Panel 3A:
Large Dams, Food Security and Livelihoods: Understanding Benefits and Impacts

Dr. Munther Haddadin
Former Minister of Irrigation, Jordan & Former President, Jordan Valley Authority
The Socio-Economic Role of the King Talal Dam in the Kingdom of Jordan

The Jordan River Basin straddles Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Palestine. Yarmouk, the largest tributary of Jordan River, drains through Syria, Jordan and Israel. Integrated plans for the development of the Basin go back as far back as the early 50s. Due to the political differences of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation in the region, the plan never saw the light of day. In the wake of the 1967 war, Jordan proceeded with its own staged plan for economic reconstruction and decided to focus on the Basin. The objective of this plan was to increase irrigable area in the Basin. This was achieved through two measures: improvements in conveyance and distribution efficiency, and developing hydrostorage on the Yarmouk. The King Talal dam, on the Zarqa, with a storage capacity of 56 MCM was completed in 1977 (and raised in 1984) to provide required additional water in the dry months.

Prior to the project the Yarmouk non-regulated flow sustained 10 500 hectares of irrigated development. Expansion of the irrigated area allowed the addition of a command area of 6 000 hectares, which was used to settle 6 000 families. The Jordan Valley Authority applied the Land Distribution Provisions of the 1977 Law, which resulted in the equitable redistribution of farmland, with small landholders expanding their holdings and landless farmers gaining land. Social infrastructure components like schools, rural hospitals, domestic water, electricity, agricultural credit institutions, were completed in the Jordan valley villages in tandem with the dam construction. With the boom in agricultural economy, by 1983, the average per capita income in Jordan valley rose to the national income, women had better access to education, life expectancy had improved and the rural-urban trend was reversed. The role of KTD was crucial for the sustenance of existing agriculture, north of Zarqua, at a point in time when Syrian use in the upstream led to a reduction in the flow.

The problems that Jordan faced, which are limited land, limited water supplies, and migration of refugees, were considerable. The success of the project is attributable not to technical policies but to the redistribution of land that occurred under legislation. The moral basis for the legislations was that public investment was undertaken to make non-productive land productive. As a consequence of this investment Jordanian society laid claim to the land and used this claim to further social equity. The law called for existing landowners who were to receive the benefits of public, to irrigate a portion of their land to the state. The land was then redistributed to the landless, serving not only to stem migration to urban centres, but to actually reverse these flows. These flows were maintained by legislation prohibiting the sale of land receiving public benefits, except to the state at predetermined and below market values. Land obtained in this manner by the government was then reassigned to new settlers. Complementary investments in social infrastructure provided further incentives to those resettled in order to maintain their rural existence.

However in the ensuing years the political turmoil in the region characterised by the civil war in Lebanon and later, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, curbed the marketing opportunities for Jordanian agricultural produce. The agricultural economy suffered a depression and many farmers faced indebtedness to credit institutions.

Ms. Adrian Adams
Federation of Organised Peasant Farmers of Bakel, Senegal
A Grassroots View of the Senegal River Development Agencies: Inter-State Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Valley, Authority for the Development of the Delta and the Senegal River Valley

This submission focuses on the social impacts of large dams, specifically the Manantali Dam on the Senegal River in Mali and the secondary dam at Diama. The dam was constructed under the aegis of the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal (OMVS). The projects had three aims: irrigation, navigation, and energy. The main problems discussed in the paper had to do with loss of fertile agricultural land, lack of information, and broken promises by the Government.

When Diama was completed in 1986 and Manantali in 1988, it was during a period when irrigated farming encountered difficulties such as massive unpaid debts. Hence, even though there was a need to supply an artificial flood to ensure food security, OMVS did not help to make that happen. Only after the research of outside organisations like the Institute of Development Anthropology did the issue of artificial flooding return to the government agenda.

Ms Adams presented "personal experience of this situation, from the underside" while expressing the view that river authorities will not change their attitudes and therefore communities must act for themselves. Local irrigation initiatives in the Senegal valley have been faced with the larger development context where the regional development authorities have imposed an organizing framework to use the waters of the River Senegal from Manantali dam. She described the pressures to conform to the development model and the problems that ensued for indebted farmers. Even efforts to organise public consultations and propose alternatives were undermined by the regional authorities.

Flood recession agriculture along the river was destroyed by water storage upstream. OMVS failed to produce the promised artificial flood even though studies showed that releases would support livelihoods and the environment. In Senegal there are no institutional channels to make local voices heard. FPOP would not survive without support from NGOS internationally. Change can not be transacted from the outside. The local people are peasants at heart and hope for change - in doing so they challenge the current trend. Such people throughout the world should regain control of their own destinies.

Mr. Abdel Kader Bangoura
Ministry of Energy & Environment, Guinée
Management of the Water Resources of Guinée and of the Garafiri dam

(speaker did not present his paper)

This paper outlines the water resource management of Guinea - a country rich in water resources and potential hydroelectric capacity (61 000 MW). Guinea's Hydraulic Development Plan was written over twenty years ago, however it was updated in 1983. These plans include an inventory of all water surface resources (including precipitation, evaporation and flow rate information), their potential value and technical options available to develop the resource. Implementation of these plans is discussed; including the role Guinea plays in regional water resource management initiatives.

The most significant water management programme the government of Guinea has performed recently is the construction of the Garafiri Dam. The main benefits delivered by the dam include better flood control and increased flow downstream in the dry season. Mitigation of impacts has been included in an action plan. Already implemented in the plan are a long-term collaborative monitoring of the environment and socio-economic measures of building of wells, schools and medical centres.

Commissioners' question time

Commissioner Moore:
Can you please comment on the current situation at Manantali? Is the World Bank considering funding an addition to the project?

Ms. Adams:
The planned Manantali energy project pushes agriculture into the background, in favour of supplying energy to Bamako, Nouackchott and Dakar. The World Bank has promised releases, but past experience shows this may not happen. A study will be undertaken in 2000, including the establishment and identification of water user rights, and the turbines will be installed in 2001 with responsibility for generation given for 15 years to a private company. There seems little opportunity at that point to make representations for flood releases to a private company.

Commissioner Scudder:
The Senegal River is one of two sites in Africa where releases are shown to be economically viable. What internal changes in institutional structure would be needed to adopt these strategies, and in what order?

Ms Adams:
The control of development activity should no longer be entrusted by default to SAED, but to an overarching authority - this role should be played by CAB (Commissariat de l'AprŠs Barrage). But seen from the grassroots, we do not see the CAB in the field, and we only see SAED hold sway. A second change - in spite of decentralisation there has been no local democratisation. Decentralisation has simply tightened its role in local affairs and rewarded local bosses. For a genuine village level planning process, we need to escape from this vicious circle and get people to judge what would be best for them. It would be extremely useful to try to get people to discuss land use and environmental pressures and what balance would be good between recession and irrigation agriculture. Village level representation is currently excluded from the decentralisation process.

Commissioner Patkar:
Does decentralisation include giving of rights of resources compared to eminent domain. Can they grant the communities participation?

Ms. Adams:
Villagers can continue to believe that they have rights in their "terroir" (customary lands used by each village). This is true as long as no one else has a claim, however these rights disappear when the national interest arises. It is felt that traditional terroirs cannot serve as the basis for something modern and productive.

Commissioner Veltrop:
The Jordan River is the only water supply for Jordan - what is the balance of water use throughout the country? Especially in the eastern part that depends on groundwater?

Dr. Haddadin:
The river is the primary source of supply for Jordan. Thanks to development efforts started by Jordan and Israel, these transformed the river into a drain. Upper Jordan has also been used by Israel so there is no reliable supply to the lower Jordan. 70% of agricultural produce comes from the Jordan valley. All in all, the western part is the part with rain and Jordan Valley is supplied by tributaries. In the east, there is dry steppe and dependence on limited groundwater. We committed the mistake of transporting water from the east to urban centres, ie people follow the water away from rural areas. We did not perfect this technique, but we have learned the lesson. The east is still dry and the wet west is more developed. I hope you can visit one of these days...and see the transformation.

Commissioner Henderson:
One issue for the Commission is the distribution of benefits such as the one you describe, it appears from the indices that the distribution has been more equitable than in other projects - are there any sections that have not gained? What were the policies that allowed this to occur?

Chair:
Yes, it seems that King Talal Dam is a success - to what do you attribute this success?

Dr. Haddadin:
I did not tell you about the negative impacts - no, it is not all success. As a dam per se it is a big success - there are no fisheries or transportation in the river and there is no other use for the water except agriculture. The dam drains the most populated area in Jordan that has a population of 4.7 million of which 2.5 million live in the catchment of the river - waste water and pollutants are generated, as well as agricultural pollution. The most important factor is the transformation due to the influx of people (we get into politics here) - the displacement of Palestinians to allow the establishment of Israel led many people to live around Amman etc. The biggest impact is on water use from reservoirs - springs drying up, and the orchards dying. But the orchards are now urbanised due to city expansion. The freshwater in the dam has now been replaced with treated waste water. The dam is a blend of flood and waste water - the blend makes it usable. 25% waste water and 75% fresh - this blend is adequate for unrestricted irrigation.

The more basic question is that in 1959 socialism was in vogue (in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq) and for land ownership issues we are not perfect. All people are equal, but some are more equal than others. Land was limited, water more limited. So overall, the resources are extremely limited. Land and water use was legislated and it has not changed since 1959.

This legislation differed from land reform as the moral force behind the legislation is the public drive to make unproductive land productive. Because of government investment, society laid a claim for social equity measures. By law, if you own land in the command area prior to development, up to 4 ha (10 acres) you get to keep it all. If you own up to 10 ha, you get the 4 ha then you get 25% of the difference, if you have 200 ha you get 6 ha + 17% of difference etc. This land was redistributed to benefit a maximum number of people. The law was amended in 1977 and prohibited the sale of that land. You cannot sell except to the government and the Jordan Valley Authority redistributes it at a fixed price.

Summary Of Panel 3a:

Discussion focussed on:

• The legislated redistribution of land, according to a pre-determined government system that favoured the resettlees, contributed significantly in furthering social equity in some dam building countries.



• Decentralisation of decision-making , despite its initial good intentions, has simply resulted in rewarding local bosses while still overlooking the interests of the people affected. Village level representation has to be included in the decentralisation process.



• It is imperative that communities defend their right to be heard and ensure that they receive adequate compensation if they have to resettle elsewhere.