is to correct developing problems and thus to ensure success. The ability to learn from experience is a fundamental characteristic of any scientific enterprise and its chances of success.

iv) For the above conditions to function effectively as part of the resettlement process we require the *establishment of appropriate legal and administrative mechanisms*, which allow for the participation of PAPS, and for the protection of their rights.

### **Sustainable Outcomes**

A number of specific outcomes should come out of a resettlement process that is successful. Resettlers should be better-off than before resettlement in a number of specific ways, which need to be sustainable over time. These include:

- Income levels, as well as diversity of income sources, both agricultural and non-agricultural
- Increasing control, and autonomy, over their productive activities
- Property rights and security of tenure in the resettlement area
- Access to services and infrastructure, which should also be reflected in better health indices.

The above four improvements should be reflected in

Greater equity among PAPs. Marginalised groups (such as women, the elderly, ethnic minorities) should be better off, and this should be reflected in a decrease of social and economic differentiation, i.e. marginalised groups should now be less marginalised than before resettlement.

Institutional capacity, in terms of the kind of decision-making processes necessary to accommodate ethnic diversity within resettlement areas, as well as to maintain services and infrastructure, which may well involve the raising of revenue.

Linked to institutional capacity, is Administrative-political autonomy at the level of the resettlement area, and its effective integration into administrative structures at regional level. This will also involve the capacity to negotiate for resources in such regional bodies.

Arising from all of the above, one would anticipate that the members of a resettlement area, or of a group of nearby resettlement areas, would develop a viable group identity in their new local and regional situation. This would include the capacity to accommodate internal diversity, as well as to unite for purposes of dealing with wider regional or even national situations.

The above broad model of successful resettlement is clearly ideal - typical, and it would be unlikely to find such a case in practice. The elements outlined in the model are for the most part interrelated, implying and reinforcing each other. For purposes of planning and policy formation, we should try to see the model as a unit. For purposes of evaluating actual cases, we will need to disaggregate the model, looking at each element as potentially separate.

Particular resettlement projects will thus be successful in some ways, but not in others. By disaggregating success in this manner, we can then begin to piece together a more detailed understanding of the conditions making for particular kinds of success and failure, and sharpen our policy focus accordingly.

### **An Overview of Dam-Related Resettlement in Africa**

Over 400,000 people have been resettled as a direct result of dam construction in Africa. The major instances may be represented in tabular form as follows

**Major Instances of Dam-Related Resettlement in Africa**

<u>Name of Scheme</u>	<u>Numbers Resettled</u>	<u>Date of Move</u>
Aswan High Dam (Egypt/Sudan) (source: Cernea 1990:331; Fahim 1983:45; Sorbo 1985:104)	100,000	1963-1969
Cabora-Bassa (Mozambique) (source: Lassailly-Jacob 1996:189)	25,000	± 1974
Kainji (Nigeria) (source: Ayeni et al 1992: 111; Roder 1994:124)	44,000	1967-1968
Kariba (Zambia/Zimbabwe)	57,000	1958

(source: Scudder 1973: 206)

Kossou (Ivory Coast) (source: Lassailly-Jacob 1996:189)	75,000	1970
Manantali (Mali) (source: Koenig and Horowitz 1988:2; Grimm 1991: Ch.4)	10,000	1986-1987
Nangbeto (Togo/Benin) (source: World Bank 1998:_,2)	10,600	1987
Selingue (Mali) (source: Lassailly-Jacob 1996:189)	15,000	± 1980
Volta a) Akasombo (Ghana)	80,000	1963ff
b) Kpong (Ghana)	6,000	1978-1981

(source: Adu-Aryee 1993:133;

Lumsden 1973:119; World Bank 1993:5)

This regional report will consider aspects of the following schemes: Aswan; Kainji; Kariba; Lesotho Highlands; Manantali; Nangbeto; Orange; Pongolo; Volta.

*Dams as Nationalistic Projects*

These dams were built principally for the provision of hydro-electricity for industrial purposes and urban growth, and for the supply of irrigation for agricultural development. However, they were also seen as cornerstones of national, and often nationalistic, projects. Thus, Aswan High Dam was conceived in the context of Nassers' vision of agrarian reform and 'the abolishment of feudalism' (Fahim 1981:15). Akasombo was a central component of Nkrumah's nation-building vision for Ghana, representing Ghana's largest single development investment.

It is worth quoting Nkrumah's own words to capture the spirit of the enterprise : 'Newer nations, such as ours, which are determined by every possible means to catch up in industrial strength, must have electricity in abundance, before they can expect any large -scale industrial advance. That basically, is the justification for the Volta River Project' [which was to be a] 'scheme which transcends any political consideration, and which is, in the truest sense, an expression of our national unity and of our national purpose and aspirations' (Nkrumah, quoted in Lumsden 1973:117). The Lesotho Highlands Water Project was to be a springboard for national development through the sale of water to South Africa and the generation of hydropower for import substitution (Maema and Reynolds 1995:1,3). The Orange River Project reflected a decolonisation of a different kind. In the wake of South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, and of the political upheaval and flight of capital after the Sharpeville shootings of 1960, South Africa was concerned to utilise a large project such as the Orange River Project to rebuild confidence in the country, both nationally as well as internationally. (World Commission on Dams, December 1998:5).

It is important to bear these nationalistic influences on large dam projects in mind, as they introduce a potentially irrational element. This is because the project has to accommodate itself to political goals and time frames, whether these are compatible with sound planning, financing and implementation, or not. As such, there is something of a built-in failing mechanism in these projects.

### *Planning and Participation*

The participation of resettlers and other affected people in the planning of and preparations for resettlement has varied very significantly on African dam projects, not least because participation and consultation have become over time more firmly entrenched as part of the resettlement process. Perhaps the starkest example of non-participation is found in one of the earlier dam projects, i.e. Kariba. In 1958, a headman and his village refused to move. The authorities attempted to arrest them. There were riots, resulting in the fatal shooting of 8 Gwembe Tonga people, and the end of any resistance (Colson 1971:41). It is however not only those at the wrong end of the power relationship that are denied participation. In the case of the Orange River, farmers who were members of the powerful white agricultural lobby, were not consulted about the dam or the impending move, and took no part in the planning of projects that affected them (World Commission on Dams, 1998:24). At the other end of the spectrum, Nangbeto serves as a successful instance of participation. Villages formed committees to supervise their own resettlement, the resettlers 'participated in designing the program, constructing the resettlement houses, and selecting village sites and household plots within the village' (World Bank 1998:16). The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is designing a 'People's Involvement Programme' to emphasise local committees to negotiate favourable resettlement conditions. (LHWP:PoE Report, June 1996; \_\_\_).

Perhaps reflecting what has been occurring more widely, is the situation at Manatali, where a greater degree of participation was achieved in planning, but less in implementation, because of the tight time frames that were involved. (Koenig and Horowitz 1998:9-10).

The problem of time frames has dogged the planning of resettlement in Africa, perhaps nowhere more dramatically than at Akasambo, where the formation of Lake Volta started more than a year ahead of plan - which put tremendous pressure on the planning and preparation of resettlement (Lumsden 1973:119). The lack of time is a constant refrain in the first major volume on the Volta River Project (Chambers (ed) 1970). This led to heavy costs. 'Parkinson's law worked in reverse : tasks were tailored to fit the short time available' (Chambers 1970b:261). This had the implication that because of the fact that issues around evacuation and relocation had to be prioritised, other, long-term, development-focussed issues had to be delayed or abandoned. (Ibid:262)

In stark contrast to the disastrous telescoping of activities at Akasambo, were the more leisurely and more participatory planning at Nangbeto (discussed above), where planners had three years before the reservoir was due to fill (World Bank 1998:3) and at Akasambo's successor - Kpong, where resettlement surveys were completed in time to allow their findings to be applied in the planning process (Adu-Aryee 1993:150). A key factor influencing the issue of time constraints would appear to relate to the degree to which resettlement planning and dam and infrastructure construction schedules are (or are not) co-ordinated.

*Too Much Emphasis on Relocation and Infrastructure,  
Too Little Emphasis on Development Planning*

In a number of instances, the actual relocation was carried out fairly successfully. People participated in its preparation, were allowed to move as communities, houses in a number of cases were ready before the move (although the first relocation campaigns at Aswan and at Manantali did not go quite so smoothly, as not all the houses were ready in time : Grimm 1991:136; Fahim 1983:44). At Kainji, there was 'Only minimum necessary pressure' to move (Ayeni et al 1992:112) and at Nangbeto 'Disturbance was minimal' (World Bank 1998:21). Basic services were available in the new settlements.

However, there does not seem to have been the same commitment to longer-term development planning. At Akasambo, pressured schedules meant that there was competition for construction equipment between housing and agricultural programmes, with the result that fields were not cleared by the time resettlers arrived in the new areas (Chambers 1970b:262). But in a number of other cases, time constraint does not appear to have been the problem. At Nangbeto (where there was plenty of time for planning), there simply was no provision made for rehabilitation. 'There was no income restoration beyond re-creating the previous farm economy' (World Bank 1998:21). Manantali lacked a coherent development plan for the region. 'A fatal flaw of the entire project [was that] it, lacked an emphasis on the need for income-generated actions' (Grimm 1991:113). The first major academic study of Kainji warned that there was a looming crisis with regard to matters such as the provision of water, sanitation and housing (Oyedipe 1973:45). The reports of the Panel of Experts for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project repeatedly complained that relocation plans were not synchronised with development strategies, and that there were problematic delays in the supply of basic services such as water and sanitation (LHPW:PoE Reports: April 1995:\_; November 1996:x) - as at Kainji.

These critical omissions in terms of longer term developmental planning seem to relate to the reduction of resettlement to relocation, in terms of the idea that once the people had been moved, the job had in effect been done (World Bank 1998:13).

*Compensation Issues*

Central to any attempt to achieve resettlement with development is the way in which compensation is handled. It is broadly acknowledged that straight cash compensation for displacement is unsatisfactory in most cases, as once the money is spent, people are left much worse off than before. One of the worst of such cases occurred with the Akasombo scheme. People were given the choice of minimum compensation and resettling themselves elsewhere, or being resettled in official resettlement areas with housing provided.

The majority opted for official resettlement (Chambers 1970a:28). However, the 'Gone Elsewheres', as those who opted for cash and self-settling were known, had to wait something like 5 years for their money (Hart 1980:82). In a somewhat atypical case, that of the Gariiep and van der Kloof Dams on the Orange River, commercial farmers had to move out of the way of the dams, and cash compensation at market-related rates was paid to these farmers, who either bought farms elsewhere, or moved to urban areas. Their farmworkers were however not compensated, and had either to move with the farmer, or strike out on their own (World Commission on Dams 1998: 14).

Some schemes have opted for a combination of cash and kind, with compensation for houses being in two parts: a house on the scheme, and a cash part to allow for relocatees to improve their houses as they chose.

This applied in Aswan (Fahim 1983:37) and at Nangbeto (World Bank 1998:8), although in the latter case people had to wait for 3 years after resettlement for payment. In Manantali, people were supplied with a new house, and paid cash for other lost property, such as granaries, kitchens, trees - with the problem of how that cash is used coming to the fore again, as people spent it on, inter alia, investments in marriages (Grimm 1991:294). At Kainji, the policy of cash and self-settlement was abandoned in favour of scheme built housing to deal with the problems arising out of the cash approach as evidenced by the problems and choices at Akasambo.

While people have generally received compensation for crops in their old fields, compensation for land has been problematic, and has raised questions concerning customary tenure and compensation. Thus, in the case of Aswan at New Halfa, the government did not compensate the Arab pastoralists coming on to the scheme (other than giving them a tenancy on the scheme) as it felt it did not owe them anything as their lands had not been individually registered (Salem-Murdock 1989:60) - and by implication were state property. By contrast, the Nubians coming onto the scheme, who had owned freehold land before resettlement, were given not only houses and tenancies on scheme, but double the hectarage they had previously held (Salem-Murdock 1989:6). Nubian landowners received larger tenancies than former labourers (Fahim 1983:37). In these ways, compensation policy may serve to reinforce existing patterns of differentiation: equity is compromised in the interests of what is perceived of as potential fairness. With Nangbeto, there was no direct compensation for available land, as land was held to belong to the state. A rather ad hoc notion of replacement operated, as people were allowed to choose farm sites, depending on availability. They had to clear the fields themselves, with the project agency backtracking on its commitment to pay them for the labour (World Bank 1998:9).

The host communities into which resettlers move often do not receive compensation for the land they have to make available. At Akasombo, there seems to have been uncertainty as to the state's domain over the land. Local inhabitants regarded land as something to be bought and sold, whereas the state had more of a customary tenure type of approach, not compensating the former lost owners, who accordingly still regarded the land as their own, leading to wrangles about who had the rights to the land (Hart 1980:80).

Whatever the policy, there have usually been delays in the provision of compensation. At Aswan, by 1979 (15 years after relocation) only 60% of resettlers had received available land (Fahim 1981:37) - and to this day, Nubians still do not have title to their land or houses (Fernea 1998:7). At Manantali (Grimm 1991:136) and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP, PoE Report, August 1994:31) there were delays in the provision of housing. At Nangbeto (World Bank 1998:8,9) people waited 3 years for the final cash payments for their houses, and are still waiting for compensation for trees lost to the dam. Such delays impact negatively upon attempts to achieve resettlement with development, affecting initiatives aimed at agricultural production, income generation and community formation.

In several cases, schemes have changed their compensation policy in midstream, in some instances with positive, in other instances with negative, effects. Thus at Kainji, the change was made from cash compensation to the provision of scheme housing. This was because 'it proved difficult to persuade people to move in the as yet absence of any evidence of a lake or rising waters' (Roder 1994:124) People were reluctant to use such 'windfall' income to construct houses, nor would it be feasible for a group to move and build together, as, with everyone building their own homes, there would be no additional help available. To deal with these problems and a growing time pressure, officials changed the compensation policy, providing scheme housing. (Roder 1994:124) At Nangbeto, it was first decided that the scheme would clear fields for the resettlers. It was then decided that the resettlers would be paid to do the work, and in the end, they were not paid for the task. It was similarly decided to pay resettlers cash for trees lost, which was then changed to provision of seedlings - with compensation still outstanding after 10 years. Such vacillation and non-delivery has made for dissatisfaction and mistrust among the resettlers (World Bank 1998:9,10).

Compensation policy changes have had a positive effect in the case of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, where the experience of Phase 1A of the Project was put to good effect in Phase 1B. Policy has been expanded to provide a range of options to meet the varying circumstances of different resettlers, some of whom may choose to move to urban, rather than rural areas. Options include annuities, lump sum cash payments, land for land, and grain provision for a number of years. People were also given the option of whether to have the scheme authority build their house for them, or to be given the money and make their own arrangements for building. This allows for greater flexibility, as well as linking up compensation with development and income-generating initiatives (LHWP,PoE Report, June 1996:iv,5,9).

### *Agriculture*

While agricultural development has been one of the goals of resettlement schemes in Africa, whether by irrigation or intensification through mechanisation, the result has for the most part not been impressive, serving to increase rather than decrease dependence upon scheme structures. As Roder (1994:162) puts matters, 'Government attempts to create large scale agricultural or irrigation projects have uniformly met with failure. The integration of peasant cultivators into a large, more or less regimented settlement has been unsuccessful anywhere in Africa south of the Sahara'.

This failure has been for the usual predictable range of reasons: lack of cleared land; lack of time, resources, supplies, marketing linkups, managerial capacity; poor water distribution; focus on irrigation to the cost of attempts to intensify dryland production; over-reliance on costly, heavy maintenance technology, top-down structures which were opaque and very costly. The focus on large, technology-loaded schemes at the cost of strategies to boost existing production systems would seem to relate at least in part to the nationalistic aspects of many of these schemes, with the resulting need for high-tech, high-visibility projects, which result in financial and managerial demands that cannot be sustained. Large schemes do not exist in isolation from their environment, and a downward turn in the regional or natural economy may make such schemes unsustainable. Akasombo and Nangbeto are clear cases of resettlement agriculture falling foul of such downturns. Another national factor which impacts upon resettlement agriculture is changing political priorities in relation to rural development. Nkrumah had seen resettlement as a special project, with its communities serving as 'bridgeheads of modernisation' (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert, 1990:200). His successor, Busia, was concerned with rural upliftment in general, through organising the poor, rather than through specific state interventions, such as the Volta River Project. The result was that resettlers no longer received any special attention, and hence resettlement as development was not a possibility, with the inevitable worsening of conditions. (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert, 1990:201).

All has however, not been dismal failure. At Kpong, a conscious attempt was made to avoid the mistakes made at Akasombo. Planners sought wherever possible to retain resettled communities within their traditional lands, with land, where necessary, being cleared in stages, on demand. Settlers for the most part worked their plots, and a successful pilot irrigation scheme was established (Adu-Aryee 1993:141-147)<sup>2</sup> At Manantali, where the new area has 'fertile soils, adequate rainfall, and a very modest host population density' (Horowitz et al 1993:237), agricultural production has been satisfactory, and is 'driving the expansion of marketing in the resettlement area' (Ibid:241).

While initially struggling with the usual problems confronting irrigation agriculture, the situation at Aswan seems to have improved considerably, with new lands having become productive and with tenants cultivating more extensively, using the irrigated tenancies to produce crops for own consumption as well as for sale (Fernea 1998:4,8).

At Kainji, agricultural success has resulted from the dam, but more by virtue of local initiative than from scheme undertaking. People are using small petrol-powered pumps to irrigate the area above the water level of the dam, and are using the drawdown area for livestock forage (Roder 1994:57).

In a similar fashion, resettlers for a number of years were able to use the benefits of the dam at Kariba to boost agricultural and livestock production. For the first five years after the dam was constructed, a scheme-initiated fishing enterprise flourished, and people used the earnings from this to diversify into the production of cotton as a cash crop, and to boost their livestock numbers and sales. (Scudder 1985:29).

With the exception of the more recent positive developments at Aswan, Roder's pessimistic view about the viability of large schemes seems valid, and it seems that what gains have come, have been through local peasant initiative, utilising available benefits resulting from the dam.

An interesting example of such initiative relates to the Pongola poort Dam in the Kwa Zulu-Natal province

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<sup>2</sup> There is a difference of interpretation and information on Kpong. While Adu-Aryee (1993) takes a fairly positive view, the World Bank (1993) report is much more negative, suggesting that incomes have not been restored, and that agriculture at Kpong has undergone a change in policy in the direction of intensification and is saddled with many of the same problems as Akasombo. It is not immediately clear how to reconcile these analyses.

While the World Bank report may possibly be based on more recent research than that of Adu-Aryee, I have not been able to find more recent reports to clarify the matter, other than the comment that "the Kpong [development] plan was never implemented because funds were not forthcoming after the completion of dam construction". (LHWP, PoE Report, September 1993:3)

of South Africa. The initial flood regime imposed by the dam authorities was destructive of downstream cultivation and grazing practices, (as it has been elsewhere,<sup>33</sup> such as at Manatali - Grimm 1991:106) leading to competition between cultivators and pastoralists for land, the inundation of large areas of cropland, and encroachment onto ecologically sensitive areas (Poultney 1982). Subsequently, through the agency of a local development project, a system of local Water Committees has been launched, involving the principal interest groups around the flood regime. These committees now negotiate the flood releases from the dam and constitute 'a successful community-based hydrological management of the floodplain' (Bruwer et al 1996:203,204).

### *Diversification of Incomes*

The above kinds of initiatives suggest that we should not evaluate the success or failure of a resettlement scheme purely in terms of its own goals. In such narrow terms, most schemes would count as failures. However, schemes create new opportunities and significantly, opportunities for resettlers and other affected people to diversify their incomes, thereby both spreading risks and enhancing incomes.

Perhaps the clearest case of this is the New Halfa scheme, which is part of the Aswan High Dam project. Arab pastoralists were brought onto the scheme and given tenancies. Agriculturally, this was not a success. However, the point is that these pastoralists continued to maintain their herds off-scheme, while cultivating on scheme, and also bringing their animals onto the scheme, deriving additional grazing benefits from the scheme. Indeed it is their off-scheme activities that have kept a number of tenant households viable (Sorbo 1985:15), and played a significant role in averting the collapse of the scheme. 'Through mutual transfers and conversions between animal husbandry and agriculture, a large number of Shukriya [i.e. Arab] pastoralists are able to continue a (more or less) settled existence on the Scheme, thus also benefiting from improved commercial, social and educational services' (Sorbo 1985:17).

The agricultural scheme itself is a source of job-creation and a growth-point (Salem-Murdock 1989:86), as is the Kom Ombo Scheme and the city of Aswan for Egyptian Nubians (Fahim 1981:108ff), who also continue their pre-resettlement tradition of working as labour migrants in Egyptian towns, while subcontracting out their tenancies on the scheme (Fahim 1981:63). Residents of the resettlement areas of the Kpong scheme in Ghana benefit in similar fashion from the employment opportunities at the nearby factories and industries that have arisen in response to the hydro-electricity from the dam (Adu-Aryee 1993:149). As at Kariba, the fishing industry has also had a multiplier effect.

The construction of dam-related infrastructure gives rise to a number of temporary income-generating opportunities. Thus, at Manantali, only locals were employed in these jobs, greatly contributing to cash flows into villages, and (not dissimilarly from Kariba), contributing to subsequent economic development. (Grimm 1991:118)

Such diversification of incomes tends to perpetuate existing patterns of differentiation, both across, and within groups. Thus the differentiation between Nubians and pastoralists was accentuated by their different access to resources on the scheme, and within the Arab group, the gap between wealthy Shukriya, with more off-scheme resources, and influence in obtaining resources within the scheme, and poor Shukriya, has widened (Salem-Murdock 1989:6;12).

These benefits of diversification would, as with agricultural success, seem to result from the ability to utilise the benefits of the scheme on the part of entrepreneurial individuals, rather than from any planned income generation strategies emanating from the scheme. It is the absence of such strategies that constitute a 'fatal flow' in schemes (Grimm 1991:113 for Manatali), and which have resulted in resettlement

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<sup>3</sup> An exception has been the Orange River, where the new flood regime has made irrigation and the production of high value export crops a possibility for down-stream, predominately white, commercial farmers - World Commission on Dams 1998).

accelerating the process of impoverishment at Kariba (Scudder 1985:59) and at Nangbeto (World Bank 1998:12).

### *Services*

Besides access to available land and to additional sources of income, one of the principal benefits of resettlement schemes is - or should be - that of better access to services. The facilitation of the provision of services is one of the main justifications behind moving people into concentrated residential areas.

Settlers on African schemes have for the most part been initially happy with better access to water, transport, schools, medical care and social services, and marketing links. However, the design of service supply has been faulty at times (as at Kpong - World Bank 1993:31) and the maintenance of services has often been problematic. Thus at Nangbeto, people had better access to water via pumps than before resettlement, but the pumps are over used and repeatedly break down, with the result that the water supply is now worse than before moving. While new clinics may have been built, they are often short on staff and drugs (World Bank 1998:14). Roads built at resettlement at Kainji are deteriorating (Ayeni et al 1992:117).

Two of the few schemes where services appear to have been maintained and even improved, are Kainji, where there has been progress in the building of new tarred roads and the provision of water and education (Ayeni et al 1992:119), and Aswan, in Egypt, where residents of Kom Ombo now have electricity and piped water in their homes (Fernea 1998:8).

The ability to maintain or improve services would seem to relate to administrative and economic capacity at both local and regional level, and to the importance of schemes such as Kom Ombo in their regional political context, as is reflected in the growing political influence of the Nubian population in Egypt.

### *Health*

While improved income and services should be the best health policy (LHWP,PoE Report, September 1993:7), a number of diseases relate directly to dam construction and the resulting body of water in the lake. One of the results of the movement into an area by outsiders who come to work on the dam, and who as a result have disposable income, is an increase in AIDS and STDs (sexually transmitted diseases). These are already showing signs of being 'major problems' in a youngish scheme such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which, if all its phases are implemented, will still involve the construction of several new dams (LHWP,PoE Report September 1993:v\_;v\_\_).

Lower-lying dams in tropical areas are particularly prone to diseases such as river blindness, bilharzia and malaria. Rates of bilharzia have increased in a number of dams such as Akasombo (Hart 1980:91) and Kainji (Roder 1994:145), although less so at Kainji because of the large change in water level and the drying out of the draw-down area. At Aswan, rates have gone down because of the improvement in piped water supplies (Fahim 1981:139). While the geographical distribution may have changed, rates of river blindness do not appear to have changed significantly in the case of Akasambo (Hart 1980:96) where there has been a programme to combat it, or of Kainji, 'where the great variations in flow from the spillway below the dam prevent the breeding of *Simulium damnosum*' (Roder 1996:145).

Apart from increases in bilharzia, the incidence of water-related diseases does not appear to have increased significantly.

### *Ethnic Relationships*

Two principal types of what one might call ethnic relationships pertain on resettlement schemes.

- between resettlers from formerly different social groups before resettlement
- between resettlers and members of the host communities which receive them.

As far as relationships between heterogenous resettler groups is concerned, the evidence seems somewhat mixed. Lumsden, working 3 years after resettlement at Akasombo found that, while there was still conflict between the 5 former villages brought together into one settlement around matters such as leadership, and access to resources, co-operation and cross-cutting ties were beginning to emerge, with ritual and ceremonial helpings to forge new ties (Lumsden 1973). Some ten years later, he found that 'inter-group conflict ..... seems much less overt than before' (Lumsden 1980:14) - which one would expect with the passage of time. However, a study of another Volta settlement, 25 years after relocation, found persisting divisions and suggests that the rivalries present after resettlement have continued 'and relations have worsened over the years. The younger generations have also begun to support and fan the conflicts ..... a freeze on intermarriages is an undercurrent' (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990:120). These tensions are hindering economic co-operation and progress. The fact that this divided settlement is much more diverse in origin than that studied by Lumsden may partly explain the difference, as may the fact that 'the resettlement town has not permitted to any appreciable extent fulfilment of the role expectations and aspirations of the sub-groups' (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990:120) - the social and economic goods resulting from the Volta River Project are presumably too limited to accommodate such diversity.

The relationship between lack of political and economic resources, and ethnic rivalry, seems borne out by material from Kom Ombo, where three ethnically diverse groups of Nubians were brought together in the resettlement area. While some 10 years after resettlement, local politics still ran along ethnic lines, and intermarriage was still limited, 'a sense of identification with a common community was emphasized' (Fahim 1983:99). This move towards community was probably spurred on by the rising importance of local Nubian leaders, and the strategic advantages of co-operation for purposes of patronage, as well as by the fact that as a group, the Nubians received a generous and standardised compensation, and thus did not have to compete among themselves for resources, as did people at Akasambo.

While they have learned to co-operate out of necessity, relationships between hosts and resettlers for the most part remain tense, because the two groups tend to see themselves as in competition, and particularly hosts often feel that they have been unfairly treated in comparison to the incoming strangers. This sense of injustice and of competition relates to matters such as differential compensation and access to services, conflicting interests between pastoralist hosts and resettler cultivators, the fact that hosts have not been compensated or paid for the land they gave up, and still see themselves as the rightful owners. Obosu-Mensah (1996:91) suggests that this sort of 'poorly conceived compensation programme', rather than ethnicity, underlies the conflicts and lack of integration in resettlement areas at Akasambo. Such tensions are graphically brought out in the New Halfa scheme where the pastoralist hosts on the scheme sought to obtain separate political representation on the local council system after the Nubian resettlers had sought to evict them from the scheme. (Salem-Murdock 1993:314;316)

### *Gender*

Colson (1999:25) talks of 'the paucity of data' about the gender dimension in resettlement. What little material there seems to be, is rather economic and political in emphasis, looking at the ways in which resettlement creates or limits access to resources, or opens out or limits and freedom of movement and opportunities, and at how men and women strategise accordingly. Rather little is said about the qualitative dimension of male-female relationships in the resettlement context.

While resettlement seems to harden men's control over resources, to women's detriment, (as in Aswan, Kariba, Manantali and Akasombo), the other side of the coin is that resettlement, and the movement of communities out of relative isolation, into wider socio-political contexts, open out social opportunities for women. Thus, Nubian women enjoyed greater opportunities for employment, education, participation in community affairs, and travel (Fahim 1983:54), while at Kariba, young women preferred the wider exposure they were offered, in terms of education and widening marriage pools (Colson 1999:37)

### *Does the Resettlement Area Ever Become 'Home'?*

This question, which has to be answerable in the positive if we are to be able to regard resettlement as successful, demonstrates the importance of taking a long-term view of the resettlement process. The Kom Ombo scheme is a stark illustration of the point. More than a decade after moving, Nubians were still suffering from what Fahim (1983:116) terms 'resettlement illness', women showed signs of fatigue and depression and people still expressed a desire to return to their old home area. 'The Kom Ombo settlement failed in the eyes of most Nubians to become a community that could provide a promising future.' (Fahim 1983:68) People stopped maintaining their houses and surroundings.

One would hardly recognise this as the same community described by the Ferneas two to three decades after resettlement (Fernea and Fernea 1991:Ch 16;17; Fernea 1998). Despite not yet having formal title to their houses, which now have water and electricity, Nubians have invested time and money on improving homes, contributing to communal buildings, developing small businesses, and cultivating their lands. Part of the reason for the metamorphosis has been the way in which access to land, efficient irrigation, and services has improved over the years.

Improved services may well relate to an increasing ability to pay for them, as disposable incomes have probably risen as a result of the increased job opportunities arising from improved education and from the development of the Kom Ombo scheme and of Aswan city. But perhaps more important has been the way in which a new and more valued Nubian identity has developed in the Egyptian context, and the way in which that identity has developed out of, and is associated with, the move to Kom Ombo. Through the enhancement of their incomes and living conditions, as well as of their political status and influence as a group, the Nubians have gained a collective self-respect that is critically tied up to the Kom Ombo experience, and has led to their identification in terms of it. Kom Ombo has become home.

The contrast is absolute with Akasombo, where 25 years on, it still seems to be the case that nothing works. Services are dilapidated, water supply provisional, land contestations and incomplete compensation drag on, settlements are still internally divided and successive government policies have led to resettlement areas becoming increasingly peripheralised. The result has been an ongoing emigration, as people leave in search of opportunities elsewhere. (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990). Nkrumah's initial vision for Ghana has perished and there is no sense of pride or identity to resonate with the Nubian experience.

While one cannot plan for identity in the same way as one can plan for access to resources and services, no one is readily proud of living in a factionalised rural slum such as many of the Volta resettlements have evidently become - there is very little to identify with. It is the lack of a long term vision for social and economic development on the part of planners at the time of resettlement that has led many resettlers at schemes such as Akasombo and Nangbeto to pull up their roots and seek to make a home elsewhere.

### *Best Practice*

In terms of a **model of successful resettlement** such as that outlined in the Introduction, the record on African schemes has for the most part not been very positive, and we would need to adopt a more modest approach in trying to give an account of what constitutes best practice and successful resettlement.

It does not appear to be the case that alternatives to resettlement were sought in the sense of trying to alter the design of dam infrastructure so as to minimise resettlement, or to look for alternative means of achieving goals such as the provision of electricity, such that people would not have to move. Potentially affected people were thus not involved in debate or decisions as to whether dams as such were the appropriate path to development or in any discussions about potential alternatives.

Having been presented with the dam as a *fait accompli*, PAPs - and effectively only those to be relocated - were in some cases allowed to participate in ways in the planning of resettlement. Thus meetings were held with community representatives and as at Kom Ombo, Kainji, Lesotho and Nangbeto, the wishes of those to be displaced were taken into account where possible - notably around issues such as moving as a community, and selection of sites and fields. In several instances, such as at Akosombo and Kainji, people were offered the option of being resettled by the authorities on a project housing area, or taking cash compensation, and settling elsewhere by themselves. In both cases, people chose to be resettled by the project into scheme housing.

This does not necessarily mean that they were satisfied that scheme settlement would be a positive option - rather that it would be the least worst option, as the logistics of people self-settling as communities provided all sorts of problems.

Relocation itself was held to be successful where basic housing structures and services were in place when people arrived, where there was little if any resistance to the move, and where people had been assisted in the move through project transport and officials. Kainji and Nangbeto would count as successful instances of relocation, with housing not always having been ready in other cases, such as Manantali and Kom Ombo.

Compensation has been successful where it has provided resettlers with options, such as the choice between self-settlement or scheme housing, (e.g. Kainji) or the division of the compensation for housing into two parts : a core house, and a cash component, to enable people to improve their houses as they chose to (e.g. Kom Ombo and Nangbeto). In this regard, the range of options which is being prepared for relocation in Phase 1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, is particularly encouraging.

One would need to take a fairly sanguine view of what constituted successful resettlement in relation to compensation for land, and say that where people actually received land, it was successful. People have received varying amounts of land, of varying quality in the new areas, and in some cases waited a number of years for it, or had to clear it themselves. An aspect of land compensation which is problematic in relation to criteria for success, is that the allocation of land has in a number of cases led to differentiation, such as between Nubians and Arabs at Aswan, or between men and women (as at Aswan, Kariba, Manantali and Akasombo), or between settlers and hosts, who have not always received compensation for the land they had to make available to the scheme.

If we are to regard it as imperative to our definition of resettlement as successful that it includes a long-term development component, most schemes would not qualify, as they simply did not have such a development component (e.g. Manantali and Nangbeto). Schemes which attempted to provide such a component through mechanisation (Akasombo) and Aswan (irrigation) fell foul of the financial and managerial complications, although things do seem to have improved at Aswan in more recent years as more reclaimed land has become available and as irrigation complications seem to have sorted themselves out.

To a significant extent, planners have - for reasons of shortages of staff, time and money, as much as of an inadequately short-term view of the resettlement process - tended to reduce resettlement to relocation.

What longer-term developmental successes have occurred, seem to relate to ways in which resettlers have been able to diversify their income by capitalising on opportunities provided by the scheme, such as fishing, draw down cultivation and grazing and the use of the dam to facilitate irrigation (as at Kainji), or the combination of off-scheme and on-scheme sources of income.

Schemes in Africa have not been successful in terms of achieving greater equity and improving the position of marginalised and vulnerable groups. As suggested above, they have made for greater differentiation, and where service provision has started to unravel, (as in Nangbeto, where access to water has become very problematic and women have to walk very long distances to fetch water - World Bank 1998:14), the poor and marginalised are perhaps worse-off than before. It is the wealthy who are able to use mopeds (as in Nangbeto) or cattle-sleds to fetch water, or to use petrol-driven pumps to irrigate their gardens (as in Kainji).

While resettlers have been able to use their own initiative to diversify and increase their income, they are not able to do so in the same way for the provision of basic services, which requires significant financial and administrative input from the state or provincial government. Economic downturns have resulted in the deterioration of service provision (as at Akasambo, Kariba and Nangbeto). It is only in rare cases (such as at Kom Ombo and Kainji) that there has been the ability to maintain and even improve services - and this would seem to relate directly to administrative and financial capacity at government level, rather than at the level of the scheme itself.

While planners at Kpong made conscious efforts to learn from the mistakes of Akasombo, they were unable to achieve resettlement with development, as intended - for reasons beyond their control. 'Under stable and economic conditions, the known problems might have been corrected without delay' (World Bank 1993:v).

Whatever the post-relocation problems may be, a resettlement scheme cannot be regarded as successful if it has high emigration rates, as at Akasombo and Nangbeto. Taking long-term identification with the scheme area as our final criterion for success, it is Kom Ombo and Kainji that have come out best - for rather different reasons. At Kom Ombo, identification with the resettlement area as home relates to the ability of the scheme and regional administrations to provide improvements in irrigation, services and job opportunities, as well as the way in which the resettlement experience has led to the development of a positive sense of Nubian identity within Egypt.

At Kainji, identification with the resettlement area seems to relate more to the positive relocation experience, and the way it enabled the maintenance and recovery of community, together with the ability to capitalise on benefits offered by the dam, such as improved fishing, irrigation and access to the draw-down area.

Successful resettlement in the African context thus would seem to be fairly modestly defined as involving

- a degree of participation in the planning of resettlement
- having moved without use of force to areas which were prepared to receive the resettlers.
- the maintenance by the state of basic services
- the ability to survive economically in the new area - largely by one's own initiative
- identification with the new area, and resultant community formation.

Such a view of success does not necessarily mean that the resettlers are satisfied with their situation, and I will presently consider what would be the benchmarks for people under threat of relocation to be satisfied that their circumstances would improve after relocation, i.e. that relocation would not simply be displacement, but rather, resettlement with development.

One of the key institutional constraints confronting the attempt to achieve resettlement with development has been the role of the overall authority co-ordinating resettlement, and its relationship to central government funding and authority. At Akasombo and at Aswan, national level bodies were created for this purpose, in the form of the Volta River Authority (VRA) and the Aswan High Dam Ministry.

In the case of the VRA, it had a limited budget and capacity. Its brief in relation to resettlement was unclear. While the Ministry of Social Welfare had legal responsibility for the rehabilitation of displaced people, the VRA was effectively responsible for at least the initial management of resettlement towns, and landed up performing a lot of resettlement-related tasks outside of its brief (Diaw and Schmidt-Kallert 1990:88). It was thus financially and administratively overstretched, and did not have the time to recruit and train staff for all the resettlement tasks, with the result that 'the resettlement organisational machinery lacked unity of purpose and cohesion' (Kalitsi, in Chambers 1970:39). The VRA accordingly sought to get government departments to take over as many of the resettlement tasks as possible, leaving 'the administration of young and fragile settlements under an already overwhelmed and financially hungry establishment' (Obosu-Mensah 1996:56), with a predictable decline in services.

The resettlement at Kom Ombo did things in somewhat the opposite way : while the financing of the project was shared by several government departments, each with their own responsibility, overall co-ordination and responsibility was with the office of the Governor of Aswan Province. There was thus not the danger of tasks being delegated or overlooked by default, as each ministry retained its responsibilities. In the Kom Ombo case, the government also overcame the problem of overstretched and alienated staff by paying the recruited personnel significant salary increments (Fahim 1983:35). This latter strategy of co-ordination of ministry tasks through a central office seems the more effective way to go, and seems to have made for a more efficient delivery than in the case of Akasombo. The fact that the Aswan project was made an integral part of the Aswan Province's programme of economic development, meant greater government commitment to the project, with resulting greater availability of funds and therefore of recruited staff - which meant that the line ministries did not have to take on a huge new task with existing staff complements.

Whichever balance one strikes between a central co-ordinating authority and distribution of tasks to government ministries, a fundamental problem remains. This is that - except in cases such as Akasombo and Kpong, where there is a continuity of experience in the form of the Volta River Authority - the skills and experience gained on one project are not usually transferable to another. Each country's resettlement operation has to begin *de novo*, to build up experience by making the same predictable mistakes. The institutional context within which this learning process takes place, does not improve either. Almost by definition, countries that need large projects are short on the very things needed to make such projects work, such as staff, money, skills, and critically (as the lack of these resources results in the resettlement programme falling progressively behind the dam construction schedule), time. The result, as Chambers and his colleagues saw only too clearly at Akasombo, is a recipe for disaster.

We need to ask a serious question : is successful resettlement in a 'thirdworld' economic and political/administrative context, in principle likely to be highly improbable, if not impossible? And if the probability is for failure, what are international donors doing finding resettlement-inducing projects?

***Legal and regulatory instruments relating to resettlement*** appear to have had few beneficial results in terms of protecting the rights of the resettlers, other than with regard to the provision of compensation - which is itself dependant upon considerations such as legal provisions about private property and eminent domain.

A number of schemes in Africa took place before the first World Bank resettlement guidelines were formulated in 1980. Some international donors, such as USAID, had no resettlement guidelines at the time it funded the Manantali project (Horowitz 1991:166). While some schemes have been partly funded by the World Bank after 1980 and thus have theoretically been subject to its guidelines, these have not always been implemented. In the case of Nangbeto, 'Bank performance lacked follow through and CEB [the implementing agency] did not heed many of the recommendations of several resettlement specialists who visited the project. Bank financing for the project was approved despite the lack of a resettlement plan ..... The Bank utterly failed to follow up to see if any of its recommendations or agreements were implemented once the relocation was implemented' (World Bank 1998:19). The Lesotho Highlands Water Project is also World Bank funded, and its guidelines and the recommendations of its monitoring Panel of Experts seem to be accorded more respect than in the Nangbeto case. This would seem to be the result of a hard-working and authoritative panel that, between its members, visits the project several times a year, and pushes its recommendations report after report until they are taken account of.

In schemes that took place before World Bank guidelines, legal frameworks tended to uphold the interests of the state, rather than of the resettlers. Thus, with Akasombo, the Ghanaian State Lands Act of 1962 and subsequent amendments provide for the acquisition of land in the national interest, and the Volta River Development Act of 1961 gives the Volta River Authority the power to administer lands affected by, and adjacent to, the dam (World Bank 1993:12). The state does not appear under any obligation to demonstrate public purpose. Similarly at New Halfa, the state did not see the necessity of paying compensation to Arab pastoralists who lost grazing land to the dam, as their lands were not registered. (Salem-Murdock 1989:60), and by implication, state property.

This relates to the problem that *customary rights and access to common property resources* have generally not been valued or compensated for in the planning of resettlement. One of the few exceptions seems to be the compensation for the loss of trees at Nangbeto (World Bank 1998:9) at Manantali (Grimm 1991:294), at Kainji (Roder 1994:125), and at Lesotho (LHWP, PoE Report, June 1996:1). People have also been compensated for production lost from fields affected by the dam. While people have been compensated for available lands which they held under customary tenure, such compensation seems to have been made on principle, rather than in terms of recognising people's rights to particular pieces of land which were of a particular size. At Nangbeto, people were allowed to clear new land, depending on availability, while at Manantali, people were compensated with fields of .8ha in size, regardless of the size of their previous holdings. People in downstream situations do not seem to have been compensated for the way in which dams have negatively influenced their access to the annual flooding patterns of the rivers, and the subsequent affect on their cultivation patterns.

What *social and cultural empowerment of resettled people* has been achieved in the resettlement process would seem to relate in significant measure to the nature of the relocation experience, and to the way in which *integration into the regional political economy* has been achieved.

Kainji is one of the more positive examples of relocation. People were consulted, and listened to, in the planning of resettlement (as with the change in compensation policy from cash and self-settling, to scheme-provided housing); they were moved as communities; they were given outright ownership of their new compounds, and allowed to modify them as they wished. Community-enhancing structures, such as markets, mosques and water points, were built in many villages. Today 'a majority of people have adjusted well and remain in the resettlement houses. Most compounds have been extensively modified ..... a new generation is growing up, for whom the lake is the only environment they know and love'. (Ayeni et al 1992:112)

Kom Ombo is a case of social and cultural empowerment developing from integration into the wider political economy, rather than through a positive relocation experience. This integration has resulted from two principle sources. The increase in schools resulting from the new settlement has enabled Nubians to obtain higher paying jobs, both at the scheme and Aswan City, as well as further afield. This has led to improved mobility. The other major source of integration has been as a result of the way Nubian identity has coalesced and taken on an enhanced status within the rest of Egypt, and how that change has in large measure developed out of the resettlement experience. While arising out of the scheme, this has been an unanticipated consequence.

The process of dam construction and resettlement of itself provides the impetus for integration into wider structures, as it pulls people out of the potential isolation of small pre-settlement villages into newer, larger and more diverse social and administrative structures and marketing networks. The provision of improved roads and education provide people with additional means and incentives to move outward, into wider circles and exchanges. Whether such wider contact leads to an advance in integration depends on the economic and administrative viability of resettlement areas and their hinterlands. Where agriculture and services are in a poor state, as at Akasombo and Nangbeto, and where there is no real reason for identification with the new resettlement area, as there is at Kainji and at Kom Ombo, the result is emigration and a haemorrhaging of resettlement areas, rather than effective integration.

The African resettlement experience has had only rather limited success, and certain steps seem necessary if we are to ***ensure the sustainability and consolidation of the gains made in the resettlement process***, for both existing as well as future schemes. These may be presented fairly schematically, as follows:

- Build in the participation of resettlers and other project-affected people into the entire project cycle
- Do not initiate administrative, economic or technological processes that are costly and cumbersome and
  - which run the risk of being unsustainable
- Promote factors that enhance the liveability of resettlement areas, and keep people living in them. These include :
  - planning settlements so as to allow for growth
  - provision and maintenance of services
  - generation of local income opportunities by providing affected people with privileged access to benefits deriving from the scheme, and by allowing them to pursue off-scheme income-generating activities while keeping their rights to resources on the scheme
  - promotion of local marketing opportunities by improved roads and transport facilities
  - granting people in the area firm land rights, so as to lessen the opportunity of conflict and to encourage security and investment in the land
- promotion of improved relations between hosts and resettlers, by ensuring that they participate in, and
  - benefit from, the scheme on an equitable basis
  - seeking to improve the socio-economic position of the marginalised sections of the community, who are usually hardest hit by resettlement
- Monitor schemes on an ongoing basis with regard to the above factors, and seek to develop organisational structures that are flexible enough to be able to respond to such monitoring.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether relocation and development should be implemented separately, or as a joint venture. Roder (1994:138-139) argues that the successful resettlement (i.e. relocation) at Kainji 'was a low key effort which aimed at returning to the population what they had lost, without making this an opportunity of imposing far-reaching development changes at an already stressful time ..... [and that] this simple policy has shown itself to be far the best'. This means that 'Resettlement and development are thus separate activities' (Ayeni et al 1992: 117) Scudder (1997) and Cernea (1996) would argue strongly in the opposite direction, that resettlement is a potentially impoverishing process, in which 'returning the population to what they had lost' without any active development component, can only leave them worse off than before. Resettlement as development is thus the only possible kind of successful resettlement. I would suggest that there is a danger that Roder's position could end up strengthening the view that has been so problematic on African schemes, i.e. that resettlement can effectively be reduced to relocation - thus relieving governments and agencies of any further responsibility. The African experience demonstrates very clearly that relocation is not enough, that a development component is an essential ingredient, if people are not to be left socially and economically worse off. Kainji is perhaps fortunate in that very little agricultural land was lost to the dam, and that resettlers have been able to re-establish themselves economically by their own initiative, utilising the lake for irrigation, and the draw-down area for grazing, and that they have been able to find markets for their produce. Not all resettlement schemes in Africa have been as fortunate.

If *reparation is to be achieved*, we thus need

- Resettlement as development opportunity
- Sufficient time for the whole planning and implementation process. Otherwise, as with Akasombo, the rushed resettlement programme will be disastrous, with development effectively being sidelined in the interests of relocation, and with the kind of long-term impoverishment and unravelling that both Cernea and Scudder warn of
- Compensation must be fairly negotiated and be paid in full and upfront - except where e.g. annuities are the preferred option. Both fields and houses must be ready before people have to move, so that they can get on with the business of settling in and making a living.
- Allowance should be made for affected people to have a diversity of income sources, including both on - and off scheme sources.

### **Better Policy**

People who are to be moved to make way for a dam, are usually made all sorts of promises as to what they will be given in the post-resettlement situation, in order to get them to move without resistance or other complications. These promises often come to very little in practice. What would be necessary by way of benchmarks, for such 'to be displaced' people to be satisfied that their position would indeed improve after the move? Such potential benchmarks would seem to relate to two interrelated factors : *resources and rights*.

Resettlement usually deprives people of rights. What sorts of rights would need to be operative to guarantee that resettlers would in fact be better off after the move?

People cannot be better off in a new situation which involves all the potential socio-economic risks that resettlement does, unless they have been directly involved in the negotiation of the terms of their own resettlement, and unless their voice has carried weight in those negotiations. This has not usually happened in the past because resettlers have not been able to make their voice heard, either because they have not had the resources, knowledge and contacts to do so, or because they have not been recognised as having the relevant rights before the courts of the land. The state has evoked arguments about eminent domain and public purpose, and the resettlers have not had any effective legal comeback - least of all when the state has resorted to force to get them to move. How is such negotiation to be secured?

1. What is needed is for those under threat of displacement to be able to assert their constitutional and basic human rights, and for the state and implementing agencies to be held to the recognition of those rights. Such basic rights would include the rights to : protection from violence or arbitrary detention; not to be summarily displaced or dispossessed of one's place of habitation, property or access to common property without due recourse to law; and to be fairly compensated for any losses incurred as a result of resettlement. Without a legal framework that upheld such rights, and provided mechanisms for appeal and redress, there could be no real negotiation, as the state would not be under any constraint to negotiate, to show why resettlement was in fact necessary for 'public purposes' (and indeed to defend its definition of public purpose), or to compensate resettlers fairly for their losses. A regulatory framework is thus necessary which obliges the state and implementing agencies to negotiate the terms of resettlement with affected people who have enforceable rights.

2. Resettlers would need to have the rights to ensure that the terms of resettlement as negotiated, are fulfilled, that the state and implementing agencies are contractually bound to deliver the compensation, land, housing and services negotiated, and to continue to maintain such services.

3. Resettlers would need to be able to ensure that the criteria and guidelines laid down for relocation and for the longer-term development goals related to resettlement, are followed, and that relevant bodies are held accountable for this. The realisation of these three conditions requires that

- Fully valid and binding legal contracts are signed between the various groups of affected people and the governmental and implementation agencies involved. Such contracts should stipulate details concerning the move, compensation, right to legal recourse, and mechanisms for obtaining redress, etc.
- Such contracts are enforceable if all parties are to be held accountable.
- One of the major problems that needs to be overcome in this regard is that the state - as the ultimate initiator and
- implementor of resettlement, and as the source of the laws that the courts must ultimately uphold - is effectively both player and referee when it comes to disputes around the rights of resettlers and the non-fulfilment of the state's contractual undertakings towards them.

With national states often not respecting the basic human rights of people which it seeks to displace, and not bothering to enter into meaningful negotiations with them, independent monitoring mechanisms need to be set up to ensure that resettler's rights are built into the legal and administrative frameworks regulating interaction between the state, project implementors and PAPs, and that those rights are upheld. Such mechanisms need to have teeth to be effective, but it is unclear as to where those teeth should best be located.

Those areas of international law that relate to displacement, such as refugees, do not apply in any binding way to development-induced displacement. Specific norms about internally displaced people exclude PAPs. (Barutciski 1999:1)

While they may be impressive on paper, the resettlement guidelines drafted by international funding agencies (e.g. African Development Bank 1995; OECD 1992; World Bank 1990; 1997a,b,c) have been problematic with regard to their consistent application. It was mentioned earlier how the World Bank had not exercised its monitoring responsibilities efficiently at Nangbeto, and it has withdrawn from problematic schemes such as Narmada, leaving them without effective international monitoring. The World Bank has recently established an Inspection Panel, inter alia to provide PAPs with a forum where they can lodge complaints and exert pressure for the honouring of agreements. Yet, even in this situation, some observers detect an 'apparent desire on the part of the Board of Executive Directors to limit the activities of the Panel' (Barutciski 1999:3).

Ideally, monitoring mechanisms should represent a range of interests - and it would make sense for groupings such as the World Bank and NGOs to work together. However, there is a history of international donors and NGOs (many of which are vehemently against dams) being at loggerheads, as in India, with Narmada.

NGOs have achieved a measure of success in holding states and project implementors accountable in countries where there is a strong NGO movement, as in Brazil (with Movimento de Atingidos) and in India (with Narmada Bashao Andolan). However, the situation in Africa is rather different, in as much as there does not appear to be a tradition of civically-minded NGOs having aligned themselves behind the rights and interests of people threatened with dam-induced displacement.

Frameworks regulating the interaction of various interest groups and ensuring accountability on the part of those parties that presume to impose their will and their dams on others, are clearly necessary. How to ensure that they are upheld is the problem. As suggested below in the context of gender and of equity issues, effective monitoring bodies seem the only way to go. This requires the establishment of legally constituted monitoring bodies which represent all interested parties, as well as outside observers, and which have both the rights and the resources to initiate legal proceedings against parties violating the terms of the regulatory framework. The donors could insist that the establishment of such bodies be a precondition for funding and could also create (as part of their funding package) a contingency fund to be available if it should become necessary to institute legal proceedings relating to the violation of the regulatory framework.

To be persuaded that they will be better off for resettlement, people also need to feel happy that they will have not only have rights but also resources in the new situation. For this to be the case they will have had to have negotiated compensation packages which will not only be concerned with replacement of lost assets, but be actively developmentally orientated, designed to create new options and new sources of income in the post-resettlement context. This would require a compensation package that actively supports a diversification of income-generating activities.

The **basic elements of economic development and social opportunity** necessary to ensure sustainable livelihoods and improved living standards, would seem to relate to the items discussed under ‘Sustainable Outcomes’ in the discussion of successful resettlement in the Introduction to this report. These relate to resettlers being better off in terms of

- income levels, as well as diversity of sources of income
- control and authority over productive activities
- property rights and security of tenure
- access to services and infrastructure, also reflected in better health indices
- greater equity among PAPs, with particularly marginalised groups being less marginalised than before resettlement
- institutional capacity
- administrative-political autonomy of the resettlement area
- integration into regional administrative and economic structures
- development of a viable identity in the new local and regional situation

These factors are all interrelated, reinforcing each other, and I suggest that they may also serve as the basis for a framework for the assessment of the social impact of dams.

Issues of *participation, of gender and of equity* are interrelated, as the inclusiveness or exclusiveness with which people are recruited to bodies that represent PAPs, will influence the dynamics of differentiation in the post-resettlement situation. By excluding marginalised categories from such bodies, one marginalises them even further. By incorporating them in a genuine fashion one can uplift them. Participation and greater equity can be enhanced by systematically building them into every phase and structure of the resettlement process. This could be a conditionality for donor funding, and in this way ensure that such incorporation works its way through the system, to each decision-making and implementation structure. One way of benchmarking these concerns would be to monitor all the structures in the project cycle continuously, watching not only the more statistical aspects, such as how many representatives, how many women or e.g. labour tenants are involved in structures, but what the nature of their involvement and participation is, whether they do in fact speak out and to what extent what they say actually influences the outcome of proceedings. A key question would relate to how such monitoring committees would be composed. It seems logical to have these committees as representative as possible of all the stakeholders in the project cycle, from planners to PAPs - as well as to bring in outsiders, in the form of government officials not involved in the project, and members of NGOs. Monitoring itself should thus be an inclusive and empowering process, compelling the various parties to work together.

These structures of participation and monitoring also relate to *accountability*, as they are the fora at which various stakeholders are held accountable. For this to be the case, these bodies must be effective, and their terms of reference and their authority, together with the system of appeal and arbitration in the event of dispute, must be clearly spelt out and legally recognised.

It is through participation in such decision-making and monitoring structures that *the interests of vulnerable groups* such as women (and through them, children), indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and the landless would seem to be best protected in the project/resettlement process. A further, important way in which their interests may be upheld, is through those interests systematically being built into the manner which compensation is decided upon and implemented. Again, this seems most likely to be achieved through their having a voice on the participatory and monitoring bodies. It is only the democratisation of the project process - starting with the initial decision as to whether to build a dam in the first place - that will result in the position of the poor and the marginalised not being even further peripheralised by the interests of the powerful and by the rising waters of the dam. Such democratisation is never going to be easy to achieve, but the provision of a representative system of structures is a necessary starting point.

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