Executive Summary
November 2000

This study is one of eight case studies being undertaken world-wide with a common methodology and approach to inform the World Commission on Dams on the subject of the development effectiveness of large dams. The Tucuruí Hydropower Complex is situated on the lower Tocantins River within the Tocantins-Araguaia River Basin adjacent to the Amazon basin in northeastern Brazil. The project was designed to be constructed in two phases, Phase I construction was started on November 24, 1975 and completed November 10, 1984, and the construction on Phase II began in June 1998 with the first turbine scheduled to be operational by December 2002. The complex was built with the primary motive of producing hydropower although the secondary goal of providing a navigable river route was later introduced.

Several fundamental research questions were put forth by the WCD. These questions, presented below, guided the analysis and the data collection for all the case studies.

1. What were the projected vs. actual benefits, costs and impacts?
2. What were the unexpected benefits, costs and impacts?
3. What was the distribution of costs and benefits, who gained who lost?
4. How were key project decisions made?
5. How did the project evolve in response to changes in policies and decision-making criteria?
6. What lessons can be learned from the experience of this project?
7. How can the development effectiveness of the project be evaluated?

Context, objective and components of the Tucuruí Hydropower Project

Basin Context

The Tocantins river, located completely within the province of Eastern Amazonia, eventually flows into the Amazon river estuary and has an annual volume of 334km³ and a catchment area of 758,000 km² representing 7.5% of the land mass of Brazil. It runs for some 2,500 km before its confluence with the Araguaia River. The Tocantins-Araguaia River Basin has a clearly defined hydrological system, with its dry season culminating in September/October, and flooding that peaks between February and April. Due to lags caused by large floodplains on the upper tributaries of the river, the highest flow figures on the Tocantins are recorded a few weeks later.

The lengthy course of the Tocantins River Basin contributes to a well-defined and stable climatic regime across this region. The north of the region is hot and humid with high rainfall.  The temperature peaks at 38°C in August and September, whereas the coldest temperatures are recorded in June (about 22°C), the rainfall can be as high as 2,400 mm with a humidity rate of about 85%. Towards the south of this region the temperature drops as the latitude increases and the rainfall averages around 1,400 mm with a humidity rate of around 70%.

The dam was built at the end of a long stretch of waterfalls, in the Southern Pará Peripheral depression caused by erosion dating back to the late tertiary era. The soils in the vicinity of the Tucuruí complex are acidic and nutrient poor with low natural fertility levels and crops can be grown successfully when it is properly prepared and fertilised.

The flora over much of the basin area is dominated by a Cerrado savannah ecosystem, with mesophilic forest towards the north with a broad transition belt separating the savannah from the Amazon rain forest. The neo-tropics of Amazonia are reported to contain as much as three times more diversity in flora when compared to similar tropics in Africa and Asia. The fauna in the area is characterised by these ecosystems and is believed to be some of the most richly endowed and most diverse in the world. Surveys carried out during the construction of the Tucuruí complex estimated that the area was home to 117 species of mammals, 294 types of birds and 120 types of reptiles and amphibians including a number of threatened and endangered species. The river is estimated to contain some 300 species of fish.

The Socio-Economic Context

Of the number of indigenous groups living in the region, the Parakanã, Asurini and the Parkatêjê groups were living in the area affected by the construction of the dam and the flooding of the reservoir. As with the colonist groups that migrated into the region their livelihoods were based on a number of subsistence and limited market activities in the region. The harvesting of dryland drugs and brazilnuts, the tapping of rubber, and the mining of diamonds and gold were the major economic activities practised by the initial colonists to the region who settled and formed a number of river bank communities along the water-courses of the area. Subsistence agriculture soon became the predominant means of survival for these communities. Fishing was also widespread in the region prior to the construction of the dam, with an estimated catch of 1,534 tons/year for which 900 tons/year came from downstream of the dam and the rest from within the area affected by the reservoir. A project feasibility study conducted in 1974 estimated the population of the reservoir area to be 3,173 inhabitants, of whom 495 lived in towns, 1,614 in villages, 237 in hamlets, 174 on ranches and 653 on smallholdings.

Until the late 1950's, Amazonia, covering over half the territory of Brazil, remained a vast 'island”, historically characterised by the presence of primary export economies, with low population densities and low national integration. With the move of the nation's capital to Brasília and the development of related road networks, the 1960s heralded a concerted effort at incorporating the region in the dominant economy of the country. With the arrival of the military government in 1964, this effort was accelerated in the interest of national security. The construction of the Belém-Brasília highway in the 1970s provided an impetus for the implementation of large-scale projects including the Tucuruí hydropower complex, steel mills and electro-metallurgical plants. These changes, especially the construction of roads ensured a rapid process of deforestation particularly in the Mid and Lower Tocantins regions, aiding the subsequent introduction of cattle raising into the area. The town of Tucuruí is strategically located in this area, within the political and economic networks linking Amazonia to the Northeast and Central-West Brazil.

Objectives and Components of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex

The initial drive behind the construction of a hydropower complex was to provide electricity for the town of Belém and the surrounding region. By the time the Tucuruí was under serious consideration, the primary focus of the project changed to one aimed at providing power for the energy intensive electro-metallurgical industry in the region. Ultimately industrial interests drove the building of the Tucuruí complex.

As a secondary purpose, pursuant to a Federal Government decision, the implementation of two locks linked by a canal was considered in order to ensure the navigability of the river from Belém to Santa Isabel, along a stretch some 680 kilometres. This was in reaction to lobbying from commercial ventures in Pará State that wanted the locks to be built in order to ensure that ore from Carajás region could be shipped out along the Tocantins River for export through ports in the Belém region.

The approximate length of the main dam wall is 6,900 meters, which, together with the length of the Mojú and Caraipé Dykes, total some 12,515 meters of dam wall built to form the reservoir. The crown of the earth-wall and rip-rap earth-wall is at a height of 78.00 meters above sea-level, with the concrete structures at a height of 77.50 meters above sea-level, resulting in a minimum freeboard of 2.70 meters and 2.20 meters respectively, in exceptional flood situations.  The spillway, the second-largest in the world, was designed to handle a maximum rated flow of 100,000 m³/s. The reservoir has a total volume of 45.5 km³ at a depth of 72m and a useful volume of 32 km³ and it was formed by flooding a total land area of 2,850 km².

During Phase I of the implementation of this power complex, only the upstream lock head was built, allowing the remainder of the system for crossing this dam to be built later.

Hydropower accounts for roughly 90% of the total power consumption in Brazil. The Tucuruí Hydropower Complex is part of the integrated hydropower programme for the Tocantins and Araguaia River Basins. Its energy sizing takes into account the final configuration plans for these basins, which includes the implementation of fifteen hydropower projects. Tucuruí produces 4000 MW of power, 70% of all electric power produced in Northern Brazil (6% of all electric power produced in Brazil). Upstream from Tucuruí, the Serra da Mesa Power Plant (1,275 MW) is completed, with the Canabrava and Lajeado Power Plants currently under construction.

Phase II of the project involves the building of a new powerhouse for the installation of 11 additional turbines with a power rating of 375 MW each, and the basic works needed to finalise the locks. As this phase is still under construction, it is not yet possible to assess the impact of the Tucuruí hydropower project as a whole. Rather the WCD case study focus is on the impacts of Phase I and the assessment of decision-making and compliance as they relate to action taken to date on both phases. 

Predicted and Actual Impacts of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex

Design of the Project and Implementation Schedule

A number of changes were made during the implementation phase of the project. The most significant alterationsto the characteristics of the project as set forth in the initial feasibility studies and the basic project design are described in the following table.

Table ES.1: Actual vs. planned design characteristics

Phase II of the Tucurui Hydropower Complex, and the consequent modifications in the reservoir scheme will change the morphometric characteristics of the lake appreciably over certain periods. Depletion of up to ten meters is likely as the reservoir is drawn down to 62m at its normal minimum– the outtake level for Phase II turbines.

Project Costs

The financial estimates for the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex went through a number of revisions prompted by design modifications, changes in external factors and the delays in implementation and financing. The debt-servicing component was most affected by delays in implementation. Interest during construction (IDC) made up 26.3% of the final cost of the complex. The table below contains a timeline of cost estimates for the project

Table ES.2: Timeline of estimated costs for the Tucuruí complex

The final cost of building the dam came to US $5.5 billion.  Including IDC the total cost of Tucuruí was US $7.5 billion. This indicates a 51% cost overrun without IDC and a 77% cost overrun with IDC included as versus the targets laid out in the feasibility study. With the investment of some US $1.27 billion for the power-lines and substations needed to connect Tucuruí to power grids in north and north-east Brazil, the total amount reaches US $8.77 billion, not including interest on these latter investments.

The operations and maintenance costs for the project was initially estimated at 1% of the project cost per annum, a standard practice at the time in the Brazil power sector. The actual O&M costs for the project from 1995 to 1998 averaged US $13.8 million (1998 prices). This is approximately 0.25% of the US $5.5 billion final (without IDC) cost of the project.

The predicted cost for Phase II of the project is US $1.35 billion dollars and the finalisation of the lock system is predicted to cost an additional US $0.34 billion.

The funding for the project was drawn partially from Eletronorte, which contributed 45.7% of the total project costs (without IDC), and the rest from external sources. Of the external sources, Brazilian sources including Eletrobrás, banks and credit agencies contributed 40% of the funds and foreign banks and international credit agencies contributed the remaining 14.3% (rounded figures).

Hydropower Generation

This project was based on the principle that electricity-intensive industries would be eager to use energy from Tucuruí, due to its expected low cost.  It was also felt that having serviced markets that were already virtually assured - such as Belém and Marabá - the remainder of the energy produced would meet repressed power demands in Pará, Maranhão and Tocantins States, in addition to the possibility of transmitting power to Northeast Brazil along a line running 1,800 kilometres between Sobradinho and Boa Esperança.

The different prediction for planned energy rating for the project resulting from construction specifications and demand parameters changes are listed in the table below.

Table ES.3: Predicted and actual power ratings for the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex MW)

The actual energy generation from the plant shows a steady increase from the time of commission in 1984 until 1999.

Table ES.4: Predicted and actual energy generation for the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex (GWH/yr)

Approximately 60% of this energy went to large industrial consumers and the rest to distribution systems in the states of Pará, Maranhão, Tocantins, the Northeast and the South-Southeast system. The latter connection was initiated in 1999 connecting the North-Northeast system with the South-Southeast system via and greatly expanding the potential market for Tucuruí power.

Using project parameters, the initial capital investment in the project, a 50-year life cycle for the project and at discount rates ranging from 8 to 12% the present value of the costs over 30 years for Tucuruí Phase I comes to between  US $40 and US $58 per MWh.  In 1998 the average end price for the consumer in Brazil per kWh was US $70 implying the possibility of significant economic gains for the project. However, as a result of subsidised prices, large industrial consumers were able to purchase power at US $ 24 per MWh, and thus a financial profit was not realised.  These figures suggest that as a whole, the large energy intensive industrial consumers received an annual subsidy from the government budget ranging from US $193 million to US $ 411 million in 1999 depending on the discount rates and productions costs adopted in the calculation. Eletronorte itself confirms that in 1998, it required a subsidy of US $194.2 million from the central government.

Navigation

Right from the start of discussions over the Tucuruí Project, the people of Pará State foresaw an association between these two projects (hydropower and shipping) as an opportunity to stimulate the local economy. To a large extent, the social and political receptivity to the Tucuruí hydropower complex at the regional level was based on the possibility of interconnecting these two ventures. In 1979, when the hydropower project was already at an advanced stage of implementation, the government decided to include the locks in the Hydropower Complex designs. Until 1984, work on the locks progressed normally, but then slowed down, hobbled by a shortage of funding, and finally ground to a halt in 1989. The remaining components for the lock system were slated to be implemented with Phase II of the project.  However much uncertainty still prevails over Phase II construction schedule, with regard to the construction of the locks.

Effects on Ecosystems

The prevalent mentality towards ecosystems at the time of project design within the Brazil power sector was dominated by concern towards the effect of the ecosystems on the construction project instead of vice versa. It is apparent that the concept of ecosystem integrity was not a concern at that time, and this was further exacerbated by a lack of knowledge of the impact of dam construction on the environment. In 1977 Eletronorte hired ecologist Robert Goodland in an attempt to bridge this gap. He recommended that Eletronorte prepare a schedule for deforestation, social, cultural, environmental and archeological inventories together with animal rescue programs, ecological preservation measures, water quality controls and multiple use studies. In an effort to comply with these recommendations, Eletronorte signed an agreement with the National Research Institute for Amazonia (INPA - Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazonia) and entrusted them with the responsibility of carrying out most of the studies recommended.

Since it was commissioned two years after the start of construction on Phase I neither the Goodland report, nor the subsequent studies spurred by it, had sufficient scope to enact significant changes. The period allocated was not sufficient to cover the entire area or to conduct an accurate and representative taxonomic identification of species. The capacity to develop detailed inventories and accurately forecast impacts were compromised. Nevertheless, some forecasts were made and when forecasts are referred to in the following section they refer to those made either by the Goodland report or by the INPA studies.

Water quality. An appreciable drop in the quality of water downstream was forecast. Studies carried out downstream during the 1986 dry season showed very low levels of dissolved oxygen in the water, made worse by low flow-rates. Under these conditions, there were two different types of water flows in 1986 along a stretch of river some forty kilometres long: one flow near the left bank was completely anoxic due to the hypolimnetic nature of the tailrace, while the spillway water had higher oxygen levels. During low flow-rates most of the water is discharged through the tailrace and the quality was of reduced quality for human and environmental uses.

The regularisation of the river flow prevented the seasonal flooding of the riverbanks downstream adversely affecting the natural fertilisation processes. In addition, it was anticipated that the physical barrier of the dam would trap nutrient rich organic matter disrupting the downstream food cycle. The aforementioned impact decreased the natural and agricultural productivity of the flood plain where as the dearth in organic matter had a likewise impact on the number of fish downstream. 

Within the reservoir, in relation to the parameters specified by the National Environment Council (CONAMA – Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente), the waters are considered of adequate quality for a variety of uses. However, the riverbank sections, most accessible for daily use by the local communities, are not always adequate for human use. Water quality studies indicate that there is trend a towards stabilisation in reservoir water quality.

The eutrophication of the reservoir water immediately after flooding due to the decomposition of the submerged plant matter and leaching of nutrients from flooded riverbanks resulted in a marked increase in the number of floating aquatic macrophytes, covering nearly 25% of the reservoir surface area. The most critical problems with this proliferation were the marked increase in population of mosquitoes and hindrances to navigation and shipping. By 1994 the area covered by aquatic macrophytes decreased to 10% of the reservoir surface area. 

The increase in the prevalence of mosquitoes was anticipated due to the filling of the reservoir and the proliferation of aquatic macrophytes. During the years after the reservoir was first flooded, an increase in the number of cases of malaria was noted, which is transmitted mainly by Anopheles mosquitoes. A large number of local people also complained that a large increase in the frequency of insect bites (by mosquitoes etc. ) was hampering their farming activity during the day. In response, a multidisciplinary and multi-institutional committee was set up to address the problem. Analysing the proliferation of mosquitoes at the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex during the post-filling phase, it was noted that initially there was an appreciable increase in Anopheles genus species after the river was dammed in October 1984. During this period, 68,532 Anopheles specimens were collected, a figure far higher than that found during the pre-filling phase. Subsequently, a significant increase was recorded in the population of Mansonia mosquitoes, whose number are documented to be positively correlated to the proliferation of certain aquatic macrophytes. With the decrease in the reservoir surface area covered by these plants, a decrease in the abundance of mosquitoes was also observed. In a 1990 survey Mansonia mosquitoes topped 97% of total culicid catches in the area, compared to a 2.3% share for Anopheles.

Fisheries.Although significant fish mortality rates were expected immediately following the initial flooding of the reservoir, information was not available to accurately anticipate the subsequent affects of the dam on the river fauna.

After the initial halting of the river flow, fish deaths occurred among the shallow reaches downstream but were not of the extent expected. Three months later large-scale fish mortality, caused by the tailrace water, was observed including among large schools of migratory species. Even when better quality water was released from the spillways, such large-scale fish deaths were common due to the poor quality of the water from the tailrace. Experimental catch data show the diversity of species of the downstream section was reduced from 164 to 133 (a 19% decline). In part, this was also attributed to the regularisation of the river flow and the subsequent disruption of the floodplain ecosystems. The ubarana (Anodus sp.), a commercially significant fish species, faced near local extinction in the downstream area. As anticipated, the reduction in diversity and the episodes of fish mortality resulted in marked reduction in downstream fish catches for the local population with catch data showing a steady decline from 1981 to 1998.

High fish mortality rates were observed within the reservoir area as well, after the initial closing of the dam. This was as a result of a number of factors, including a) the highly oxygenated ecosystem of the waterfalls which was an important habitat for the juvenile of many species, was inundated by the reservoir, b) as the water rose and the currents slowed the amount of dissolved oxygen fell c) the diversity of niches was reduced and d) the lack of oxygen in the deeper levels due to the decomposition of submerged organic matter. An eventual increase in fish catches was expected due to a widespread proliferation of pelagic species, together with herbivorous and peryphytiverous species in the riverbank areas. In contrast only the piscivores species increased from the pre to the post filling stage, all the other food chain categories were less abundant. Overall the reservoir area saw a reduction from 173 to 123 species (a 29% decline) in the number of fish species from the baseline.

No specific forecasts were drawn up for the region upstream from the reservoir but changes were anticipated to be caused by the flight of species from reservoir area to the unaltered regions upstream. In experimental catches before and after the filling of the reservoir, of the ten most frequent species sampled before filling, only 5 species were found after filling. The total species composition of the upstream reaches showed a decline of 25%, from 150 to 113 species after filling.

Fish productivity data from the mid-1990s show that the total recorded fish catch increased by over 200% as a whole for the affected area (upstream, reservoir and downstream).  The reservoir area catch increased by 900% whereas the downstream fish catch decreased by 45%.  In total the number of species sampled declined from 181 to 169, a 7% decline.

Terrestrial Impacts. The submersion of 2,850 km² of land including large areas of rainforest for the reservoir was expected to have a significant impact on the land-dwelling and arboreal fauna of the area.  To address this concern a Wildlife Working Group (GT Fauna) was set up to prepare the Wildlife Development Inventory Plan (PIAF – Plano de Inventário do Aproveitamento da Fauna) for the Hydropower Complex region. They were designed to produce a basic list of vertebrate species found in this region, including land and aquatic mammals. The total number of species recorded at Tucuruí during the implementation of this Plan reached 120. In the final report published by the working group it was suggested that protected areas capable of maintaining viable communities be established together with a permanent wildlife study group. In some cases increased monitoring activities were suggested with specific bans on hunting and poaching. Subsequently a wildlife rescue operation known as Operação Curupira was initiated to capture, triage and resettle animals forced out of their natural habitats. This was the largest and the most expensive wildlife rescue carried out in Amazonia with a total investment of US $30 million from Eletronorte. This operation resulted in the capture and release of some 280,000 animals. The animals were released in four areas along the banks of the reservoir.

Greenhouse Gases. Sampling of greenhouse gases (GHGs) shows that the Tucuruí reservoir emits substantial amounts of greenhouse gasses and that the emissions are highly variable from year to year. The gross greenhouse gas emissions measured by Rosa et al. for 1998 and 1999 fluctuate from 76.36 to 5.33 tons/km²/year for methane and from 3 808 to 2 378 tons/km²/year for CO₂. When compared with GHG emissions for alternative sources of electricity generation the sampled gross emissions from Tucuruí are lower than those for diesel, heavy oil or coal, but of comparable magnitude in the case of natural gas combined cycle plants. However, some theoretical studies reported in the literature present an opposite view and provide higher estimates of gross GHG emissions from Tucuruí. There are no definitive conclusions as to how the net emissions from the reservoir compare with those of alternatives, since pre-impoundment background emissions were not measured and information is not available on how these emissions have (and will) vary over time.

Potential Phase II impacts. The implementation of Phase II of the Tucuruí project is likely to result in additional environmental impacts with reduction in water volumes triggering a number of processes related to the exposure of the banks. Exposed banks may erode or be turned into cropland resulting in the flow of fertiliser, pesticide, and erosion sediments into the lake, exaggerating some of the earlier mentioned effects. The new operating rules for Phase II will however, reduce the time spent by water in the reservoir. Therefore it is possible that the reservoir water quality will improve through more frequent renewal of its liquid mass, reducing the severity of the adverse effects mentioned earlier, although an increase in the portion of water discharged through the tailrace might further reduce downstream waterquality. But, it should be noted that since the phase II turbine intake point is 10m above the phase I intake point, the water leaving the tailrace is likely to be of better quality.

Social and Economic Impacts

The construction and operation of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex triggered sweeping changes in the social and economic structure and organisation of the segments of society affected directly and indirectly. The severity of the impacts was far greater than initially foreseen.

The possibility of gaining construction or related employment attracted large inflows of migrants increasing the population of the immediate area six-fold. Overall the area doubled its population in ten years, severely straining the social infrastructure of the area and resulting in the emergence of slums (favelas). During the resettlement process, over 14,000 people formerly resident in the areas inundated by the reservoir were relocated in the adjoining areas further aggravating this problem. These mandatory relocation programs and economic migrations adversely affected the structure of lifestyles, social, economic and cultural organisation of rural groups. The establishment of a number of new administrative units and the restructuring of existing towns and villages were carried out to accommodate the displaced and immigrant communities.

A number of displaced people, estimated to be around 3,700, colonised the myriad of islands that were formed by the hilltops when the reservoir was formed. There was no infrastructure on these islands and the lack of tenure was a disincentive for further improvements. In the summer the only water source available was the reservoir, even for drinking. The lack of sanitary infrastructure, clean drinking water and the use of smudge pots to ward off mosquitoes rendered them vulnerable to diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, verminoses and respiratory problems.  In addition these island dwellers were harassed by the former owners of these lands and by loggers.

A subsequent social upheaval was triggered by the completion of the Phase I of the project in 1984. A number of people lost their employment resulting in mass unemployment and out-migration from the area. This backflow extended through 1987 when the population began to grow again especially around Tucuruí through new activities springing up in the trade and services sectors. The infrastructure in the area did not keep pace with these new arrivals. Although the communities around the area expected the project to catalyse the development of the area, these communities living in the shadow of a large hydropower complex did not receive electricity from the project until 1997, when, due to increased pressure from local groups, a step-down substation was constructed to serve the town of Tucuruí. In fact the construction of the Tucuruí prompted expectations that, in addition to Greater Belém, the lower Tocantins region would be supplied by power from the high tension line cutting through this area. However, by June 1998, only the towns of Barcarena (were the aluminium smelter is located) and two other towns were connected to the power grid.

Although the downstream communities did not have to face most of the direct impacts of the process, a number of indirect impacts affected them. Some of these include the disruption of fishing activities due to water quality and quantity changes, disruption of trading activities due to shipping problems, changes in farming activity and the increased health risks similar to those faced by communities adjacent to the reservoir and upstream.

The Resettlement Process

In order to build the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex, Decree No. 78,659 dated November 11, 1976 declared an area to be of public utility for the purposes of expropriation, consisting of a polygon that covered part of the municipal districts of Bagre, Itupiranga, Jacundá, Marabá, São Domingos do Capim and Tucuruí, all in Pará State. In 1979, Eletronorte signed an agreement with INCRA to analyse the compensation payable on the lands and improvements to be affected by the formation of the Tucuruí reservoir, as well as for resettling local communities. The decision process was handled solely by the INCRA with the affected communities merely forced to accept compulsory relocation and arbitrary compensation. These facts triggered latent conflicts and clashes between Eletronorte and the affected group including riverbank communities, settlers from the Transamazon Highway, and urban dwellers from the towns of Jacundá and Repartimento.

The criteria for assessing assets for compensation purposes took only material aspects into consideration, neglecting to include the value of work invested in the land, as well as affected and symbolic values, meaning the cultural logic, and social and historical conditions of local communities. Anyone who did not accept these compensation criteria, or the areas to which they were allocated for resettlement, was urged to sign a waiver. The resettlement process took place late and in a very limited manner with little or no consideration given to the livelihood patterns of the families. This negligence was evident when riverbank communities were resettled inland and when the extractive communities were settled in lands requiring farming.

From the perspective of the affected communities the lackluster performance of the dam authorities in the resettlement process, the outstanding issues and hardships facing the affected people and the consistent delays in government redress resulted in the formation of a number of collective organizations to address these issues.

From Eletronorte's standpoint, the relocations and resettlements were carefully thought out and coherent with regional conditions. They were implemented in partnership with other local and Federal Government agencies, in ways designed to minimise the traumatic effects on resettled communities, while also maintaining conditions for farming and ranching production, as well as inserting those expropriated into the same rural context where they lived previously. The relocation and resettlement projects were based on the active participation of society, such as professional organisations – associations and unions – as well as religious and philanthropic entities such as the Church and Universities. The final assessment by Eletronorte is that the procedures adopted were properly conducted, compared to the practices of power sector utilities at that time, with all commitments fulfilled.

The existence of sectors that are still today dissatisfied with the compensation policies indicate the consequences of the official attitude that denied any conflicts of interest in relation to this project, in the name of a 'general interest” defined by 'higher levels”. The lack of any clear-cut sectoral policies for dealing with social issues meant that the compensation criteria for the segments of society affected by this venture were gradually established in parallel to the displacement and resettlement processes, under pressure from organised grassroots movements. Statements by the river-bank communities – although putting forward perceptions and points of view that at times differ – indicate that the advent of this dam caused sweeping alterations in their lifestyles, either directly or indirectly, while undermining their means of survival. They confirm and reaffirm the urgency of investigating the nature and scope of the impacts caused by the construction and operation of this power plant.

A figure for the total number of people displaced is hard to come by since different reports produce varying numbers but it is likely that the numbers are between 25,000 and 35,000. This is in comparison to the projected relocation of 1750 families in the basic project design.

Continuing problems and inadequacies in the relocation process resulted in mass demonstrations starting in 1981. After considerable pressure, Eletronorte established a parity committee in order to initiate dialog with the grassroots movements involved in the demonstrations. The committee considered the 2 247 cases submitted and resolved 2 121 of these cases. As a result of further lobbying by the grassroots movements an interministerial committee was set up in 1994 to address a number of issues including the remaining 126 cases.  The leaders of the grassroots movements state that some of the claims have still not been addressed adequately and that they have been referred to the courts.

Health Impacts

The local health impacts of constructing the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex are significant and mostly negative.

The increase in population caused by the influx of immigrants resulted in a marked upsurge in the incidence of vector transmitted diseases such as malaria, schistosomiasis, etc, as well as industrial accidents, alcoholism, sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS. In 1980 during the implementation stage of the project the infant mortality rates for the Tucuruí municipal district was more than six times of that for the rest of Pará State and nearly five times the infant mortality rate for the whole of Brazil.

The use of defoliants by the Eletronorte sub-contractors from 1980 through 1982, hired to clear paths for power lines, is believes by some to have had a health impact on the communities living in the area. The use of these herbicides caused much controversy at the time, due to claims that their composition was similar to that of the defoliant known as Agent Orange, notorious for its use by the US military in Vietnam. Although toxic, these products were authorised for use by the Brazilian Government, and did not contain the amounts of dioxin that made Agent Orange highly poisonous to human beings.

In areas where these herbicides were used, there were also allegations of widespread deaths among animals and plants, with contamination of wells, inlets and people of all age groups, in addition to reports of miscarriages and symptoms compatible with acute exogenous intoxication: headache, vomiting, dizziness, ocular erythema and sluggishness, followed by hematuria, oliguria and anuria, fever, seizures and tremors, with death in some cases. Eletronorte in their 'Livro Branco sobre o Meio Ambiente na Usina Hidrelétrica de Tucuruí” (White Book on the Environment of the Tucuruí Hydropower plant), officially denied all these impacts.

As was mentioned earlier the establishment of the reservoir and the related works resulted in an explosive outbreak of mosquitoes and other insect vectors and pests. In the Tucuruí region, the rise and fall of malaria outbreaks coincided with the construction and operation phases of the hydropower complex. From 1975 onwards, an explosive upsurge in malaria was noted in the Tucuruí Municipal District that extended throughout the entire construction period. As this phase drew to an end in 1984, malaria peaked at around 10,000 cases per year. From 1998 onward, news of the start-up of Phase II of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex once again drew heavy flows of migrants to this region, already reflected in an upsurge in the number of cases of malaria.

The proliferation of certain aquatic macrophytes is closely related to the incidences of outbreaks of Mansonia mosquitoes, the main disease vector for filariasis (or filaria). Therefore when favourable conditions were created for the abundant growth of these water plants, the communities adjacent to the reservoir reported excessive numbers of these mosquitoes. The menace from these insects increased to such a degree that it impeded the day to day farming activities of the communities resulting in the migration of some groups into other areas.

A study on the origins and effects of mercury in tropical reservoirs was conducted in the environs of the Tucuruí reservoir by a group of Finnish scientists. Their findings indicated that on average the mercury levels among the local community members for whom fish from the lake is a significant source of food, was close to the low risk level for neurological damage. Their levels were significantly higher when compared to those of other communities with less reliance on reservoir fish. Although gold mining in the basin was found to be the primary source of mercury found in the reservoir, it is known that dams concentrate mercury already present in the water and that the increased human activity in the area contributed to an increased release of mercury into the water. Most of these results were widely disseminated with a variable degree of accuracy by national and local press at the time of their publication, raising concern among the populace.

Eletronorte however has queried the validity of these studies and as of yet there is there is no definitive proof of impact of the Tucuruí reservoir on mercury concentration levels.

Indigenous People

The Parakanã and Asurini indigenous groups and the 'Gavião da Montanha”, a local group belonging to the Parkatêjê were affected by the construction and operation of the Tucuruí Dam.

The Parakanã: By the late 1970s, construction of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex flooded 38 700 hectares of the Parakanã Indigenous Reserve. This led to the removal and relocation of the Eastern Parakanã who lived in three villages in the eastern section of the reserve, as well as the Western Parakanã who live in two villages partly outside the reserve. This involved the relocation of about 247 people (1986 data), all of the known Parakanã. Eletronorte signed a contract with FUNAI (National Indian Foundation) and entrusted them with the task of relocating the Parakanã people.  The resettlement process was rife with delays and inadequacies. The indigenous group was split up and relocated several times (some groups as many as four times in a span of 5 years) which eventually resulted in the break-up of the unit and some of them migrated elsewhere due to the unsuitability of the resettlement areas. After repeated attempts at gaining redress for their grievances, the Parakanã in August 1986, threatened to block the Transamazon Highway and employ terror tactics.  Negotiations began in Brasilia in November 1986 over what was to become the Parakanã Programme. This programme, an attempt to assimilate the Parakanã in to the mainstream culture, consisted of sub-programs in education, health care, agricultural support, border surveillance, works and infrastructure and administrative backup with a total budget of US$740 000 in 1998. The largest component of the project was a health programme aimed at providing the community with access to emergency and longterm medical care. The border survailance programme consisted of telephone communication links and training of Parakanã youth to identify and resist encroachment. The programme contributed to the expansion of the Parakanã, and their establishment of new villages, which, parallel to their traditional hunting and gathering activities, has been important in maintaining the integrity of the Parakanã Indigenous Reserve.

The Asurini: The Asurini live on the Trocará Indigenous Land just 23 kilometres north of Tucuruí along the Transcametá Highway which runs through the indigenous lands located downstream from the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex. In 1977, these lands were demarcated by PLANTEL (a private company hired by FUNAI), assuring the Asurini a territory of almost 22,000 hectares, which was ratified in November. Located downstream for the Tucuruí dam, the Asurini were exempt from most of the direct impacts of the complex but were subject to a number of indirect effects that had significant impacts on their community. The arrival of large number of migrant workers and well as the resettlement of dam affected people were factors that affected the Asurini and their lands.

In 1998, as part of the actions scheduled for development with the indigenous groups affected by the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex, Eletronorte's advisor on indigenous affairs visited the Asurini and drew up a report stressing the need to carry out further studies on the impacts caused by the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex. The FUNAI requested Eletronorte to set up a working group to study these impacts and establish a support programme similar to that introduced for other groups that the utility considered as being directly affected by this venture (Parakanã Programme and Waimiri-Atroari Programme). Eletronorte argued that 'due to budget difficulties” this Project should be postponed to early 1990, at which time they wrote to FUNAI, advising it that 'it was still not in an administrative and financial position to start the studies”.

In the 1970's an overland route to connect Tucuruí with Cametá was started, cutting through nine kilometres of the Asurini Reserve and in 1997 Eletronorte contemplated running a power line also through their reserve. In both instances the Asurini resorted to the destruction of public infrastructure in order to register their protest. Although in response, the path of the power lines were changed, the road was ultimately built and the Asurini have not been compensated as of yet.

The Gavião da Montanha: Currently living in a single village in the Mãe Maria Indigenous Land, the so-called 'Gavião da Montanha” are a local group of the Parkatêjê (a Jê-Timbira speaking-group), also known as the 'Gavião' or 'Gaviões', who have traditionally lived on the right bank of the mid-Tocantins. Until 1973, the members of this group were settled in the indigenous area that had been awarded to them adjacent to Tucuruí.

This area was selected as the works-yard for the construction of the dam and was declared to be a 'public utility” through Presidential Decree in 1976.  From 1975 onward, the 'Gavião da Montanha” were treated as 'remaining” by the official agents, and were persuaded to move to other areas and the Mãe Maria Indigenous Land, despite rivalries with the group living there. Although limited in numbers, this group was most unwilling to leave the location where it had settled. In the mid-1970s, pressure from the FUNAI agents was stepped up by threats from the representatives of Eletronorte, the State-run enterprise and the sub-contractors who were starting to build the Tucuruí Dam. Despite specific legislation (Law No 6,001/73, known as the Indian Act) that guaranteed the replacement of these lands, countless attempts were made by employees of the Company to offer individual compensation to the leader of the group in attempts to convince him to move his group away from the location. The accounts told by the members of this group about this period reflect the various incidences of violence to which they were subject to. Psychological pressures and threats of physical violence built up, finally forcing them to move to Mãe Maria.

At meetings with representatives of Eletronorte and local and regional agents of FUNAI, it was agreed that the Gavião da Montanha lands should be replaced through legal means, in addition to a process of compensation for moral and material losses, damages, injury, pain and suffering. Claiming the 'unavailability of equivalent lands”. Eletronorte agents decided to turn this proposal into an award of rights to the 'Parkatêjê Community” by Eletronorte, by means of equivalent cash compensation paying the amounts stipulated and concluding this issue.

Dissatisfied with the procedures adopted both by the Company as well as FUNAI, the leader of the directly affected group, sued Eletronorte and the Federal Government in 1989 for compensation, through the Pará State Society for the Protection of Human Rights (Sociedade Paraense de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos) in order to annul the agreements and compensations. In December 1993, the Federal Courts in Belém, where this case was heard, handed down a decision in favour of the Eletronorte.

Regional, National and Global Effects

At the regional level, Tucuruí was an integral part of the introduction of a modern industrialisation process (mining and metallurgy) into an area formerly dominated by an extractive economy. This resulted in an enclave model that shaped urban growth and underpinned the expansion of small-scale industries, particularly in the Belém region. These enclaves are characterised by the fact that energy from the Tucuruí hydropower complex was available only to selective industries and their immediate surrounding therefore creating distinct enclaves of development in the area.

The migratory labour attracted by the implementation of the dam and the relocation of dam affected people resulted in the urbanisation of the many areas heretofore rural or forested. This urbanisation process was not accompanied by the provision of adequate infrastructure or electricity.   

Within this context, Tucuruí is an integral part of the changes in this region, together with projects such as the Transamazon Highway, the Greater Carajás Mining Project, Steel Complexes, the PA-150 Highway, giant farming and ranching projects run by the private sector, etc. Consequently, it is quite impossible to separate out the specific influences of Tucuruí among those of other projects in this region. Expect for some changes associated with specific groups and sectors, a quarter of a century after the construction of this Hydropower Complex, the local and regional economic profile seems mostly unaltered, confirming the evaluation of the low capacity of the Tucuruí power project to foster local and regional development.

At the national level the interconnection with the North/Northeast System through the Tucuruí-Sobradinho power line (1981) was an achievement of strategic national importance. The inauguration of power production enabled Tucuruí to replace thermo-power plants in the Northeast that were providing power to the industries in Belém at a higher cost. In 1998 with the integration to the South/Southeast System through the Tucuruí-Serra da Mesa power line, electricity was sold to Southeast Brazil which has the most dynamic economy in the country. With these integrations into the national power grid, the Tucuruí emerged as a key link in the Brazil energy market.

The implementation of the Tucuruí hydropower complex was a factor in the regional and national policies influencing the globalisation process of Brazil. The presence of mining and metallurgical industries in Eastern Amazonia has fostered this process in three ways;

1. In light of the economic crisis in many developed nations, low investment opportunities and subsequent low interest rates, during that time, large infrastructure projects in countries such as Brazil provided attractive investment opportunities.
2. With favourable economic conditions and subsidised inputs the state mining company Companhia Vale do Rio Doce CVRD was able to develop into one of the worlds largest iron ore producers with international investments.
3. The provision of cheap subsidised power provided incentives for the migration of energy intensive metallurgical industries from developing countries burdened with high energy prices into Brazil.

The globalisation process was evident in this sector with the involvement of trans-national corporations from countries such as United States, Canada, Japan, France etc. 

Distributional Impacts of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex

When the decision was taken to build a power plant in order to underpin the development of the local mining and metallurgical industry, the preliminary distributive effects soon became apparent. The main 'beneficiaries” of this process in terms either of quantity of power furnished and tariff paid would be large international aluminium industries (based in Japan, Canada and the USA) and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), and consequently related sectors of the national and regional economy. At a secondary level, initially Northeast Brazil would benefit from the power supplied by the Tucuruí hydropower project, in addition to the towns of Belém, São Luiz and Marabá, extending later to Eastern Amazonia. Finally, the decision-makers believed at that time that the local populace would have no net losses or gains, as communities would be compensated and properly relocated.

The gains for major industries were confirmed, but without widespread positive effects expected for the national and regional economies. Regional development was isolated to enclaves surrounding metallurgical industries. Pressures from its international partners forced Brazil to make concessions, particularly in terms of low energy prices, adversely affecting economic gains at the national level, with little or no return for the region. In counterpart, the power supply functions of the Tucuruí complex expanded rapidly, as it grew into a key link in Brazil's hydropower system and consequently the national economy. Today, about 97% of Pará State and 100% of Maranhão State power demand is supplied by Tucuruí.

Power supply for the localities closer to the Dam, however, was virtually non-existent until 1998/99, when the Tucuruí Linhão power-line reached the towns of Altamira, Santarém and Itaituba and a power line that reaches part of the downstream region was built.

The main 'losers” were without doubt segments of the local population - small farmers, indigenous communities and riverbank dwellers whose homes and livelihoods and health were adversely affected by the project. Some of them were subjected to poorly implemented relocation and resettlement processes with inadequate compensation payments, causing material and cultural losses. It should be noted that this process was not homogeneous as well: the downstream populace was not offered mitigatory measures, while the Parakanã indigenous community was awarded a broad-ranging program offering reimbursement for losses and damages, while major land-owners in the Caraipé valley were properly compensated.

Options Assessment and the Decision-Making Process

Four factors heavily influenced the development of hydropower potential in Amazonia. First, the oil price hike in the 1970's provided an incentive for many industrialised countries to shift their primary mining activities to developing countries with cheaper sources of energy; second, the world wide economic recession enabled countries to obtain international loans at low interest rates; third, the development paradigm in Brazil at that time promoted vigorous state intervention and national integration and, fourth, the state drive to nationalise the energy markets dominated by foreign concessionaires. The rapid settlement of Amazonia on a vast scale was considered a top priority for economic, political and national security reasons. With this background the government made provisions for building 79 hydropower plants by 2010, many of them in Amazonia. This led to the launching of the Tocantins Basin Inventory in 1972 and the creation of Eletronorte in 1973, essentially to develop the Tucuruí complex.

The Tucurui Hydropower Complex thus dates back to the 'infancy” of sectoral planning. Planning was restricted to a mere procedural or methodological approach that was essentially sectoral, stressing the stages of the study and their respective minimum contents, providing feedback for a decision process where servicing the power market was always the immediate main purpose. Nevertheless, the history of planning in this sector features a number of cases where strictly technical and economic logic was supplanted by political decisions.

The principle that water should be used for multiple purposes, associated with the integrated use of other natural resources, has long been included in Brazil's national development plans. However, it has produced few definitive results. This is due largely to scattershot sectoral priorities, and short-sightedness on the part of both the Federal Government and the sectors involved, as they seem unable to make good use of complementary effects and opportunities for maximising the planned benefits through well-coordinated, multi-sector actions. This explains why the shipping route and lock at Tucuruí were included in the hydropower project only when it was already at an advanced stage. In the same manner; although the principle that all planning should be socially acceptable is explicitly stated in Brazil's national development plan, no vertical communication mechanisms were ever established to ensure that the large development plans coincided with social needs and priorities and the included public opinion.

Inventories of the Tocantins river basin in order to evaluate hydropower production potential were carried out in 1963, 1969 and in 1972. In 1973 funding was requested from ministerial level for the construction of a hydropower dam. Although there was no definite site, two sites were identified (on of them near the town of Tucuruí) as the most favourable sites. By December 1974 two private Brazilian firms concluded the feasibility study for a dam at Tucuruí. The final order for building the dam at Tucuruí came directly from the then military leader of Brazil.

The operation of the Tucuruí hydropower complex is still carried out with a minimal mandate. It is operated with the solitary goal of producing the maximum amount of hydropower possible with little concern for other uses or users of the water.

The decision to build Phase II of the project was taken by Eletronorte under the context that it is merely a continuation of the previous project not warranting separate impact assessments or consultations. The state of Pará environmental authority concurred and exempted Eletronorte from conducting a formal EIA. Affected people movements and international NGOs who state that the new operating rules of Phase II will result in adverse effects contested this ruling. They contend that the changes should be evaluated in light of the new social and environmental condition of the region.

Criteria and Guidelines: Policy Evolution and Compliance

The Legal and Institutional Framework

The legal framework of Brazil's electricity sector in the 1970s consisted of a State holding company: ELETROBRÁS - Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S/A, and four regional utilities. Eletronorte (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil S/A) incorporated in 1973 was the last of these four and it serves as an ELETROBRÁS subsidiary in the capacity of a public power services concessionaire. Eletronorte was established and began operation in 1973. The operating area of Eletronorte covers all of legal Amazonia, 58% of the land area of Brazil, and currently includes the States of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins.

The policy environment in many sectors of Brazil is currently in a state of flux. Under a government decentralisation drive the electricity sector is undergoing modest reorganisation with the establishment of the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL - Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica) with a mandate to regulate the concession system for public power services. ANEEL, which is was still in the structuring phase at the time this report was written, is to be entrusted with the tasks of authorization, registration, environmental monitoring and evaluation of power plants.

The Evolution of Environmental and Social Policy

Although the current Brazilian environmental law is considered among the most complete in the world, consisting of standards regulating the use of environmental assets and activities that may affect them, as well as standards that introduce environmental protection tools, there was little restriction to Federal Government decision and actions at the time of the Tucuruí decision-making process. After the 1988 Constitution the situation has changed and it would be very difficult to repeat such a decision-making process today.

The construction and start-up of operation of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex took place prior to the introduction of legal requirements for environmental licensing, under Brazilian environmental law. Nevertheless, some pre-existing legal requirements were not taken into consideration by the authorities and the entrepreneur, such as those covered by the Waters Code enacted into law in 1934, stipulating that hydropower venture should comply with requirements protecting general interests such as: (i) food and the needs of riverbank communities; (ii) public health; (iii) shipping; (iv) irrigation; (v) flood protection; (vi) conservation and free circulation of fish; and (vii) the outflow and disposal of water.

Environmental legislation in effect in Brazil since 1986 requires the approval of prior environmental studies for licensing new large-scale hydropower plants. The final decision on licensing is taken by the State Environmental Agencies only after public hearings are held with various segments of society, in order to discuss the conclusions of the studies. However, this process was not required for Phase II of Tucuruí, as it was considered merely an extension of Tucuruí I.

During its construction phase, measures to deal with social issues were implemented in a reactive manner by Eletronorte, lacking guidance from policies covering the resettlement and compensation for the communities affected, as well as for dealing with emergency situations.

Stakeholder Assessment of the Tucuruí Complex

One of the dynamics stipulated in the methodology of the World Commission on Dams was the completion by the participants of the consultative group, a questionnaire containing questions on the effective contribution of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex to development. When analysing these results, it should be borne in mind that the number of people present was not a statistically representative sample of the population of social agents involved. Consequently, no statistical inferences should be drawn from these data. The results are summarised below by question:

1. Does the Case Study Preliminary Report undertake an adequate evaluation of the performance of the project in terms of its initial objectives?

Most participants in the meeting selected the 'I agree” alternative.  

2.  Is the Tucuruí project environmentally acceptable?

Most people selected the 'strongly disagree” alternative, followed by 'disagree”.

3. Has the project encouraged economic growth and generated wealth?

The results of this survey indicated a split in the understanding of the role played by the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex as a springboard for the economic growth of this region. There was a virtual tie between the 'agree” and 'disagree” alternatives

4. Did the proponent comply with the national laws applicable at the time of the development, construction and operation of the project?

Most people felt that it did not do so.

5. Did those in charge of the project adequately assess the options available at that time before taking the decision to build the dam?

According to most of the participants in this meeting, those in charge of the project did not properly assess the existing options before taking the decision. But yet again, there was a provison that consideration should be given to the difficult period through which the country was passing.

6. Did those positively affected participate in the decision-taking processes associated with the project?

About 60% of answers were 'strongly disagree” and 'disagree”. About 24% of answers were 'Agree” or 'Strongly agree”.

7. Did those negatively affected participate in the decision-taking processes associated with the project?

Most participants opted for the 'strongly disagree” and 'disagree” alternatives.

8. Do the direct economic benefits generated by the project (electricity) justify the resources invested? 

About 60% of answers were 'strongly disagree” and 'disagree”. Exactly 1/3 of answers were 'Agree” or 'Strongly agree”.

9. Were the benefits deriving from the project fairly distributed?

Most of the participants opted for the 'strongly disagree” or 'disagree” alternatives.

10. Did the benefits deriving from the project outweigh the negative impacts that it generated?

This result was split equally between the 'strongly disagree – disagree” and 'agree” alternatives.

11. How would you classify the contribution made by the project to development?

Once again, the replies were split between negative and positive.

Lessons Learned

This section presents the lessons to be learned from this Case Study, proposed both by the members of the team as well as the representatives of the different stakeholder groups who attended the meeting of the Consultation Group held in January 2000. These lessons are divided into general and specific lessons, indicated by the technical staff of the participant in the Consultation Group meeting.

1. Future hydropower projects should be implemented according to a new model, which includes regional and local development objectives right from the initial conceptualisation, rather than being limited solely to power generation for ventures producing benefits outside the region.
2. In order to implement new hydropower projects, studies of the hydropower inventory of the entire basin should be reviewed in advance, incorporating in the location and power choice of each power plant location assessments of the resulting social and environmental impacts of all alternatives.
3. The importance of a prior assessment process for the environmental impacts of various alternative sites demands the introduction and fine-tuning of new public participation mechanisms throughout all stages of large-scale dam design: planning, construction and operation.
4. The implementation of large-scale hydropower ventures requires a development committee to be set up for the entire basin, responsible for conducting the project and disciplining negotiations among the various social agents involved.
5. The criteria for defining the area directly affected by hydropower ventures should be reviewed, particularly those with the right to compensation or royalties. This should not restricted to the percentage of the area flooded, and should also introduce social control mechanisms for the allocation and investment of funding.
6. A lack of scientific certainty regarding the scope and relevance of the environmental impacts and risks of the venture cannot serve as an alibi for its failure to consider them, but should rather urge the adoption of the 'precautionary principle” throughout all stages of the project: planning, construction and operation.
7. The lessons learned from the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex case study should be deployed during the planning, construction and operation of new hydropower projects in Amazonia, ensuring that they make a real contribution to the participatory and sustainable development of both the region and the country.

Lessons learned proposed by the participants in the final stakeholder meetings include:

1. Redefinition of the concept of the populace affected, ensuring that this is no longer restricted solely to the population living in the area to be submerged by the future reservoir.
2. Acknowledgement by the project entity that grassroots movements are the legitimate spokespersons for the definition of public policies in taking decisions that affect their lifestyles.
3. The project entity should start off from the principle that community perceptions of impacts affecting their lifestyles, even when lacking scientific proof, should be taken under consideration and be dealt with through social welfare measures and policies.
4. The knowledge already built up of the environmental impacts caused by large-scale hydropower projects should underpin the preparation of social policies for dealing with the associated social issues.
5. Access should be assured to technical information in language appropriate to the public domain, covering the project and its associated impacts.
6. There is a need to establish permanent channels of communication between the project entity and the communities affected by the venture throughout the entire project cycle.
7. Promoting integrated development actions for rural areas, stressing renewable energy projects and upgrading the quality of life for local communities, taking into consideration the fact that the urban populace has easier access to the benefits of these ventures, in addition to poor service levels in rural Amazonia.