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Panel 4:
Large Dams and the EnvironmentAbstracts of submissions -
Dams and climate change: new
hydroelectric projects in the La Plata watershed. A debate within
the framework of the United Nations Convention on Climate
Change Within the framework of the Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP4) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 2-13 November 1998, the Argentine government presented a report called "Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases" (Project ARG/95/6/31 PNUD-SECYT), by which large hydroelectric dams are proposed as one of the ways of mitigating the greenhouse effect. In this context, they proposed building two new large dams on the Paraná river (i.e. Corpus, between Argentina and Paraguay, and Paraná Medio, in Argentinean territory), and another dam on the Uruguay river (Garabí, between Argentina and Brazil) and three dams on the Bermejo river (as part of an agreement with Bolivia). A new argument for dams A new aspect of the debate was thus opened regarding the necessity of building dams; this time the proposals did not only cover future supposed energy needs, but also introduced the strong justification that "they would serve as an alternative for the reduction of Greenhouse Gas emissions". For the Argentine government this would mean 7000 megawatts that would replace, according to the report, the building of thermoelectric plants that burn natural gas, in the process increasing the greenhouse effect and hastening climate change. What the government has in mind is to make use of the Mechanism of Clean Development or a similar one to be regulated at the COP4, in Buenos Aires. According to the Kyoto Protocol, those countries obliged to decrease their emissions could choose to do it in developing countries, such as Argentina, instead of making more expensive investments within their own boundaries. This would create a flow of capital for large-scale engineering works, of very low emissions, for the generation of electricity. The Corpus and Paraná Medio hydroelectric projects would then be competitive, being paid in part by countries which made the commitment at Kyoto to reducing emissions. The proponents of dams, such as the Argentine government would then be able to compete with thermoelectric plants. The Greenhouse Gases saved by not constructing thermoelectric plants would be credited to the country that helped fund the dams.. The rejection by civil society It looks like a smart "equation", in which the climate is protected, energy needs satisfied and the economy and employment reactivated. Nevertheless, the government proposal included in the Report of Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases Effect and the subsequent energy scenario, were strongly rejected by a group of NGOs and civil society entities present at the Climate Change COP4, most of which took part in the prior process as part of the "Foro del Buen Ayre" that brought together NGOs from Argentina and from South America on the subject of climate change. Many of these had opposed the Paraná Medio (3000 MW, 760.000 ha of flooding) hydroelectric project since its refloating in March 1996. The reasons for rejecting the dam were clarified in diverse documents, letters, petitions and recommendations. During the Regional Workshop on Climate Change and Energy Alternatives held in Santa Fe, Argentina, in October 1998, the declaration entitled "Objective: Climate Protection" maintains that "those high-impact projects such as large hydroelectric dams and nuclear plants, or any other large project of high social, sanitary and environmental impact must not be eligible for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Instead, clean and renewable energies, mainly solar and wind energy, and energy efficiency should be promoted". In addition, "we reject the scenarios presented in the report "Mitigation of greenhouse gases effect" (Project ARG/95/6/31 PNUD-SECYT) due to the level of emissions permitted and its proposals for inappropriate technologies, including dams and nuclear plants. They also called for "the carrying out of new studies with public participation, as called for in Article 6, clause a, point iii, of the Convention Framework on Climate Change" as well as "public information and public awareness " for implementation of Article 6 of the UNFCCC. Dams are not "clean energy" A short time before, NGOs had sent a note to the Implementation Joint Office (OAIC), the National authority acting in relation to the Convention Framework on Climate Change, stating: "the COP4 of UNFCCC constitutes an opportunity for world governments to show their political firmness by adopting emission reductions through the implementation of proposals which do not generate new problems for the environment". The note rejected the fact that "new hydroelectric dams are being built so as to mitigate the emission of Greenhouse gases, which is an open and clear contradiction to strategies involved in applying the Agreement on Biological Diversity and the UNFCCC". They stated that "among other impacts, large dams impact biodiversity, cause displacement of large populations, destroy many jobs, favor the propagation of illnesses and epidemics, pollute water, diminish fishery resources, thus threatening food security, emanate methane gas (a greenhouse gas) during the process of filling reservoirs, and flood large expanses of native forests, thus discreasing capacity of these forests to absorb Greenhouse Gases". In short, the position could be summarized: "dams cannot be considered neither as 'clean' nor as 'renewable' energy". Alternative energies, participatory management This year on March 14, the "International Day of Action against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life", coordinated in Argentina by the Rios Vivos Coalition, more than 30 NGOs and civil society organizations issued a platform entitled "A Five-Point Plan for Preserving the La Plata Basin", which received broad coverage from the national media and international news agencies based in the country. It states: "due to the serious changes suffered by river in the basin because of large-scale engineering works and inappropriate technologies, we call for a halt to all dam projects on the Paraná and Uruguay rivers and their tributaries. No to Corpus, No to Garabi, No to dams on the Bermejo, No to Paraná Medio, No to raising the water level at Yacyretá reservoir. We are also alert regarding plans, within the National Energy Plan, for other dams planned for the Uruguay river, such as Roncador-Panambí (Misiones province) and San Pedro (Corrientes province)". On the poster published on that date is the basic conclusion of the Declaration of Curitiba: "It is essential that alternative energy sources be developed and water resources be managed in a participatory and sustainable way ". Meaningful advances A few days ago the "Foro del Buen Ayre" was consulted by members of the Argentine government technical team which is preparing a study that will lay the groundwork for adopting greenhouse gas emissions goals to be submitted at the next COP5 (5th Conference of the UNFCCC). This commitment was made by the Argentinian President in a message to the COP4 in Buenos Aires. And, many hydroelectric projects all over the country are still listed in the current process for assessing ways to fight the greenhouse effect by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Paraná Medio and Bermejo River hydroelectric projects, in the wake of the serious conflicts they have, (mainly due to strong opposition by civil society groups and objections raised by NGOs) continue to be on the list, but they are not now considered as priorities. However, this does not mean the projects have been shelved. Report in preparation lists 28 hydroelectric dams, from 24 MW to 2,900 MW in installed capacity being planned for the periods 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2010-2015, for a total installed capacity of 11,206 megawatts (MW). In short, this is about a set of 28 hydroelectric projects, ranging from 24 MW to 2,900 MW. Although the Paraná Medio mega-project and the Bermejo dams are not included, the large dams of Corpus and Itatí-Itacorá (2900 MW and 1660 MW respectively, Argentina-Paraguay, Paraná river) and Garabí (1800 MW, Argentina-Brazil, Uruguay River) are still included. Therefore, we are dealing with an open and important debate, which is far from having ended. All the NGOs, civil society and communities already affected by dams, will have to continue to disseminate information on the considerable social, financial and environmental impacts caused by hydroelectric plants and on the need to promote clean and renewable alternative sources of energy, capable of generating energy and long-term employment without damaging environment and society. As an example, the recent passing of the National Wind Power and Solar Energy Law, for which the National Congress overrode a presidential veto thanks to a broad mobilization, together with the downgrading of two of Argentina's most controversial hydroprojects, are a clear and hopeful sign for the future. Brazil’s Tucuruí
Dam: lessons from its planning and impacts The presentation will review environmental and social impacts of Brazil's Tucuruí Dam, the mitigation measures that were and were not taken, how the environmental studies were carried out and reported, and the role that these considerations played (or failed to play) in the decision-making process. Often presented by authorities as a model for hydroelectric development because of the substantial power that it produces, Tucuruí's social and environmental impacts are also substantial. The power station has 4000 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity in its present first phase (Tucuruí-I) and is being increased to 8400 MW in a second phase (Tucuruí-II). Authorities have systematically overestimated benefits and underestimated impacts of Tucuruí. Given Brazil's ambitious plans for hydroelectric development in Amazonia, much use could be made of the lessons from this dam. Many of these lessons are not unique to Brazil. Flooding the forest leads to loss of timber, loss of natural ecosystems and to greenhouse gas emissions. Aquatic ecosystems are heavily affected by the blockage of fish migration and by creation of anoxic environments. Decay of vegetation left in the reservoir creates anoxic water that can corrode turbines, as well as producing methane and providing conditions for methylation of mercury. Defoliants were considered for removing forest in the submergence area but plans were aborted amid a public controversy. Another controversy surrounded impacts of herbicides used to prevent regrowth along the transmission line. Mitigatory measures included archaeological and faunal salvage and creation of a "gene bank." Decision-making in the case of Tucuruí was virtually uninfluenced by environmental studies, which were done concurrently with construction. The dam (closed in 1984) predates Brazil's 1986 requirement of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS, known as the RIMA in Brazil). Despite limitations, research sponsored by the electrical authority (ELETRONORTE) provides valuable information for future dams. Extensive public-relations use of the research effort and of mitigatory measures sometimes misrepresented research findings, creating tension with researchers who had signed ELETRONORTE contracts that demanded confidentiality. Social costs of Tucuruí include impacts on indigenous people, resettlement of displaced population, loss of fish and other resources to downstream residents, and health problems such as malaria, a plague of Mansonia mosquitos, and accumulation of mercury in fish in the reservoir and in the people who eat them. The subsidized aluminum industry that consumes two-thirds of Tucuruí's power distorts the entire Brazilian energy economy and leads to tremendous impacts as other dams (such as Balbina) are built to supply power to cities that could have been supplied by Tucuruí had the output of Tucuruí not been committed beforehand to smelting aluminum for export. Employment generation is minimal in the aluminum industry. The wide-ranging social impacts of Tucuruí's role as a supplier of power to the aluminum industry include the opportunity cost of not having used the nation's financial and natural resources in ways more beneficial to the local inhabitants. Social and environmental costs received virtually no consideration when the actual decisions were made. A curtain of secrecy that surrounded many aspects of the project contributed to this. Since its inception, Tucuruí has been intimately tied to military and security agencies. Testimony at the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) on Tucuruí, held in the Pará State Legislative Assembly in 1991, accused some of the most powerful men in Brazil of corruption in arranging the foreign financing and purchase contracts for Tucuruí, and also linked Tucuruí to one of Brazil's most notorious political assassinations (Alexandre Von Baumgarten, who was killed 2 October 1982). While these charges remain unproven, they have also never been properly investigated. The charges come from Lúcio Flávio Pinto, a highly respected source who has also published them in his books. Tucuruí-II is one of the highest priorities in the federal government's "Brazil in Action" program, and is expected to be completed by 2002. On 15 June 1998, during a visit to Tucuruí, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed the order releasing funds for Tucuruí-II, without an environmental impact study. Only 21 days before the order was signed an ELETRONORTE Environment Department representative stated publicly that an environmental study was underway but not yet completed. This illustrates the continued fragility of Brazil's environmental impact assessment system, which, despite great advances since the Tucuruí Dam was built, continues to function as a mere formality to rubberstamp decisions that have already been taken based on other criteria. It also serves to emphasize a general problem with the planning and licensing of hydroelectric development, in which the approval of one dam project (such as Tucuruí-II) sets in motion a chain of events that leads to much more damaging impacts from upstream dams that are needed to take full advantage of the first dam. In this case, the Santa Isabel Dam, upstream of Tucuruí, is expected to displace at least 80,000 people (probably well over 100,000). An urgent case in point is the dams planned for the Xingu River: the extraordinarily cost-effective Belo Monte Dam would lead to tremendous pressure to complete much more damaging dams upstream that would flood large areas of indigenous land. Brazil's current system of impact assessment is incapable of dealing with the sequence of events in river basin development because analyses are restricted to one dam at a time. Brazil also currently lacks legal mechanisms by which irrevocable commitments can be made not to undertake damaging developments such as the Xingu Basin dams upstream of Belo Monte. The planning process for dams focusses on engineering features until the last phases in decision-making. All sites with hydrological potential for power generation are considered in preparing the initial lists of future dams. Social and environmental considerations are largely left to the EIA and EIS (RIMA) to incorporate into the decision process. Preliminary information on social and environmental impacts needs to be used to eliminate especially damaging sites from the list of proposed dams at an early stage, before the dams are formally proposed and the interests in favor of construction become unstoppable in practice. In addition, the EIA and EIS (RIMA) need to be fortified to insure that environmental and social impacts have a real role in decision making once dams are formally proposed. The pernicious role of secrecy is evident in many aspects of planning and execution of the Tucuruí project, and indicates the need for informed public participation in Brazil and throughout the world. Project to prepare an integrated
management plan for the Parana River Basin The project for an Integrated Management Plan for the Paraná River Basin was prepared by Paraguay’s Vice-Ministry of Mines & Energy and includes a proposition to reopen discussions on the legal and institutional mechanisms required to manage the country’s water resources in accordance with technically-validated criteria and with the in-depth participation of the various partners involved. Paraguay boasts one of the highest rates of water per capita in Latin America (approximately 63,000 m3 per inhabitant per year), although there are signs of and swift and continuous deterioration in quality, specially in urban environments and in agricultural regions. However, even if the amounts of water available in the country are not a worrisome issue, there is a visible lack of action managing these water recourses and particularly of initiatives that take a hydrographic basin as the fundamental control unit. The vacuum one sees in territorial ordering has contributed to environmental decay – whether by a process of accelerated deforestation arising from expanding agricultural frontiers, by soil erosion stemming from deficient control, or by water contamination caused by the indiscriminate use of pesticides. The construction of huge hydroelectric plants in the Paraná river (Itaipu, in partnership with Brazil, and Yacyreta, with Argentina) has strongly impacted the entire area, both socio-economically and environmentally. The drastic changes made to the ecosystems that comprise this body of water have caused great transformations, particularly in natural habitat of land and water animals. In spite of these megaprojects, Paraguay has no clear policy nor any legal and institutional mechanisms for the integrated management of its hydrographic basins. In addition to the lack of any specific legislation, water management is currently dispersed throughout approximately 20 institutions of various natures. Thus, the present project aims to promote the integrated management of the resources in the Paraná river basin, preserving and enhancing the water supply – the country’s main natural resource. This project has a holistic focus, emphasizing the environmental aspects in order to preserve and improve the environment in all its components. One of its specific goals is to diagnose the current situation of the basin on the Paraguayan margins in terms of the quantity and quality of water, land usage, factors of environmental decay, and water quality of the Paraná river. The project intends to monitor the basin’s behavior by means of a management model that enables a follow-up of the situation of water resources within the basin. A Pilot Project to manage a sub-basin will be developed so that the experience may become a model for the integrated control of the entire area. Other proposals for intervention in the basin will be analyzed, such as the Corpus Project, and the eventual usage of its resources will be evaluated – for energy production, fluvial transportation, fishing, irrigation, flood control, tourism, drinking water supply and environmental conservation. The final goal is to prepare the Integrated Management Project for the Paraná River Basin. This work will require a participative, interdisciplinary and trans-institutional focus, and a joint effort with Brazil and Argentina, both of which have experiences in the same basin. With this in mind, the goals the project intends to achieve at the end of its implementation will be detailed – based on the creation of a management model, on the development of the Pilot Project and on the compilation of a database. The main tasks to be performed will also be specified – the basic diagnoses, the construction of monitoring stations, the supervisory meetings (with state companies, non-governmental organizations, and social and private organizations), the development of the basin’s integrated management project, and the evaluation and follow-up seminars, among others. These initiatives will culminate in a final seminar during which the results will be presented by all those who participated in the project. Dams, Sustainability and
Public Consultation Mechanisms In Brazil, as well as in most other countries, water resource utilization especially of large rivers is linked to electric power generated through large dams. In São Paulo, for example, the reservoirs responsible for meeting a major part of the Metropolitan Area water supply - Billings and Guarapiranga - were originally built at the beginning of the century to provide energy for streetcars. Large dams were constructed in the early decades of this century without great attention being given to their environmental and social impacts, because awareness of the effects of such civil works did not exist. And also because these large civil works were considered to be an expression of the nation's engineering accomplishments. Because of the significant amounts of land available in the country and the low demographic density of the time, these infrastructures were accomplished without major conflicts. From the 50s, with increasing levels of urbanization and industrialization, the construction of large hydroelectric projects became a constant feature of the Brazilian rivers, especially in the more industrialized regions. It is important to note that hydroeletricity was seen as a major source of energy in the country so the development of large projects was seen as a part of the national development strategy. This aspect is fundamental for understanding the context of the building of large dams in Brazil. From the 70s, the concept of development itself became an object of discussion, in trying to mark the distinction between economic growth and development. In Brazil, and other countries, the absence of democratic systems made it practically impossible to conduct a debate on large projects. At the international level, the country assumed an extremely conservative and reactionary stance on environmental issues. This was at the time of the Stockholm Conference. The slogan of the day was "pollution is progress", and all actions that questioned this were considered to be subversive. In Brazil the projects and initiatives associated with economic growth were considered to be conceived in the national interest and thus protected from any critical discussion. This national protection ideology was translated as being absolutely sui-generis to the implementation of hydroelectric enterprises, creating a kind of mini-state within the state mentality: the enterprises "governed" by the state-owned companies imposed their own regimes. This was done because of the arbitration of personal conflicts that occurred in workers' camps, determining directly or indirectly the destiny of the community involved by the project. The state and municipal governments were completely disregarded, even as major areas under their governance were radically affected by the dams. In other words, when one considers the different concepts of sustainability, one can clearly state that the greater number of dams built in the 60s, 70s and 80s were constructed without any consideration for public participation. As a consequence, we have bad examples like Balbina, which has drawn international critique, and doubts about the needless destruction of the heritage of Sete Quedas by Itaipu. In the 80s, there were a number of factors that made an impact on trends of the previous decades: the growth of a global ecological conscience, through greater media attention on environmental problems, the appearance of an international ecological movement, with national counterparts in several countries, the democratization wave in the world and the discussion of the multilateral agencies on the financing of large projects. It became practically impossible to retain the models adopted until then. Civil society became more organized and began to demand greater participation in policy making. This process helped to transform national legislation. In Brazil, however, we are far from affirming that the dams implemented in our country operate with any sustainable criteria. Why? Because Brazilian society is yet to organize itself to offer viable options to meet the demand for energy. Big builders and governments have only been interested in the construction of large dams and have only recently begun to show an interest in the issue of energy conservation. While environmental assessment is a requisite for project implementation, the fact is that these evaluations are conducted after decisions are taken, and sometimes after significant public investments have been made. This makes the EIA another instrument of compensatory and mitigation measures rather than an instrument of decision making. The debate rests on a very unequal footing between the defenders of large infrastructure projects and the rest of civil society, simply because the former possess material and political resources that assist in influencing development decisions, while the latter do not. Today there is greater awareness of the importance of water resources and the need to develop a different management system, that emphasizes multiple uses of these resources. A movement for the implementation of decentralized models of management, with the participation of all actors is emerging, through the existing basin committees. The approval of Law 9.433 in 1997, that established the national water resources police, has implications for new dams in the remaining rivers. Under this law it will be a necessary requisite for dam operators to abide by the guidelines and involve all the different actors in the management of dam projects. In addition to the opportunity offered by the World Commission on Dams, it is important to try and find consensus on the implementation process of large projects. These must be accomplished with the participation of diverse segments of society (due to the magnitude of the impacts caused), and this must be given large emphasis in the operation of the project, so as to make compatible several possible uses of the basin.
Copyright © 1998-2001 The World Commission on Dams |
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