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Panel 3: Large Dams and Indigenous/Traditional peopleAbstracts of submissions -
Indian communities and power utilities in the Brazilian Amazon –
Eletronorte’s experience Over the last decades, the Brazilian government’s style of dealing with social issues has undergone noticeable transformations. These changes may be directly related to various awareness-raising movements and to society’s own assertions of the importance of respecting the fundamental rights of people. In this sense, the enormous social transformations brought about by the ventures of large state companies in Indian lands have also served to increase awareness within significant segments of society. The first consequence has been a compulsory change in the entrepreneurs’ attitudes – being also the only legal way of making such endeavors feasible. If we focus our attention on unique and specific Indian societies – both in terms of the ethnic and cultural differentiation and of the legal protection assured by the Constitution – we’ll see that these have received a special treatment from the power utilities. Among the major power utilities, Eletronorte innovated and sought new policies coherent with the degree of intervention of the six major public works that affected Indian lands. Eletronorte’s area of influence must also be mentioned – Legal Amazonia, comprising the states of Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá, Maranhão, Acre, Rondônia, Mato Grosso, and Tocantins. In this region – home to most of Brazil’s Indian groups – any major enterprise to generate or transmit energy will very likely affect various Indian communities. In a partnership with FUNAI (the National Foundation for the Indians), Eletronorte has been promoting direct accords with Indian communities. By seeking joint solutions for the problems created by major public works, it assures the right of these groups over their lands and creates conditions for them to preserve their culture. From this perspective, the Indian communities are no longer seen as an obstacle to be removed but rather as participants in their social results. Some outsatnding examples of this new posture were the assuaging measures proposed by Eletronorte to FUNAI to reduce the impacts of the reservoir of the Balbina hydroelectric plant. These measures resulted in the implementation of the Waimiri Atroari Program, a set of actions aimed at creating conditions for the Waimiri Atroari Indian to overcome the difficulties of relationship with the Brazilian society and to reduce the impacts of economic endeavors that intrude upon their traditional territory. The Program, financed by Eletronorte, has been active for more than 10 years and has managed to deter the process of population extinction that seemed irreversible. This pernicious trend was reverted and today the Waimiri Atroari community boasts a population growth rate of approximately 7% per year. The lands of the Waimiri Atroari were delimited and regulated. This allowed the Indian community to return to cultural practices that had fallen into disuse at the time of the Program’s inception. It was, therefore, an important contribution to redeem the dignity of a people that had been lost during its prolonged contact with segments of the Brazilian society. Health, educational and environmental protection subprograms were also instituted, providing the Waimiri Atroari Indians with the best perceived standard of life in Brazil. As in Balbina, a partnership between Eletronorte and FUNAI at the Tucuruí hydroelectric plant launched a similar program for the Parakanã Indian community, whose lands were also affected by that plant’s reservoir. This Program follows the same policies as the Waimiri Atroari’s: it aims to confer economic independence to the Parakanã community at the end of a 25-year period, with the preservation of their cultural values. Like most Indian groups in the Amazon region (especially those located in the state of Pará) the Parakanã Indian community’s situation was calamitous prior to the 1988 Program: its frightening death rate alone was leading the ethnic group to extinction. In its 10 years of existence, the Parakanã Program launched coordinated health, education and environmental protection initiatives that have reversed the situation. The population growth rate is now 6.5% per year, enough to allow the cultural recovery of the group and to provide them with new perspectives to life. In those cases in which transmission lines cross Indian lands, indemnificatory and support initiatives have also been implemented, giving the affected Indian communities conditions to advance their productive processes, regularize their lands and mitigate adversary impacts. The work to interlink Brazil and Venezuela’s electric systems has also given rise to an ongoing project in the north of Roraima, an Eletronorte/FUNAI partnership to offer indemnification for and mitigate the interference upon the São Marcos Indian community. This program, among other things, intends to recoup the land that is being lost by the Macuxi, Wapixana and Taurepang Indians. By means of direct negotiations and cultural enhancement processes, Eletronorte has been enabling the Indians to regularize their lands and, consequently, to redeem their dignity. Eletronorte is proud of its pioneering relationship with Indian communities, an approach that has not only saved from ongoing extermination the Indian groups inhabiting the impacted areas, but also provided them with a standard of life that had never before been attained by Indian communities. Socio-cultural rights and ethnic diversity of the indigenous and quilombos
people The construction of dams has demonstrated Brazil's lack of respect for the rights of traditional populations that have lived for hundreds of years in river basins that contributed to maintaining them alive and to maintain the quality of drinking water supplies, as well. Despite that fact, we are aware that the Brazilian Electric Sector Plan sees construction of 494 hydroelectric dams by the year 2015 (cf. Plano Energético da Eletrobrás), failing to consider the socio cultural and ethnic diversity of populations, as well as the importance of our rivers for the continuity of life. It is important to stress that, in practice, the construction of dams is based on studies (EIA/RIMAs) carried out in isolation without looking at the socio-environmental and cultural impacts within the complex of a river as a whole, and as river basins. Such studies demonstrate the feasibility of a project and its economic advantages, also emphasizing its multiple uses for flood control, industrial waterway, tourism, etc. However, they ignore the awful consequences caused by those dams already constructed, such as: poisoning of rivers e flooding forests and destroying fauna, death of fish, salinization of lands, proliferation of vectors of diseases, destruction of lake estuary complexes, expulsion of traditional communities from their lands, such as indigenous nations and communities of Quilombos. Who are the indigenous peoples and Quilombos and what legal protection do they have? After 500 years of resistance, entire indigenous nations are being decimated by projects which fail to take into account their culture and customs. These are descendents of the first inhabitants on Brazilian soil Currently, they are protected by the Federal Constitution, according to article 231, which recognizes the social and cultural organization and their rights to the lands which they occupy, and which in its third paragraph says: "The use of water resources, including for energy potential, and the exploration and mining of mineral wealth in indigenous lands can only be carried out with authorization of the National Congress hearing the affected communities, and assuring them participation in the results of the project in the form of a law." and according to article 232 recognizes them as legitimate parties in the defense of their rights and interests. During these nearly 500 years, other people brought by force from their own nation arrived here as slaves, and participated actively in the construction of the country, without the right to liberty or to live on their land with their customs. They did not enjoy the benefits of the Land law of 1850, but today they are resisting to ensure their right to land that has been theirs for many years, ever since Black people fled from slavery in search of liberty, forming the first free territories: Quilombos. Considering that the United Nations Declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination of December 20,1963 (General Assembly Resolution n.¼ 1904 (XVIII), solemnly affirms the need to rapidly eliminate racial discrimination in the world, in all its forms and manifestations, and to ensure the understanding and respect for the dignity of the human being in agreement with art. 1 of this Convention. The Federal Constitution recognizes article 68 of the ADCT, the right to Titling of the lands of Quilombos: "It is recognized that the descendents of Quilombo Communities have definitive property to those lands they have beenoccupying, and it is the responsibility of the State to issue them these land titles". Article 216, 5 of the Constitution confers on quilombos the status of being part of Brazil's cultural heritage. Indigenous People and Quilombolas affected by dams We present here examples of peoples who were affected by dams, some of them expelled from their traditional territory, losing their self-esteem, cast aside to depend on food handouts, living marginalized.
Quilombos and Indigenous Nations that are threatened by new dams * Indigenous Nations Currently, many other peoples are threatened by construction of new projects:
* Communities of Quilombos There is still no precise number as to how many Quilombo communities are threatened by dam construction. But we have some already identified who are defending their lands and seeking land titling:
This demonstrates that inherent and fundamental rights of these peoples, guaranteed by the Federal, state, municipal Constitutions, as well as international treaties. We demand respect for the Lives of these people and their right to land and we demand compliance with Brazilian law and with treaties ratified by Brazil. Signing this report:
The impact of hydro-eletric dams on indigenous people, chinantecos, otomies and
huicholes: a case study from Mexico Mexican experience with involuntary resettlement has been characterized by frequent failures and a shortage of successes. Construction of hydroelectric and irrigation dams have resulted in the dismantling of communities, leaving many unable to recover their original social and economic vitality. Years later, some remain overly dependent on federal government resources. The Sector gives a low priority to resettlement. CFE plans resettlement programs without benefit of explicit federal legislation or guidelines. Plans are based on insufficient data, make incomplete appraisals, involve nominal programming, and lack public participation. Few provisions are made to mitigate or prevent environmental problems associated with a new reservoirs which may threaten the viability of economic activities on their shores. CFE* has no special provisions concerning the impact of their projects on Indian populations or construction "boom towns." Sector social and economic planning is cursory, lacks methodological rigor and falls far short of acceptable standards. The basic nature of these problems is that CFE approaches resettlement as a construction, not a social and economic development problem. Highest priority is given to rebuilding of housing and infrastructure. Low priority is given to re-establishment of the dismantled productive base. CFE resettlement planning focuses on estimating property losses, locating potential resettlement sites and costs estimates. Indemnification funds due those being relocated are combined with a government contribution and then reallocated according to CFE priorities. The physical organization of the move is ad hoc with little or no attention paid to programming the social, economic and agronomic development. The absence of resettlement legislation and guidelines also places undue stress on relationships between CFE and other agencies which should assume post-construction responsibility for investments. CFE had limited control over the resettlement process which, in large part, depended on the actions of other organizations over which CFE had no authority. Relocation was carried out by the CFE construction coordinator, actually the social development office makes decisions on those issues. The sector did not required to monitor or evaluate the resettlement process, on this new experience monitoring and external evaluation was accepted. CFE neither encouraged nor made provisions for public participation in its power siting and resettlement. Displaced people were given few options and almost no power over decisions concerning their future. Nonetheless, public interests and opinion influences CFE actions. In the absence of institutionalized public participation, politicians, church leaders, newspaper columnists, social science researchers and intellectuals have assumed the role of spokesmen for those who are perceived to be harmed by CFE projects. Involuntary resettlement was unavoidable in the two hydroelectric projects: the Zimapan dam will indunated 2,291 hectares and required the involuntary resettlement of 5 communities with approximately 2,000 people part of which were Otomies indians. This included 306 hectares of highly productive horticultural land which yielded 2,970 tons per year with a market value 279,000 US in June 1986 and two to three crops of maize per year. The Aguamilpa dam required relocating less than 1000, half of whom were Huichol Indians and matched all Bank criteria for being tribal peoples (OMS 2.34). Thus far, no special provisions were established to assure the Indians will benefit from the dam. Past experiences of other institutions which have worked with Huichol Indians suggested that Indian resistance to projects and plans could place the project at risk. Property losses included 12,927 hectares of which 698 hectares were agricultural and 2536 hectares were grazing lands. Collateral losses included 224 houses, 4 schools, 2 km of roads, 3 temples (ririkies). At that time, I recommend the Bank seize the opportunity provided by the negotiations and encourage Mexico to improve its performance on resettlement, this was supported by the first consultant hired (Theodore E. Downing, 1987). As a short term tactic I suggested the Bank should push CFE in the desired direction by requesting (1) an improvement in its internal policies and procedures and (2) establishment of an inter-agency group of agreement to assure all agencies and the communities affected in the Zimapan and Aguamilpa projects, (3) complete the in-depth analysis of cultural, social, infrastructure and economic factors of the Aguamilpa and Zimapan projects, including an Indian component. Preferably, Mexico should establish and finance a multidisciplinary resettlement team. There are sufficient numbers of proposed CFE and SAGH hydroelectric and irrigation projects to justify this unit. Finally, it was recommended that the Bank encourage long term, routine cooperation between CFE and INAH, the agency responsable for avoiding irreparable damage to Mexico's renowned archaeological heritage. Application of this policy was especially necessary in a country which (1) had been plagued with previous resettlement difficulties, (2) had stressful inter-agency relationships with regard to this issue, (3) already recognized the need for such actions and (4) had articulated environmental and resettlement critics. Resettlement is socio-economic development and CFE is not a socio-economic development agency, to encourage this focus required significant internal reorganization and demanded substancial increase in specialized staff in resettled populations. An alternative was for CFE to second its resettlement work (planning, implementation, agricultural development, etc.) to another government ministry, state government, special purpose commission and grassroots organizations. In both cases CIESAS and the National Indian Institute were formally involved. CFE, INI and CIESAS sponsored 5 workshops on resettlement for members of the CFE resettlement team and those involved in planing, designing, construction, and legal departments and select participants from the local governments and communities in social participation and cultural analysis. CFE established policies and procedures to routinely incorporate archaeological surveys and salvage work into all phases of its planning process. This is because it represents one of the most sustained efforts to link applied anthropological field research on resettlement to international and national resettlement policy reforms. The core of the Mexico Hydroelectric Project consists of two large dams and reservoirs. The project also includes several major policy and institutional reforms in Mexico's national power company, the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE). The reforms are wide-ranging. TABLE.1 Selected Dam Projects with Resettlement in Mexico
* Under preparation Like many other countries, Mexico's experiences with resettlement have not been happy ones. Perhaps the best documentation comes from the Miguel Aleman and Cerro de Oro projects, which consists of two dams and reservoirs constructed on the Papaloapan River in the southeast part of the country. They were built by the Comisión del Papaloapan primarily to free rich agricultural land downstream from annual flooding. The two dams together displaced nearly 40,000 people, a majority of them Chinantee and Mazatec Indians. Analyses conducted by anthropologists during and after the relocation program revealed the severity of the social and economic decline of the resettles (Barabas and Bartolomé, 1973; Bartolomé, 1990). Proposed resettlement sites were several hundred kilometers away, located in dense tropical forests. With the typically poor soils and multiple crop diseases of tropical areas, resettlers’ farms soon degraded the land and productivity collapsed (Szekeley and Restrepo, 1988; Partridge, Brown, and Nugent, 1982; Bartolomé, 1990). Unrest caused by the mishandled resettlement spread throughout Indian Oaxaca: the army was called into the affected communities at least seven times to quell local protests. There is, of course, no single explanation for why resettlement planning in Ziimapán and Aguamilpa appears to be so much more substantial than resettlement planning for other hydroelectric projects in the same country. The first and perhaps most important lesson is the need to plan resettlement in the context of a resettlement policy framework. For the two hydroelectric projects, obtaining the land needed for the dams and reservoirs was only the first step of what has tumed into a very complicated planning process. Yet norms and standards for such exercises are largely lacking in national legislation: the difficulty not just of obtaining land but also of transferring ¡t to the affected population indicates that new concepts and mechanisms for planning resettleinent need to be introduced and systematized. Thus, a final lesson from this project is that resettlement researchers have much to contribute by focusing on the middle ground between theories and ground level effects on policies about resettlement on the one hand, and the other. All too often, the gap between the good intentions written into laws and guidelines is not bridged by the organizations and rnethodologies needed to carry them out. BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Bayano Hydroelectric Dam in Panama Construction of the Bayano Dam in Panama in the 1970s flooded more than 350 km2 of pristine and highly biodiverse tropical forest, and forced the relocation of 2,000 Kuna and 500 Embera indigenous people from their traditional territories. Because access roads to the dam site were constructed, the area was opened to colonization by outsiders. Although the World Bank provided most of the capital for the Bayano dam ($42 million), the Bank did nothing to guarantee that the affected indigenous peoples would be appropriately resettled or that their rights would be protected. Consultation and participatory decision making processes were woefully inadequate. The territories on which the Kuna and Embera were resettled were far less fertile and productive than the valuable ecosystems in which they lived prior to the creation of the reservoir. Environmental degradation since construction of the dam has further reduced the value of these lands. The Panamanian government has systematically violated both the agreements made with the affected indigenous people at the time of construction and those negotiated since that time. Among the violations are the failure by Panama to provide the Embera and Kuna with adequate compensation for their traditional territories and legal title to the new lands. Because the Embera and Kuna do not have legal title to their current territories, they have not been able to protect the area from invading colonizers. Though a bank and government project opened the region to colonizers, neither entity took action to prevent the entry of settlers. The colonizers destroyed the environment and ecosystems of the Embera and Kuna territories through activities such as uncontrolled deforestation, hunting, and other resource extraction. This, in turn, caused a notable decrease in biodiversity and productive capacity of the lands. The trend continues to date as outsiders continue to enter the Bayano region. The poorly executed forced relocation of the Kuna and Embera peoples has caused three decades of land disputes and violence in the Bayano river region. The disputes have led to deaths and injuries, and remain unresolved. The project damaged the region’s water resources. Submerged trees and vegetation caused eutrophication of the reservoir, impacting fish populations and making the water unsuitable for human use, while uncontrolled proliferation of aquatic vegetation spurred chemical spraying of the area. Disease vectors proliferated due to standing water. Three decades after the forced relocation, the Embera and Kuna of the Bayano region live a marginal existence in that they often lack adequate food, water, and income. Their quality of life is much reduced compared to that before construction of the dam. The survival of the culture and traditional life of the Kuna and Embera is threatened. Construction of the Bayano dam was proposed by USAID, financed by the World Bank, and executed by the government of Panama. Because the project was carried out without adequate prior social and environmental assessments, it caused grave environmental and social harm. The Bank, the government of Panama, and USAID share the responsibility for these problems, and all three should take action to insure that these are resolved in the near future. The Chixoy dam case Introduction and Summary of the Proposed Presentation The Chixoy hydro-electrical project was built during the military dictatorship in Guatemala and in the midst of a violent civil war fought between the army and armed opposition groups. A war that made about 200,000 victims among civilians between 1980 and 1984. The construction of the dam was heavily affected by the war, the "tierra arrasada" strategy, and the "forced resettlement" policy adopted by the military junta of Rios Montt in order to control guerrilla warfare in the country's inner areas by means of militarised "model villages". The presentation will allow to understand how the interaction between the interests of TNCs, public funds and military goals, with various roles and degrees of responsibility, has generated not only a ruthless exploitation of natural resources and the marginalisation of local communities, putting at risk the present means of self subsistence, but also their physical suppression. Thepresentation will also point out how an analysis of the impact of the Chixoy project on culture, socio-economic structures and health of the Maya Achì communities, along with environmental and territorial damages, has been severely omitted. As elsewhere in Guatemala, Rio Negro massacres aimed at depriving the ethnical and cultural groups of their mechanisms of continuity. The present problems of their subsistence economy will also be analyzed. Why is the Chixoy Project a relevant case? The case brings together a cross-cutting analysis ranging from indigenous resettlement and its impacts, to decision-making, legal and institutional framework issues. It could be also seen as a broader case about the political economy of the dams (as privatization issues and debts creation) and their over-all equity and distributional impacts. On other issues -such economy, environment, options assessment- it supplies a clear understanding of the financing and planning methods used twenty years ago by MDB and TNCs building companies, whose effects are still striking nowadays. Moreover, and above all, this case could allow to define and analyze another category of impacts: massive human rights violation, such as genocide, which occurred because of the building of large dams. There are too many facts, witnessing and documents, proving the link between violence and the aim of getting rid of the more reluctant Rio Negro inhabitants to allow the filling of the basin. Those actions that the army stated as "counter-insurgency measures" are not justified by the presence of guerrillas in the area, a presence that wasn’t very consistent before 1980, as confirmed by the recent report "Guatemala Nunca Mas" of the Archibishop of Guatemala. The logic of the government in the detection of new lands for compensations was not determined by the indigenous farmers’ needs but by security needs of counter-insurgency and the communities were resettled in the so-called "aldea modello". The clarifying process of the massacres was opened just on 1996. At last, in February 1999, the Commission de Esclarecimiento Historico (CEH) created under the UN auspices after the peace agreement of December 1996 to make clear the truth on massacres of Guatemalan people during the civil war, classified the violence in Rio Negro as genocide in compliance with art.11 of the Convention on Genocide. In this process of event reconstruction, the CEH has significantly included the forced resettlement among the voluntary causes of elimination of the Rio Negro community Unfortunately, after having restarted and strongly supported the compensation process since 1996, the World Bank mission in Guatemala is now oriented to consider this process as ended; experts very close to the World Bank think that nowadays almost all relocated communities have reached the level they had in 1976 or are almost about to reach it. The WCD could now play an important task in this respect: it could allow the opening of a dialogue between all Chixoy stakeholders in order to try to widen the framework of what was considered "damage" until today and develop other wider criteria. As regards to the Chixoy case new criteria will have to take into account not only the World Bank new policies on resettlement, indigenous people and EIAs, but also the violence suffered and the twenty years of forgotten suffering and deprivation. The cultural eradication of the group, its psychological instability deriving from a sense of uncertainty linked to resettlement and to the violences, the loss of food self-sufficiency and conflicts with neighboring communities, and last but not least the loss of traditional economies and working possibilities for about twenty years, should be taken into account when dealing with the Rio Negro and other neighboring communities compensation issues. Since resettlement and violence were linked, World Bank should continue to support the compensation process taking into account the compensation criteria listed by the CHE. INDE, the state energy company, took advantage of the violence that occurred to deny compensations to local people for their losses and did not fulfil the commitments undertaken with the international funding institution: the World Bank, the IDB, Italian bilateral aid and/or Italian export credit guarantees. After twenty years, it is now clear that corruption went hand in hand with the use of funds to finance military activities and, since 1996, INDE took part in the compensations only in a marginal way. About 8 to 12 million dollars were allocated for the compensation process, but only 3 were really used. Where did the money go? A survey should be carried out in this sense, by the funding institutions. A brief outline of the case: The Chixoy dam was built in the area were the Maya Achì indigenous group have lived for hundreds of years; the department of Alta and Baja Verapaz, a region which holds approximately 75,000 Achì speaking Maya people. The largest community living along the banks of the Rio Chixoy river, in what would later become the dam basin, was the Rio Negro, in the Rabinal department. Out of the 463 families officially recognised as affected by INDE in 1976, 150 were from Rio Negro. The basin was planned for 50 km along the river affecting around 3,445 people livings on the river's embankments in the Rabinal, Cubulco, S.Cristobal Verapaz and San Miguel Chicaj departments. Consultations between INDE and local indigenous peoples took place in a climate of terror and intimidation. The entire area felt the consequences of the civil war, then raging in the country. The intimidation campaign against the Maya Achì Indians began in 1980, following the community's refusal to move to the new settlements provided by INDE. Thus, prior to dam completion and the resettlement of local residents, between February and September 1982, the death squads and the army killed about 400 men, women and children from Rio Negro, during massive or individual massacres. The attacks were officially declared by the government as being counterinsurgency activities. Between September 1981 and August 1983, about 4/5 thousand people were killed in the Rabinal department. The filling of the basin began in January 1983 right after the final massacre. The resettlement village was one of the "model villages" that the Guatemalan army had built to control guerrilla movements. The economic situation of people in Pacux was worse than the previous one: land was bought only at a second’s notice and at least two thirds turned out to be unsuitable for farming. The issue of population growth was not taken into account: more than 170 families now live in Pacux, but there are only 150 houses and there is no land to build new ones. The arrival in Pacux didn’t put an end to the violence: this situation lasted many years. Pacux became a forced refuge for the victims of massacres made by the counter revolutionary strategy more than a project of national development. Widows and orphans are still predominant today, as a good evidence of that. In 1978 the World Bank took over. Its directives envisage the restoration of living standards and revenue generation capacities of displaced people, but this did not happen in the case of Chixoy. INDE did not acknowledge the heirs of those families completely killed during the massacres and that could not assert their rights. For twenty years the issue of compensations for the Chixoy resettled people was completely forgotten. Only in July 1996, in fact, after denunciations from Witness for Peace, did the World Bank carry out an on-site investigation which concluded that local people were never adequately compensated and urged the purchase of more land. INDE was presently in extremely difficult circumstances and in 1998 was privatised. The World Bank negotiated with FONAPAZ (National Fund for Peace) the commitment for the missing land. Although the process of compensation was reopened, the criteria adopted were limited to the completion of what INDE had imposed to local communities in 1980, in a climax of terror and not of consultation or negotiation. A short-term target with a limited compensation value. The meaning and quality of the value were not taken into account in the light of previous needs, and needs resulting from the resettlement of the communities. Moreover also on what had been "promised" many commitments have not been fulfilled. One of the first promises, forgotten by INDE then and now by WB and FONAPAZ, was that the land assigned to damaged people had to be of the same quality and quantity of that which was lost. Some facts about the dam: The plant has never operated at more than 70% of its expected capacity. Maintenance costs are higher than planned and additional technical problems have required additional maintenance work. Sedimentation is higher than expected and the reservoir is likely to be filled with debris in the coming future. These factors contribute to shortening the dam's life: according to some sources it will not last for more than 20 years. The dam has turned out to be a financial disaster, since it does not cover the country's energy needs. Guatemala still spends US$ 150 million a year to produce electricity. Every year a minimum of US$ 8 million are spent on structural maintenance costs of the Chixoy project, and only when fully operating does it cover about 50-60% of the country's needs. Energy costs supported by the population have constantly increased during the last few years, but still only 30% of the population benefit from electric power. The final cost of the project has not yet been clearly defined. Evaluations range from US$ 1.2 billion (521% higher than predicted) to US$ 2.5 billion. Because of the dam, the country's national debt has increased substantially with the population paying the real costs of the whole operation. INDE incurred a US$ 40 million debt. In 1991, the INDE debt accounted for 45% of Guatemala's foreign debt.
Copyright © 1998-2001 The World Commission on Dams |
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