São Paulo, Brazil

Large Dams and their alternatives : Social & Resettlement Issues

• Community-Managed Resettlement: the case of Itá Dam
  Prof. Dr. Celio Bermann
• Porto Primavera dam, Parana River
  Mr. Mieceslau Kudlavicz
• The binational hydropower Salto Grande project and the relocation of the city of Federación
  Mr. Carlos Avogadro
• Urra dam project, Colombia
  Mr. Ivan Correa
• Lessons from the resettlements in the Urra dam hydroelectric plant project
  Ms. Margarita Rosa de Casto Illera

Community-Managed Resettlement: the case of Itá Dam
Prof. Dr. Celio Bermann
Graduate Programme on Energy, Eletrotechnics and Energy Institute, University of Sao Paulo, USP
BRAZIL

The presentation will discuss the necessity of reformulating resettlement procedures conducted by government regulatory agencies of the countries involved in carrying out large hydroelectric projects.

The case of the Itá Dam is presented. This is a hydroelectric project which was constructed by a public utility - ELETROSUL (regional subsidiary of the federal state owned holding company Eletrobrás) in the Uruguay River basin, designed to produce a total 1,450 MW of installed power, and create a reservoir area of 10,300 ha, flooding 3,200 small rural properties and causing the forced displacement of 4,000 families.

The project was announced in 1979. Since the publication of this announcement by Eletrosul, the affected people began an organizational process. Representatives of the Catholic Church, rural workes union leaders and small farmers created the Comissão Regional de Atingidos por Barragens (CRAB) - Regional Commission of People Affected by Dams, with the objective of "gathering, explaining to and organizing the people directly and indirectly harmed by constructed or projected dams in the Uruguay River Basin, defending their rights against the companies, authorities or any other bodies which are in any way involved in this matter".

Under the privatization process, in 1996 the construction of Itá Dam was been transferred to private companies organized in a consortium, with a total amount of US$ 986,5 million to be invested.

Before this, after a hard negotiation process with the state utility, and after having experienced two conventional resettlements, the community is now managing the financial resources to be invested in resettlement.

The changes on resettlement procedures indicate a remarkable reduction in costs, including the purchase and preparation of the land, construction of houses, warehouses and community buildings, basic infrastructure (power and water), as well as access roads, thus resulting in obvious financial, political and social benefits.

Some examples regarding two resettlements are presented below: (1) Marmeleiro, as a conventional resettlement; and (2) Mangueirinha, as a community-managed resettlement:

a) size of the houses:

(1) Conventional Resettlement (Eletrosul's criteria):

- 54 m2: with living room, 2 bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and laundry area, for families of up to 5 members and children of the same sex.

- 63 m2: with living room, 3 bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and laundry area, for families of up to 7 members and children of different sex.

- 72 m2: with living room, 3 or 4 bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and laundry area, for families of up to 8 or more members.

(2) Community-managed Resettlement: (note: with the same funds)

- 81 m2: with three bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and laundry area, for families of up to 5 members and children of the same or different sex.

- 108 m2: with four bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and laundry area, for families of up to 7 members or more, and children of different sex.

b) size of the warehouses: (note: with the same funds)

(1) Conventional Resettlement (Eletrosul's criteria): 96 m2

(2) Community-managed Resettlement: 150 m2

c) total costs per family: (data from field research, 1995)

1 Conventional Resettlement: US$ 93,750/family

2 Community-managed Resettlement: US$ 47,920/family

These results represent an evident reduction in the investment costs initially planned for the resettlement process. However, for the people displaced by Itá Dam, the proposal has meant a great challenge.

Organizational difficulties, lack of experience, and the need for technical advice, were all problems that were overcome as the collective working praxis took place. Difficulties encountered during the process were also helpful in the learning process as the resettled families were forced to confront the laws of the market.

Whatever the outcome of the present process will be, the fact is that, out of the 1,100 families registered as beneficiaries of resettlement, only 462 have actually received such benefits. It is worth noting that 30% of the indemnities have not so far been paid.

Perhaps, the major challenge today is the maintenance of the successful community-managed resettlement process in the hands of the people affected by the Itá Dam, an experience which should be extended to other dam projects.

Porto Primavera dam, Parana River
Mieceslau Kudlavicz
Pastoral Land Commission
BRAZIL

Porto Primavera Hydroelectric dam is being constructed on the Paraná River between the municipalities of Rosana in São Paulo state, and Bataiporã in Mato Grosso do Sul state. Its construction began in the end of the the 1970's and was scheduled for completion by 1988, with an initial budget of $2.5 billion, flooding 225,000 hectares to produce a maximum of 1,815 MW. Work was suspended on various occasions, altering the timetable for forming the reservoir and generating energy. So far, the project has cost $9 billion, four times the initial budget. Porto Primavera will produce the most expensive energy in Brazil. With a reservoir larger than that of Itaipu, it will only produce one-sixth the energy.

With the formation of the reservoir, 77 river islands disappeared forever, among them, some with an area superior to 300 ha., such as the Ilha Comprida, 18 km. long, which is the only island where the tenants have land title. The area being flooded in Mato Grosso do Sul will submerge a very rich and complex ecosystem, very similar to the Pantanal wetlands, where thousands of animal and plant species live in harmony, including some threatened with extinction (spotted jaguar, yellow-throated jacaré crocodile, and nhambú guaçu - tinamidae family).

With the partial closing of the principal channel of the river in 1994, fish were blocked from ascending the river, and fish capture diminished by 80% upstream. Porto Primavera, as Itaipu, Jupiá, and Ilha Solteira, has no means by which fish can swim upstream, and there is no feasible alternative for solving this problem during the reproductive season. This barrier to the normal upstream migration of fish, made worse by the disappearance of river lakes, which constitute natural cradles for the development of diverse species, threaten the survival of some of the most valuable commercial species, such as the dourado (salminus maxillosus), pintado (pseudoplatystoma) , pacú (characidae family), and jaú (paulicea lutkeni). According to studies carried out by the consulting firm TEMAG, and commissioned by the São Paulo Energy Company - CESP, builders of the dam, there are 700 professional fishing families who survive by fishing in the area of impact of Porto Primavera Dam, but they will not receive any mitigation compensation. Fisherfolk have had to take legal action against CESP to prove that they are already suffering negative economic impacts, and that these impacts will only get worse as a result of the construction of the dam.

With the formation of the reservoir, the best clay deposits in Brazil, and possibly in Latin America, will be drowned, affecting the ceramic-making activities of hundreds of families in the region. For example, in Três Lagoas, there are 48 ceramic and brickmaking plants, generating 770 direct jobs. In all, there are about 200 ceramic and brickmaking plants in the region which will lose their sources of raw materials.

CESP formed a lake by damming the Bahia River, about four years ago, without clearing the reservoir area of trees, without rescuing animals, and in a totally illegal way. For this reason, the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) joined the State and Federal Prosecutors' office in bringing suit against CESP in 1995.

CESP says it will relocate 1,729 families, who live in the area to be flooded by the reservoir. The Mato Grosso do Sul state land institute, Terrasul, says there are, in Mato Grosso do Sul state alone, an additional 370 families living in the reservoir area. This in addition to the 700 professional fishermen who live outside the area of flooding, but whose economic activity will be adversely affected. These fishermen were not considered by CESP to be impacted by Porto Primavera Dam.

Resettlement Programs:

- farmers and ranchers will receive lots varying in size from 25 to 40 ha., house, water, electricity;

- ceramic workers in the area directly affected will have their plants relocated, and will receive eight years of clay - the ceramic workers have called for compensation of 25 ha. of land and 20 years worth of clay; those who live outside the directly affected area will receive eight years of clay - they are calling for 30 years of clay.

- fishermen will receive a house in the city - they want a house and land on the shore of the reservoir.

- salaried workers will receive only five ha. of land - they want a larger plot with house, water, and electricity.

- unemployed families will receive only a house in the city.

- ceramic workers of Bataguassu will receive a line of credit worth $30,000. Those families who do not fit the criteria for resettlement will receive cash compensation.

The participation of society and directly affected populations was ignored throughout the process of implantation and execution of Porto Primavera Dam. CESP provoked a climate of uncertainty, intranquility, and insecurity, and paralyzed the economic activities of the affected families. The company intimidated the population, pressuring them to accept what CESP was unilaterally offering. Still, it must be stated that, for years, the affected population has solicited through documents, and through the Mato Grosso do Sul state legislature, a negotiating meeting with CESP, which has refused to meet with them.

The huge socio-economic-environmental debt is the result of more than 20 civil lawsuits brought by the State Attorney General of Mato Grosso do Sul, and the Federal Attorney General in São Paulo. In recent days, the attempt to privatize CESP, as part of an agreement between the Brazilian government and the International Monetary Fund, has once again obliged the state of Mato Grosso do Sul to bring eight new legal suits against the privatization of CESP, to avoid these social-economic-environmental debts being excluded from the privatization package.

For all these reasons, Porto Primavera Dam is considered to be one of the three worst dams in the world.

Três Lagoas, MS, June 5, 1999

The binational hydropower Salto Grande project and the relocation of the city of Federación
Carlos Avogadro
Member of IHA / University of Morón
ARGENTINA / URUGUAI

Aspects related with the relocation of the City of Federación (Argentine side) will be considered in the paper, motivated by the construction of Hydropower Salto Grande.

The hydropower project is situated in the Uruguay river, in the locality Ayuí, near the cities Concordia (Argentina) and Salto (Uruguay). The river has a mint of flow annual average of 4,640 m3/s and a reservoir area of 783 km2.

The total installed capacity is 1,890 MW and the generation annual average is 6,640 GWh.

It has 2 powerhouses separated by the spillway, equiped each one with 7 Kaplan turbines of 135 MW.

Federación is the first case in Argentina of the relocation of a city for the purpose of building a hydropower.

Historically, Federación had 3 settlements. The first one in 1810, in the locality of Mandisoví, after several pillages it was moved to the margin of the Uruguay river, in 1847, and it was called "Pueblo de la Federación" (second settlement). The third one was in 1979 due to the construction of Salto Grande.

In 1946 an agreement between Argentina and Uruguay was signed, for the construction of the hydropower Salto Grande. This meant a long period of uncertainty for its population.

In 1971, the National Law 19,210 declare the properties that were necessary to fulfill the Argentine - Uruguayan agreement, of 30 December 1946 as being public utility and subject to expropriation,

After 1973, the National Law 20,139 delimited the expropriation zone, establishing conditions for making land claims, fixing a limit of expropriation according to the water level, getting only part of the city.

The National Law 21,125 of 1975 enlarge the limit of expropriation to all of the City.

In 1974 a plebiscite was made among the population, to decide among several options the situation of the new city.

In that year the permanent population was of 5,500 inhabitants, with a high percentage of people descending from European immigrants, who came mostly in the 1870s, when agricultural settlements were encourged.

The principal activities, when the plebiscite was made, was the wood industry and the production of citrus juices.

In 1977 the work begin on the New City. It was officially inaugurated in 25 March 1979, and called "La Nueva Federación".

Its past and traditions are kept in the "Settlements Museum" in the New City.

The beginning of the construction of the hydropower project, generated an important impact on the people, due to the proximity to Salto Grande (45 km), and its direct effects motivated by the relocation.

The constant changes that the inhabitants were obliged to face, completely different from other localities farther from the Hydropower, in the same Province, influenced in worries that took then to look for new commercial activities.

For example, geological studies made in 1992, to the discovery of thermal waters, which generated a new activity.

In 1994 the construction of a new thermal complex began in the urban center which was inaugurated in 1997, turning it into an important touristic attraction.

Since that time, tourism has increased greatly, as have other and the complementary activities, producing a process of transformation with in the population.

I will include in the paper data about: population, density, population structure, educational levels, housing, economic activities for different years, including both the Old and New City of Federación.

The work will be illustrated with graphics, plans, and photographs.

Urra dam project, Colombia
Ivan Correa
Association of Producers for Communal Development  of La Cienaga Grande de Lorica – ASPROCIG
COLOMBIA

BACKGROUND:

The URRA I hydroelectric project is located on the Sinu River, 30 kilometers south of the city of Tierralta, in Cordoba department (Colombia). It is in a tropical jungle zone, part of Paramillo Nature Preserve. The construction of the dam was first proposed in the 1950s, but due to serious questions about potentially catastrophic effects on the Sinu River basin and its inhabitants, it wasn't until 1992 that construction was authorized as part of a national plan to expand the country's energy supply in the wake of the energy crisis Colombia suffered in 1990.

The 7,400-hectare reservoir has a capacity of 340 megawatts, with four generation units of 85 megawatts each. The energy produced by the dam would produce about 3% of the national total. The principal work on the project began in 1992 and were finished in mid-1998. The contractor on the project was the Swedish company Skanska.

URRA S.A., whose largest shareholder is the Colombian government, received permission to build the dam in 1992. It now needs a new license to fill the reservoir and operate it; that licensing process is overseen by the Environment Ministry.

ITS INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS IN THE LOWER SINU BASIN: Just as many had argued in academic debates, the construction of the dam has had a series of extremely serious social and environmental impacts on the ecological stability of the Sinu River basin and the survival of thousands of indigenous, peasant and fishing families who live there. In the lower Sinu basin, which is the area we are focusing on, the main environmental impact has been the impediment of spawning migration by the principal species of rheophilic fish (Prochilodus reticulatus, Brycon morei, Sorubin lima, Leporinus sp., etc.) This event, caused by the 73-foot high dam, has produced a series of effects:

* Loss of biodiversity due to the modification of the chain of aquatic ecosystems.

* Significant decrease in the fish population in the main bodies of water, and as a result, unemployment and general deterioration of the quality of life in the small fishing, peasant and indigenous towns.

* Deterioration of the food supply in all the towns in the region which depended on fishing as a principal source of low-cost protein.

* Severe deterioration of the social and cultural structure of peasant, indigenous, and fishing communities.

The number of those directly affected by this problem is estimated at 60,000, about 15.4% of the total population of the lower Sinu basin. Fishing production, previously estimated at approximately 6,000 tons annually (ASPROCIG, 1997) has decreased to 1,700 tons (INPA, 1999).

VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:

Since 1994, before the dam's construction began, indigenous, peasant and fishing communities of the lower Sinu basin began to publicize the disastrous effects that the dam would cause. However, the construction continued while its proponents refused to listen to those who stood to be most affected, who demanded to be consulted about the project. The construction of the dam has violated their right to life, to a healthy environment, to work, to their own health, and to participate.

To defend these rights, those affected have gone to the Constitutional Court, which in November, 1998 and March, 1999, ruled in their favor and ordered the suspension of the filling and operation of the reservoir until the effects are mitigated and they are compensated.

The struggle to defend these rights has cost the life of various intellectuals such as Alberto Alzate Patiqo and Mario Caldersn; of indigenous leaders such as Alonso Domico Jarupia and Lucindo Domico Cabrera; and the exile of others who supported the affected communities. All of these crimes have been brought to the attention of the international community, but to date there has been no justice. Worst of all, threats to the affected communities continue every day, and the Colombian government does nothing.

PARTICIPATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT:

URRA S.A. and the Colombian government have totally refused to allow the affected communities to participate in decision making about the construction of the dam. It is only through their own actions, international pressure, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court that URRA S.A. and the Environment Ministry have taken timid steps toward consulting those affected.

But despite the court ruling which ordered respect for the rights of those affected and the mitigation and compensation of the damage caused by the dam, URRA S.A. and the Environment Ministry still lack the will to seek a serious and lasting agreement in this conflict.

Lessons from the resettlements in the Urra dam hydroelectric plant project
Margarita Rosa de Casto Illera
Empresa Urra S.A. / Ministry of Energy and Mines
COLOMBIA

The Urra Hydroelectric Project is located in northern Colombia, more precisely in the southern section of the Cordoba Departamento, on the Sinu river, whose hydrographic basin extends over 1,137,000 acres, with an average flow of 350 m³ per second. The project comprises a 73-meter high dam and a 18,300-acre reservoir and 1740 m³. The hydraulic drop varies from 33.6 to 55.9 meters, making it a plant of medium declivity.

Because of its impacts, Urra is one of the country’s most controversial projects. It includes one of the largest reservoirs built in Colombia and its impact on the population has been monumental – with the resettlement of 7,268 peasants and 25 Indian families from the Embera-Katio ethnic group in the Upper Sinu.

The project’s major engineering works have been practically finished since July 1998, but a court order has suspended the filling of the reservoir until agreements with the Indian people are ratified.

The construction of the project’s major engineering works and the flooding of the reservoir have changed the usage of 37,000 acres of land previously dedicated to subsistence farming, and have forced the dislocation of 1,236 peasant families that lived in the region.

The project’s region, as every other colonization frontier in Colombia, is characterized by a complete lack of inroads and by governmental absence in the areas of health and education, and in providing basic water, electricity and sewage services.

The project’s social management measures were preceded by a census and a socioeconomic diagnosis, from which resettlement policies for the peasant population were developed and approved – policies that stemmed from the recognition of the population’s vulnerability to displacement.

Highly vulnerable families were entitled to guided resettlement;

Less vulnerable families were eligible to receive direct indemnification.

The resettlement program’s goal was not only to restore a previous standard of living but also to improve it by means of strategies and programs designed to prepare the people for resettlement and for the social stabilization likely to occur after they were moved.

In 1990, when the policy of indemnification for impacted families was designed, Colombia had failed in two prior resettlement efforts by the electric sector. Furthermore, there was no legal injunction to bring it about again.

The Resettlement Plan was widely debated before being ratified because one of the project’s assumptions stipulated an indemnification that surpassed the funds made available by law. However, sheer political will made the execution of the Plan possible, after consultation with the upper of the judiciary system on the feasibility of acknowledging reparations that superseded the assessment of the inventoried property of each affected family.

Novel channels for citizen participation were made available to the affected families in 1984, and they too required training the peasants and the Indians to exercise their right.

In Colombia, the agreements establishing the participation of ethnic minorities were ratified in 1991 under the guidance of the ILO and were partially regulated in 1994 (still to be defined are the regulations on prior consultation and on the bestowal of benefits to the Indian peoples affected by large public works).

The cumulative experience derived from planning and executing the Urra resettlements and from intervening on similar processes in other projects allows us to conclude that it is indeed possible to successfully accomplish peasant resettlement plans. After five years, the resettled families in the Urra Porject have enjoyed a significant improvement in all quality of life indicators.

As there are actions that can be generalized, and actions that must unavoidably be accomplished, and pending uncertainties to be solved during the execution of the resettlements, the following premises need to be discussed in reference to this scenario: