4. Projected Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts & Unexpected Impacts

Question No. 2 posed by the World Commission on Dams:
What were the projected versus actual benefits and costs?

Question No. 3 posed by the World Commission on Dams:
What were the unintended costs and benefits?

4.1 Irrigation Assessment

4.2 Hydropower Assessment

4.3 Flood Control Assessment

4.4 Project Affected People

4.5 Ecosystem Assessment

4.6 Recreation

Question No. 2 posed by the World Commission on Dams: What were the projected versus actual benefits and costs?

Question No. 3 posed by the World Commission on Dams: What were the unintended costs and benefits?

The Grand Coulee Dam is unusual in that it was initiated in response to the national economic depression that began in 1929, and one of its principal short-term purposes was to provide relief for unemployed workers. While we will summarise these employment benefits in our assessment, we will concentrate on the more traditional measures of benefits, costs, and impacts associated with water resource development projects.

Arguably, the most sophisticated estimates of monetary benefits would be those associated with the benefit-cost analysis (sometimes referred to as an "economic justification") that has been required of many federal water resources projects in the U.S. since the passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936. Documents prepared for project authorisation before 1936 are not likely to contain the types of rigorous benefit and cost computations that would be expected in projects authorised later.

4.1 Irrigation Assessment

4.1.1 Predicted Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

The studies providing the foundation for the congressional reauthorization of the Columbia Basin Project in 1943 were undertaken beginning in 1941 as part of the Columbia Basin Joint Investigations. A report on the Columbia River Basin conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers provided the essential figures used by the Bureau of Reclamation in estimating the number of acres that could be brought under irrigation, and the types of crops and cropping systems that would accompany irrigation. The report estimated that the net irrigable area would be 1,029,000 acres, and that figure is still used today as the estimate of irrigable area under full project development. The current level of project development includes slightly more than 550,000 irrigable acres. These lands are in portions of Grant, Lincoln, Adams, and Franklin counties, with some northern facilities located in Douglas County.

The area's currently served with irrigation water are commonly referred to as "First Half " lands, and those parts of the project were developed primarily in the 1950s and 1960s, with some acreage being added sporadically until the mid-1980s. Three irrigation districts-Quincy, East, and South districts-share responsibility with the Bureau of Reclamation for operating and maintaining the Columbia Basin Project. In 1989, the Bureau of Reclamation issued a draft environmental impact statement in which the proposed project was to provide irrigation water to project lands not yet served. This attempt to bring irrigation water to " Second Half" lands was not successful, and Reclamation decided not to produce a final environmental impact statement. Thus, the Columbia Basin Project currently remains a little more than half completed in terms of total land provided with irrigation water.

Benefits in the form of higher valued crops and more intensive yields

Many portions of the Columbia Basin Project area can grow crops without irrigation water. However, irrigation water allows for the introduction of higher valued crops, and it also allows for increased yields of crops that could otherwise be grown without irrigation water. The introduction of higher valued crops or more intensive yields (compared to the situation without irrigation water) provides one measure of the benefit of providing irrigation water.
One of the reports of the Columbia Basin joint investigations provides estimates of the types of crops and cropping systems likely to be brought under irrigation as part of the Columbia Basin Project. The report notes that "lands of the project are physically suitable to a wide range of crops, including alfalfa, clovers, small grains, corn, flax, sugar beets, potatoes, field peas, onions, and many fruit and vegetable crops." The report goes on to observe that for many of the crops, for example, vegetables, and fruits, the market, rather than physical limitations, is likely to be the critical factor determining the acreage grown. Furthermore, the report estimated the following overall breakdown for the project as a whole at full development: " 40 percent of the lands will be used for hay, 23 percent for pasture, 14 percent for four small grains, 18 percent for other field crops, and five percent for fruit and vegetable crops."

In making their estimates, authors of the joint investigation report highlighted the tentative nature of predictions and called for the periodic re-examination of their findings and conclusions. They urged that the experience of settlers on the first blocks to be brought under irrigation be used in making adjustments in procedures and policies, and they also argued that a program for data collection and analysis would be helpful in making plans as new portions of the total project were served by irrigation water.

Monetary estimates of direct (or primary) economic benefits

The formal procedure for estimating economic benefits from irrigation involves a determination of the net increase in income from the land receiving irrigation water. Economic analysis involves making projections of cropping patterns and crop yields with and without irrigation water. A widely used monograph describing the estimation of benefits of water resource development projects in the United States characterised the benefit estimation procedures used by the Bureau of Reclamation as follows:

The basic data for this (irrigation benefit) computations are drawn from farm budget studies, which have been undertaken by the Bureau [of Reclamation]. These studies show output, production expense, and family living expense figures for farms of different types. For any given project it can be determined what kinds of farms are likely to be developed and in what numbers; these figures can be combined with the budget studies and price estimates to derive an aggregate analysis for the entire farming operation on the project (Eckstein, 1961:198).

In practice, the cropping pattern without irrigation water is often taken as the pattern that existed before the project, unless there were reasons to anticipate improved dry farming operations. Cropping patterns with irrigation water are sometimes estimated by examining the cropping patterns on nearby irrigated areas with similar soil types, climate, etc. For crops whose price is likely to be unaffected by the quantities of output linked to the project, market prices are often used to convert crop output data to monetary income.

The fact that pre-project estimates of irrigation benefits are based on predictions of future market prices suffices to signal the hazards involved in making meaningful comparisons of pre-project and post-project benefit estimates. Moreover, post-project benefits (based on comparisons of income with and without irrigation water) are often not conducted on a regular basis. For all of the reasons mentioned above, we are not optimistic about identifying information that would allow a meaningful comparison of pre-project and post-project direct monetary benefits of irrigation.

Monetary estimates of indirect (or secondary) economic benefits

In the United States, the subject of indirect benefits has been controversial, except when benefits are calculated from a regional (as opposed to a national) point of view³. To avoid these controversies, we will adopt a regional perspective in examining indirect economic benefits. In this context, many economists point to two types of indirect economic benefits that can accrue within the region served by a new irrigation project. One type of indirect benefit, the so-called induced benefit, occurs because the money payments made in constructing the project, at least in part, contributes to local wages and profits. These payments constitute income that is re-spent by the recipients for the purchase of goods and services. This sets off a chain of interactions which are sometimes referred to as "multiplier effects."

The second type of indirect benefit, the so-called stemming benefit, originates in the processing stages of production and is therefore confined to the period of project operations. The basic idea is that increased farming activity will require increased purchases of seed, fertiliser and so forth. And they will also require increased payments for crop transport, grain storage, and the like. Thus the physical interdependencies among economic units is a key source of economic benefits from a regional point of view.

³ The nature of the controversy over whether irrigation projects yield indirect benefits to the nation as a whole is detailed by Eckstein (1961:202-12)

4.1.2 Unexpected Irrigation Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

Unexpected impacts associated with early project operations

By 1946, a number of farmers withdrew lands amounting to more than 300,000 acres from the Columbia Basin Project. Although these farmers wanted cheap, subsidised irrigation water, they also wanted to control all the land they owned, not just 160 acres of it. The land withdrawals on the East Side of the project made construction of the proposed East Side canal impractical. This withdrawal of almost one-third of the project land was unexpected. After 1946, Reclamation decided to undertake piecemeal construction of dams, canals, wasteways, and other irrigation works spread out over several decades.

Another unexpected event that interfered with Reclamation's efforts was the Congress' decision in 1943 to abolish the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), the main force behind the effort to draw-up master plans for the region (among others). The Washington State legislature formed a new Columbia Basin Commission in 1943 to fill the planning vacuum created by abolition of the NRPB. As a result of shifts in top-level staff at the Bureau of Reclamation during 1946, Reclamation shifted its focus away from long-term planning and began to emphasise construction of irrigation works.

After irrigation water began to flow in 1952, the Bureau of Reclamation recognised that much of the Columbia Basin Project required unanticipated and expensive drainage works to carry away excess water. Reclamation pressed farmers to renegotiate contracts to pay for the unexpected additional costs. However, farmers avoided repayment negotiations with Reclamation. Instead they lobbied Congress to ease restrictions on the maximum size of land holdings. Modern, efficient methods of farming meant that farmers could increase their incomes by working with substantially larger holdings. Over time, changes in technology and the economics of agriculture have place increasing pressure on the viability of the 160-acre limitation set out in the Reclamation Act of 1939.

The above noted stand-off between Reclamation and its project settlers eventually halted continuation of the Columbia Basin Project and had unanticipated consequences. By 1967, after years of disagreements between Reclamation and the farmers - particularly over acreage limitations - both the Washington legislature and the U.S. Congress lost enthusiasm for the Columbia Basin Project: the Columbia Basin Commission was disbanded and federal project funding decreased notably.

Increased consumptive use of Columbia Basin waters

Currently, irrigation from surface and groundwater is by far the dominant off-stream use of water in the Columbia River basin. Collectively, both federal and non-federal irrigation projects have led to the introduction of enormous areas of irrigated land. In Washington alone, it is estimated that more than 1.8 million acres of land is served by irrigation water. The federal agencies' System Operations Review concluded that most streams in the Pacific Northwest are fully appropriated or over appropriated (Volkman,1197:55).

The diversion of water from the upper Columbia River above Grand Coulee Dam during the irrigation season reduces annual river flows downstream. Part of this loss is made up by irrigation return flows.

Quality of irrigation return flows

The adverse effects of irrigation return flows on water quality are widely recognised. Typical adverse effects include increased levels of salinity, and the runoff of sediments, pesticides, and chemical fertiliser in irrigation return flows. The problem of linking water quality degradation to irrigation is made complex by the large number of other activities, such as timber harvesting, grazing, and land development that also affect water quality adversely.

According to the Bureau of Reclamation's 1989 draft environmental impact statement (EIS) on "Continued Development of the Columbia Basin Project, Washington," beneficial uses of the project area's primary surface water systems (as classified by the Washington Department of Ecology) included drinking water supplies, irrigation, stock watering, fish and wildlife habitat, food processing, and recreation (p. III-31). The draft EIS also indicates that irrigation return flows often have temperature, fecal coliforms, suspended solids, dissolve solids, and nutrients in excess of the amounts found in source water for project lands.

Effects on groundwater quantity and quality

The 1989-draft environmental impact statement summarises an assortment of project impacts on groundwater quantity and quality. For example, when project water was supplied to the Quincy basin sub area, water levels rose nearly 30 feet per year in some areas. Water levels continued to rise for approximately ten years after the onset of irrigation. Levels eventually stabilised when the groundwater table reached the level of its surface drainage channel (p. III-49).

According to a study by the Montgomery Water Group (1997:3), artificially stored groundwater resulting from the Columbia Basin Project operations has been licensed by the Bureau of Reclamation under an "artificially stored groundwater program" since 1975. As of 1996, approximately 40,000 acres in the project area were being irrigated under this program.

Effects of irrigation on population and communities

Although some of the promoters of the Grand Coulee Dam had hopes that the area would be converted to a major agricultural and industrial complex, most of the industrial development that is linked to the project occurred in Portland, Seattle, and other cities that were far from the project area. Population in the Columbia Basin Project area was undoubtedly influenced by the conversion to irrigated agriculture to some extent.

Factors influencing CBP expansion

Since 1968, less than 50,000 additional irrigated acres have been added to the Columbia Basin Project. In the mid-1980s, the Bureau of Reclamation initiated an unsuccessful attempt to add substantially to the project. Indeed, Reclamation circulated a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) in 1989 laying out alternative plans for bringing in more irrigated land into the CBP. However, because of concerns about salmon, as well as the project's potential to adversely affect hydropower generation and water quality, Reclamation decided to shelve its plans. The draft EIS has not been issued in final form.

As of the late-1990s, irrigation components of the Columbia Basin Project (as authorised) remained far from complete. Of the one million plus acres scheduled to receive irrigation water in the original project proposal of the 1940s, just over 550,000 acres had received water.

4.1.3 Issues to be addressed

Irrigation: planned versus actual benefits, costs and impacts

1. Determine actual areas irrigated by Columbia basin project versus areas proposed to be irrigated for selected time periods.
2. Based on available data, report on trends in crops and crop values over selected years.
3. Report on predicted vs. actual costs for Bureau of Reclamation irrigation works' construction and operation and maintenance.
4. Summarise studies reporting on direct and indirect economic benefits of CBP irrigation, such as those conducted by Weeks and Peterson (1967) and Olson (1996).
5. Verify that traditional kinds of irrigation-related benefit estimates conventionally considered a part of benefit cost analysis are not available.
6. Determine, based on available data, the degree to which different groups (e.g., small landowners, large landowners, Native Americans, minority immigrants) benefited from irrigation water provided by the CBP.
7. Based on available data, assess planned versus actual cross-subsidisation from hydropower revenues to CBP irrigators.

Irrigation: unexpected impacts

1. Identify, to the extent that data is available, costs of unanticipated drainage works to carry away excess CBP water beginning in 1952 for selected years.
2. Report on extent of water logging due to inadequate drainage.
3. Based on available data, report on the effects of decreased flows to fisheries related to CBP irrigation withdrawals.
4. Summarise water quality problems associated with irrigation return flows to surface water.
5. Summarise effects of irrigation return flows on groundwater quantity and quality.

4.2 Hydropower Assessment

Although the impetus for early project planning was irrigation, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt supported the placement of a dam at the Grand Coulee in 1932, the principal project purpose was hydroelectric power, and an important reason for Roosevelt's support was that the project's construction would provide relief to unemployed workers. Even as the project evolved in the 1940s, and irrigation resumed its earlier prominence as a central purpose, hydropower remained important because of the revenues it generated. With passage of the Rivers and Harbours Act of 1935, it was understood that power generation at the Grand Coulee Dam would provide a "means of financially aiding in assisting" such undertakings as irrigation and flood control. Two years later, Congress passed the Bonneville Project Act which created the federal agency that eventually became the Bonneville Power Administration (in 1940) to carry out the marketing and distributing of power generated at federal dams on the Columbia River. Federal legislation requires that revenues from the sale of hydroelectric power at federal water resource development projects on the Columbia be used to pay for the entire portion of project costs allocated to electric power, the federal transmission facilities, and a fraction of project costs allocated to irrigation. Revenues from power sales also support the rehabilitation of fish and wildlife populations.
 
Collectively, power from dams on the Columbia River produce more than 70 percent of the power used in the Northwest. The Bonneville Power Administration has gone to great lengths to optimise the operation of the dams in the U. S. Federal Columbia River System to produce hydroelectric power. The Grand Coulee Dam plays a central role among all dams that make up the System, in part because of the enormous storage capacity of Lake Roosevelt. With its location just south of the Canadian border, Lake Roosevelt is in a key position to store releases from Canada, and to release them at the most opportune times from the point of view of hydroelectric power production at the Grand Coulee Dam and at downstream hydroelectric facilities.

4.2.1 Predicted Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

Effects of hydropower on the development of the Pacific Northwest

At the time construction began on the Grand Coulee Dam in the 1930s, the demand for all of the power that would be generated had not yet materialised. However, there was tremendous interest in the creation of public utility districts to provide a market for the power generated at the Grand Coulee Dam, and many people expressed great enthusiasm for the concept of power provided by public utilities at "postage stamp" rates, low uniform wholesale rates across the entire region. It was thought that such rates would promote wide use of the abundant hydroelectric power that would soon become available. As the prospect of war became more real in the late 1930s, little remained of the early concerns about whether there would be demand for the power generated by the Grand Coulee Dam (and the Bonneville Dam, which was being built at approximately the same time). Moreover, the Bonneville Power Administration of the 1940s and '50s had been particularly successful in responding to one part of its original charter: "encourage the widest possible use of all electric energy that can be generated and marketed" (White, 1995: 72).

Low-cost hydroelectric power marketed by the Bonneville Power Administration helped transform the Pacific Northwest. Richard White, a noted historian of the American West, has aptly described this transformation:

During World War II, electricity from the dams [on the Columbia River] went almost totally to defence. National defence, in turn, gave the region the industrial base it so longed for. The dams powered the shipyards of Portland, Vancouver, and Seattle, the aluminium mills the Defence Plant Corporation built across the Northwest, and the factories that turned aluminium into airplays. They supplied power to the top-secret project at Hanford, which was producing plutonium for the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. It was the federal investment and federal power that freed the Pacific Northwest from being a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the East (White, 1995: 72).

Monetary economic benefits of hydropower

The Bureau of Reclamation has been a pioneer in the development of procedures for estimating the monetary economic benefits of hydroelectric power projects (Eckstein, 1961:239). Prior to 1952, Reclamation estimated direct power benefits as being equal to the actual expected revenues to be collected. It also had procedures for estimating indirect benefits. These procedures were heavily criticised, and in 1952 Reclamation changed its calculation methods completely. The procedures adopted in that year measure the benefit of hydroelectric power by the cost of power from the most economical alternative source. As pointed out by Extern (1961:Chapter 8) in his highly regarded monograph on the economics of water resource project evaluation, many assumptions must be made in using these benefit estimation procedures, and those assumptions can affect significantly the numerical values obtained as benefits.

Projections of direct hydropower benefits in the original documents used as a basis for authorising the Grand Coulee Dam are unlikely to exist because Reclamation was not required to make such benefit estimates in the early 1930s. However, data on such calculations probably exist in authorisation documents for the Third Powerplant, since that project was constructed well after Reclamation had standardised procedures for calculating hydropower benefits. Although there may be estimates of current economic benefits, studies comparing post-project hydropower benefits with comparable estimates of pre-project benefits are unlikely to exist.

4.2.2 Unexpected Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

Grand Coulee Dam and World War II

When President Roosevelt approved the Grand Coulee Dam project, he could not have anticipated the enormously significant role of the Grand Coulee Dam in providing electricity to support the manufacture of aluminium in the Pacific Northwest. Aluminium manufacturing played a pivotal role in the U.S. effort to produce large numbers of aircraft for use against the axis powers in World War II. Although it was unanticipated, the benefit of having enormous quantities low-cost electricity from the Grand Coulee (and Bonneville) dam in World War II was of pivotal importance in the war effort.

Ironically, the war itself caused some delays in bringing the full hydroelectric generating capacity of the dam online. The full generating capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam (as authorised by Congress in 1935) was made available in 1951. Years later, Congress authorised the Bureau of Reclamation to generate even more power at the Grand Coulee Dam, and this was reflected in the construction of the Third Powerplant. Following completion of the Third Powerplant, the Grand Coulee powerplant complex had a "nameplate capacity" of about 6,480 megawatts.

Unexpected Impacts of the Third Powerplant

The Columbia River Treaty cleared the way for the addition of the Grand Coulee Third Powerplant. It also guaranteed the additional power needed by the Bonneville Power Administration to create a power "intertie" in which it sold Canada's share of the Columbia River Treaty power in the Southwest during periods when the power represented an unwanted surplus in the Northwest. On June 14, 1966, Congress authorised the Third Powerplant at the Grand Coulee Dam (Public Law 448, 89th Congress). The first unit in the powerplant started generating electricity in 1975, and the sixth and final unit was completed in 1980, which marked the final completion of the Third Powerplant Project (as authorised).

A notable adverse consequence of constructing and operating the Third Powerplant was a significant increase in the fluctuation of the river downstream of the dam. These fluctuations, which began to occur in the mid-1970s, caused significant instability in the riverbank downstream of the Grand Coulee Dam. The resulting damage to the banks led the Bureau of Reclamation to initiate major bank stabilisation works over a six miles stretch of the river. The project, which involved reshaping slopes, placing riprap, installing dozens of wells, and constructing extensive drainage works, continued from 1982 until 1988.

Environmental benefits of hydropower compared to thermal power

From an environmental perspective, hydroelectric power is relatively clean. Unlike power generated from thermal power facilities using coal, oil or gas, hydropower facilities do not emit sulphur dioxide, greenhouse gases, and other air pollutants.

Dynamic system benefits of hydropower

The nature of hydropower as an energy source provides distinct advantages over other sources of power (e.g., thermal) in areas such as frequency control, voltage control, and synchronous condenser operation. These dynamic system benefits can generate economic efficiencies that are not available to power generating facilities using other energy sources.

Hydropower within the Columbia Basin Project canal system

The striking increase in value of electric power in the 1970s caused the irrigation districts that are part of the Columbia Basin Project to construct hydroelectric generating facilities on canals within their districts where hydraulic head and flow discharge were large enough to justify the required investments. Based on agreements between the irrigation districts and the Bureau of Reclamation, the districts had the option to construct hydroelectric facilities on the canal system provided Reclamation was not interested in doing so. Since construction of these facilities commenced in the early 1980s, seven generating plants have been licensed, financed and constructed, and they have a total installed capacity of approximately 145 MW. These plants were financed and constructed by the cities of Seattle and Tacoma and by Grant County Public Utility District No. 2., but the irrigation districts own the plants.

Adverse effects of super-saturated dissolved gas

During the mid-1960s, problems caused by super-saturation of dissolved gases had become evident. Super-saturation occurs during high runoff when water is released over a spillways at dams in the Columbia River basin. These supersaturated levels of gas interfere with wild salmon and other aquatic resources in the Columbia Basin. Because the flows arriving from Canada between May and August of most years are generally supersaturated when they arrive at the Grand Coulee, releases from the Grand Coulee during those months generally exceeds the 110 percent of total dissolved gas that represents the standard for the river. This occurs even when there are no spills at the Grand Coulee dam, but the problem is exacerbated during very wet weather when spills are required. Long-term solutions to this problem are currently being researched by a number of organisations.

Importance of the Grand Coulee Dam in the context of the Columbia River Treaty

Because of their size and location near the Canadian border, the Grand Coulee Dam and Lake Roosevelt have come to play a pivotal role in the creation of downstream hydroelectric power benefits from releases from Canadian storage reservoirs.

Tensions resulting from increased demand for low cost power

The power generated by Grand Coulee and other dams in the Columbia River Basin are relatively inexpensive, and this low cost power has been used by local officials to attract industry to the region. An unintended side effect of increased industrial development in the project area is that demand for low cost power created by the Grand Coulee and other dams in the basin often exceeds supply. When this occurs, Bonnevilee Power Administration must purchase more costly incremental power to serve its customers. Tensions between BPA's industrial customers and its public customers have arisen over the issue of who should pay for the relatively high-cost incremental power that BPA must purchase when demand for power execs supply.
 

4.2.3 Issues to be Addressed

Hydropower: planned versus actual benefits, costs and impacts

1. Examine available pre-project authorisation documents to determine whether estimates were made of expected hydroelectric power generation, expected revenues from the sale of this power, and expected cost recovery; to the extent that such information is available, compare those estimates to actual power generation, revenues, and cost recovery for selected years.
2. Based on available data, characterise the "dynamic benefits" of hydropower versus other types of power generation as they pertain to the Grand Coulee Dam.
3. Identify primary beneficiaries (in both the public and private sectors) of hydropower generation.

Hydropower: unexpected impacts

1. Using available data, characterise the nature of the bank stabilisation problems below the Grand Coulee Dam and the relationship between these problems and the Third Powerplant.
2. Based on available data, characterise hydropower facilities built on irrigation canals. Determine whether these hydropower facilities were planned for in original project authorisation documents.
3. Describe the nature of the dissolved gas super-saturation problem as it pertains to the Grand Coulee Dam.
4. Describe the tensions between BPA's public and industrial customers that have arisen due to the demand for low-cost power generated by the Grand Coulee Dam and other dams in the basin exceeding supply.

4.3 Flood Control Assessment

4.3.1 Predicted Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

In the Congressional Act that authorised construction and operation of the Grand Coulee Dam, flood control was listed as one of the project's main purposes. However, since the Grand Coulee Dam was authorised in the 1930s, a time when benefit-cost analyses were not required for federal water projects, little formal data exists on the projected flood control benefits of the project.

A local newspaper article from 1937 estimates that annual flood control benefits were $5 million and dam backers said that the dam would end downstream flooding (Pitzer, 1994:258). An issue of Atlantic Monthly in 1936 carried an article stating that the Grand Coulee Dam would control floodwaters "down the Columbia to 450 miles to the sea." We have found no information on projected benefits that is more quantitative or more carefully detailed. Documents we reviewed, as well as our consultations with flood control staff at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Portland Division Office, suggest that little, if any, detailed information exists on pre-project estimates of monetary flood control benefits provided by the dam.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, local project proponents did not view flood control as a major purpose of the Grand Coulee Dam. Bureau of Reclamation correspondence from then Commissioner Floyd Dominy dated 1961 indicates that, in fact, the dam was not designed specifically for flood control operations (Pitzer, 1994:260). However, the Army Corps of Engineers "308" study on the Columbia River Basin lists flood control as a potential project purpose.

The projected cost of flood control works relative to the project, as a whole was modest. When the government allocated the total cost of the dam to its various components, the amount indicated for flood control and navigation combined amounted to only $1 million (Pitzer, 1994:258). Despite its large size, Lake Roosevelt, with an active storage capacity of about 5.2 million acre-feet, is actually quite small relative to the immense flow of the Columbia River.

Flood control operations prior to 1972

During its early years of operation, the Grand Coulee Dam was not managed with flood control as a priority. Generally, the reservoir level reservoir was kept high to maximise the potential to generate power and to provide irrigation water. The limited ability of the dam to control floods became obvious when it was unable to prevent severe flooding in 1948. That year, the peak flow of the river reached 800,000 cubic feet per second. In its wake, the city of Vanport, then the second largest city in Oregon, was destroyed. The disaster caused over $100 million in property damage, demolished 38,000 homes, and killed 38 people. The 1948 flood losses demonstrated that the flood control-related projects in the basin at that time were not capable of handling large flows. After 1948, efforts at basin-wide flood control (along with basin-wide hydropower management) received heightened attention and congressional funding.

From 1948 to 1972, significant improvements were made in flood control operations at the Grand Coulee, and other multi-purpose dams were brought on line that provided additional flood control benefits. After the 1948 flood, an interagency task force released a basin-wide plan, which called for 7 major dams on the main stem of the Columbia River. The proposal's estimated cost was 3 billion dollars. In 1950, Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers agreed to use 900,000 acre-feet of storage in Lake Roosevelt for flood protection, and in 1954, it is estimated that the Grand Coulee Dam and associated flood control works in the basin reduced the flood crest in Portland by over 1 foot (Pitzer 1994:260). Government estimates for flood control benefits attributable to the Grand Coulee prior to 1972 ranged from $79,000 in 1960 to $25 million in 1956 (Pitzer 1994:261).

Flood control operations after 1972

By 1972, flood control operations had become fully integrated into the operation of dams throughout the Columbia River Basin. Three projects in Canada were completed in that year. The Canadian projects were able to store water and control releases in ways that greatly enhanced the generation of hydropower and provision of flood control benefits throughout the basin.

Most of the system storage capacity on the Columbia River is in Canada. Out of 37 million acre-feet (MAF) of available storage, 43% (16 MAF) is provided by U.S. facilities. The Grand Coulee Dam-with the largest reservoir on the U.S. side-
is the system's main storage dam, accounting for about one third of the total U.S. storage capabilities and 13% of total U.S. and Canadian storage. The dam is the gateway for 74,000 square miles of river drainage and is operated for flood control in conjunction with 10 other dams on the mainstem Columbia. Lake Roosevelt is the last major catch basin for flood control on the river. Today, the combined operation of dams in the U.S. and Canada has served to significantly reduce the potential of downstream flooding.

While Reclamation has general responsibility for operating the Grand Coulee Dam, the Corps is responsible for specific operations related to flood control. In the spring, rain and melting snow generate large volumes of runoff. When runoff is high, the level of Lake Roosevelt is lowered to accommodate high river flow, thereby reducing the risk (or minimising the impact) of downstream flooding. The Corps regulates the level of Lake Roosevelt based on daily, weekly, and monthly forecasts of upcoming river runoff. Using these forecasts, reservoir regulators determine the maximum controlled flow for the downstream portion of the Columbia River and adjust reservoir outflows accordingly.

Since 1972, estimated monetary benefits of basin-wide flood control have been substantial. Corps records summarised in Appendix D provides annual data on controlled flows, uncontrolled flows (i.e., what flows would have been without flood control), and estimates of damages prevented. This data show the value of flood control operations in the basin for particularly wet years has been on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, in 1972-one of the highest runoff years of the century-river flow downstream of the Grand Coulee was regulated to 618,000 cubic feet per second (cfs). River levels reached 6 feet above flood stage and caused $1.5 million in damage. In contrast, the Corps estimates that uncontrolled flows (at over 1 million cfs) would have caused approximately $213 million in damage in the lower basin and resulted in river levels 18 feet above flood stage.

While substantial, the exact flood control benefits directly attributable to the Grand Coulee Dam itself are difficult to detail because the storage capacities of all the major reservoirs that provide flood control are linked and operated as a system. The Corps maintains general records of system-wide flood control benefits but does not dis-aggregate benefits on a project-by-project basis.

4.3.2 Unexpected Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

The major flood control activities that are carried out at the Grand Coulee Dam are: 1) maintaining a certain storage level within Lake Roosevelt (i.e., keeping levels low enough to accommodate runoff during the spring and early summer), and 2) controlling flows at the dam site. These activities are also closely tied to the operation of the project for hydroelectric and irrigation purposes. Therefore, the unanticipated effects of these activities are not solely attributable to flood control operations. The major unintended impacts of the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP are discussed in other sections of the report and include adverse effects on ecosystems (particularly anadromous fish), recreational benefits, and project-affected people.
A phenomenon often associated with increased flood protection is increased settlement in floodplains. Flood protection commonly facilitates settlement in previously flood-prone areas.

4.3.3 Issues to be Addressed

Flood control: planned versus actual benefits, costs, and impacts

1. Review original project authorisation documents for the Grand Coulee Dam to determine the extent to which flood control benefits were computed and taken into account in decision making at the time of project authorisation.
2. Review available data on project specific costs associated with constructing, operating, and maintaining flood control works over the project's lifetime; as part of this task, determine whether data exists on flood control as a separable cost of the Grand Coulee Dam.
3. Based on available data, characterise the main groups who enjoy increased flood control benefits downstream of the Grand Coulee Dam.

Flood control: unexpected impacts

1. Investigate the feasibility of identifying any links that may exist between flood control at the Grand Coulee Dam and intensified development of the floodplain downstream of the dam.

4.4 Project Affected People

Two principal groups of people were affected directly by the project: 1) people whose lives were disrupted by project construction in the 1930s and 1940s, and 2) those affected by subsequent project operations. People in the first category include Native Americans and settlers whose land was inundated by the dam and reservoir. Entities in the second category are farmers in the project command area, and individuals residing upstream and downstream of the dam whose livelihoods were affected by project operations.

4.4.1 Projected Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

Groups impacted by dam and reservoir construction

Preparing the project area for construction of the Grand Coulee Dam required major relocations of people already settled in what would become the location of the dam and Lake Roosevelt. Unoccupied land was secured by the federal government without problem, but obtaining land occupied by settlers and Native Americans was more difficult. Home sites, both upstream and downstream, that needed to be relocated numbered in the thousands. A portion of the dam and reservoir site was also located on land owned by the Colville and Spokane tribes.

In return for their land, the settlers received monetary compensation. At this point, little is known about the extent to which project planners considered what groups of people would need to be relocated; how much they planned to spend on compensation; the mechanism by which oustees would find new homes; and the final settlement amounts for various groups of relocated people.

Property rights of the Spokane and Colville Indian tribes were also affected by construction of the dam and reservoir. Treaties between the tribes and the federal government controlled the use of the land needed to build both the dam and reservoir. In order to use the land, Reclamation had to broker an agreement requiring congressional approval. Negotiations took place between 1935 and 1939, while the dam was under construction. In the early stages, the affected tribes felt that construction of the dam on land they owned violated their treaty rights. They were also concerned about traditional burial sites that would be flooded once the dam was constructed and the reservoir began to fill (Pitzer 1994:220).

By early 1939, the tribes and the federal government had still not reached official agreement that would have granted permission to the government to flood parts of the Indian reservations. In March, water had begun to cover reservation property, and most of the families whose land would be inundated had already reached independent settlements with the government. In late 1939, a hasty agreement was put together that gave the tribes $174,000 for their land, and Congress formally legalised the transaction (Pithier 1994:221). Data on the degree to which project planners considered how negotiations with the Indian tribes would be handled compared to how they actually came to pass is not readily available.

Groups Affected in the Irrigation Command Areas

A primary purpose of the project was to provide irrigation water to farmers in the command areas. See Section 5.1 for a list of issues to be addressed in this category.

Groups Affected Upstream Effects

Little data exists on people living upstream at the time of dam construction. Prior to construction, Canadian government officials considered how the project might affect them. At the time, they did not perceive the loss of salmon spawning grounds caused by dam construction as significant. However, indigenous people in the Canadian portion of the upper basin were dependent on salmon that spawned above the Grand Coulee Dam. Any Native American tribes who had traditionally fished above the Grand Coulee Dam were literally cut off from the salmon.

Groups Affected Downstream Effects

The principal downstream effects of the project are linked to flood control (Section 4.3) and fisheries (Section 4.5); there may also be effects related to recreation.

4.4.2 Unexpected Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

A significant unexpected impact of the project during dam construction involved the theft of Indian artefacts from graves and the failure to relocate Indian burial sites that were eventually inundated by the reservoir. In 1938, before the reservoir began to fill, the tribes and federal government agreed that the graves would be relocated. However, during the relocation process, many Indian artefacts buried with the deceased were stolen or taken to museums for "preservation." According to Paul Pitzer, an historian who has extensively studied Grand Coulee Dam construction, tribal officials viewed these unscrupulous activities as "a looting of their ancestral lands" (Pitzer, 1994:221). After the Colville Indian tribe objected to the removal of artefacts from burial sites, Reclamation halted the relocation project. It is impossible to determine how many artefacts were taken and if any were taken after the tribes voiced concern.

By 1940, 1,200 Indian graves had been relocated. At that time, 2,000 additional burial sites were discovered and it was projected that many more might exist. Later that year, attempts to relocate graves was halted, despite protests from the tribes and the 1938 agreement Reclamation had signed with the tribes.

Another type of unexpected impact concerns litigation over the taking of settler and Indian reservation land to develop the Grand Coulee Dam and Lake Roosevelt. When the government initially offered to buy the land of people residing in the future dam and reservoir location, many refused, arguing that the proposed compensation amount was too low. In response, the government exercised its "taking" rights and the courts had to eventually settle the issue of compensation. Several local residents joined together to file suit against the government, alleging unfair taking of about 1,100 acres of land. The government had appraised the property at approximately $15,000, but the plaintiffs argued that their land was worth $15 million. The case was first heard in 1935 and in the end, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $17,000, even though estimates of lawyers fees were $10,000. Outraged, the settlers appealed-first to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and next to the Supreme Court-but the ruling held.

Negotiations for land further upstream of the dam were not as contentious, but most farmers who lost their land also felt that were not adequately compensated. Water eventually inundated the now non-existent towns of Peach, Keller, Lincoln, Gerome, Gifford, Inchelium, Daisy, Kettle Falls, Marcus, and Boyds.

Both the Colville and Spokane tribes felt they had been unfairly treated during construction. In 1951, 1975, and 1991, they took legal action against the government demanding reparations for the forced inundation of tribal lands, the loss of traditional fishing and root digging areas, the failure to honour agreements and treaties, and other "historical inequities." Their main argument was that the government had never justly compensated them for their losses, despite decades old promises. In 1994, part of the conflict was settled, when federal officials announced that the government would pay the Colville Confederated Tribes, which had owned land on the dam site, a lump sum of $53 million and $15.25 million annually thereafter. The Spokane tribe, which owned land farther upstream, was not part of this agreement.

4.4.3 Issues to be Addressed

Project-Affected People: Planned Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

1. Review available Bureau of Reclamation files and attempt to determine pre-project relocation plans; Bureau of Reclamation staff has indicated that records of original relocation plans may be very difficult to locate.
2. Where feasible, compare planned versus actual compensation agreements.

Project-Affected People; Unexpected Impacts

1. Describe key unexpected impacts of the project on affected groups such as oustee rights and litigation, the controversy over the flooding of Native American burial sites, the theft of artefacts from burial sites that were moved, and the loss of cultural and archaeological resources in the inundated area.
2. Report on treaty rights of Native American tribes to harvest from populations of wild and hatchery-raised salmon as they pertain to the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP. Characterise cultural significance of salmon to Native American tribes and people of the Pacific Northwest.
3. Document, based on available information, the impact of Grand Coulee Dam and CBP on commercial and sport fishing.

4.5 Ecosystem Assessment

4.5.1 Predicted Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts: Anadromous Fish

The most salient ecosystem impact has been the detrimental effect of the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP operations on anadromous fish populations. Historical runs of anadromous fish (e.g., salmon and steelhead trout) returning to the Columbia River a century and a half ago ranged between 10 and 16 million fish annually. Today, the numbers are significantly less-only 2.5 million fish return every year, and most of those go to hatcheries rather than to traditional spawning grounds. In 1991-92, three species of Snake River salmon, were listed as endangered or threatened (i.e., the Snake River Sockeye Salmon, the Snake River Spring/Summer Run Chinook, and the Snake River Fall Run Chinook). Since the time of listing, populations of these species have dropped 75%.
 
While not the sole cause of declines in fish populations, the construction and operation of dams and irrigation projects within the Columbia River Basin, including the Grand Coulee, is a significant contributing factor. The Grand Coulee Dam, which was built without fish passage facilities, eliminated over 1,200 square miles of spawning grounds in the Upper Columbia Basin, nearly half of the watershed that the salmon has historically traversed. Dams and irrigation projects along the Columbia have also affected the fishes' natural environment, through changes in water quality, flows and creation of physical obstacles.

Anticipated project effects on fish populations and early mitigation efforts

In the planning stages of the Grand Coulee Dam, officials acknowledged that construction of the dam would eliminate half the species' traditional spawning grounds and have significant impacts on the fishing industry. The Federal Power Act of 1920 required that the licensee of a hydroelectric project on a public waterway protects migratory fish or compensates by building hatcheries. But determining an appropriate method to protect salmon populations during the planning and early construction stages of the dam proved to be a lengthy and protracted process.

Beginning in 1933, the Bureau of Reclamation, the U.S. Department of Fisheries, and the State of Washington debated for several years over what steps should be taken to preserve the fish runs. Several alternative methods for fish mitigation were considered. In 1938, the North Central Washington upper Columbia River Salmon Conservation Project was agreed upon by Reclamation and relevant federal and state agencies as the plan for migratory fish control in the upper basin. The project plan centred on operating a fish hatchery at Leavenworth and several other locations. Under the plan, fish traps would be installed at the Rock Island Dam to snare mature salmon (in 1944, the fish ladders at Rock Island were altered to enable salmon to pass through to eliminate the need for expensive trucking). The eggs would be artificially propagated and the young salmon replanted to new locations below the Grand Coulee Dam in hopes that they would identify these locations as their spawning grounds. This plan required mechanically transporting both young and mature fish and was both complicated and experimental. The plan for the entire project involved establishing four hatcheries at an estimated 1939 cost of $2.5 million dollars.
Between 1933 and 1943, the number of salmon moving through the fish ladders at Rock Island ranged from 20,000 to 35,000 annually. By 1949, the Bureau of Reclamation declared the mitigation program a "success" and transferred over full ownership of the hatcheries to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. However, overall mitigation efforts (i.e., fish passage facilities and hatcheries in the basin) to protect fish populations encountered difficulties. For example in 1971, the National Marine Fisheries Service estimated that dissolved gas super-saturation killed 70% of downstream migrants in the lower Snake River (Mighetto and Ebel 1994:89).

The Northwest Power Act passed by Congress in 1980 created an interstate agency, the Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC), with federal powers. The Council's mandate included the authority to call for changes in the management of the hydropower system in order to protect anadromous fish. The Northwest Power Act stated that anadromous fish conservation efforts must be put "on par" with the generation of hydroelectric power. Despite the Council's efforts, however, fish populations continued to decline.

The fall of salmon populations has been particularly damaging to Native American tribes that depend on salmon harvests. Treaty agreements with the federal government guarantee the tribes the right to harvest fish on their "usual and accustomed" grounds in perpetuity, and related Supreme Court rulings have further translated the treaty to ensure the tribes the right to 50% of the harvestable yield. However, recent yields have been so low that in some traditional fishing locations, the harvestable yield has been zero.

The salmon crisis in the Pacific Northwest is widely documented and the subject of numerous investigations being conducted by research institutions, agencies, and non-governmental organisations throughout the region. The answers to many questions about the main causes of decline and what should be done to resolve the problem remain unclear. The WCD study will not add any new information to this debate. Rather, we will focus our inquiry on impacts directly attributable to the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP, namely, the loss of habitat caused by construction of the dam, the hatchery program, and the impacts of CBP irrigation and farming practices on salmon habitat and health.

Recent recovery efforts

In early 1980s, the Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC), along with congressional leaders, project operators, fisheries agencies, Indian tribes, and Northwest utilities established the Water Budget. It is water used to increase river flow to help flush young fish downstream to the ocean.

Over 1990 and 1991, a stakeholder group, including representatives from federal agencies, the basin states, Native American tribes, the commercial fishing industry, hydropower and irrigation interests, developed an integrated plan for restoring salmon populations to healthy levels. The result of this "Salmon Summit" was that governors from the basin states directed the NPPC to develop a comprehensive salmon management plan. In 1992, the NPPC published its Strategy for Salmon, which recommended a series of actions to improve conditions for salmon in different parts of the basin. Those actions particularly relevant to Grand Coulee Dam, the CBP, and the hatchery program include augmenting instream flows and improving barge transport of juvenile fish past dams.

Expenditures on salmon recovery projects

Estimates of how much money has been spent on salmon recovery vary. An article appearing in 1988 in the Wenatchee Daily World, estimated that since 1972, the government had spent $127 million dollars (about $8 million annually) to preserve the salmon for an industry that yielded $17 million annually. Another estimate puts a price of $2.5 million annually on fish recovery efforts. However, the significance of salmon in the Pacific Northwest goes far beyond their economic value. In this region, the salmon is an icon of life and renewal, and not just to Native American tribes that depend on the salmon for subsistence. As recent newspaper coverage to Endangered Species Act listings makes clear, salmon have "iconic value" to the millions of residents living in the Pacific Northwest. The high cultural value Native Americans and Pacific Northwest residents place on wild salmon populations explains, in part, why so much public attention has been focused on salmon recovery efforts in the region.

4.5.2 Unexpected Impacts: Anadromous Fish

Effects of farming and irrigation practices

Farming practices (e.g., livestock grazing) have damaged gravel streambeds that serve as the birthplace for young fish and the final resting-place of spawned-out adults. If sediment from nearby farming covers the gravel in the riverbeds, the survival of eggs is severely impaired. Certain farming practices can also impair riparian conditions that are necessary for successful young hatchling migration to the sea (e.g., eliminating shade needed to protect fish from warm temperatures, eliminating currents that provide food, and providing habitat for resting and protection from predators). In addition, polluted agricultural runoff and irrigation return flows that find their way back into the river can degrade water quality by adding salts, fertiliser, pesticides, and livestock waste to the water. Certain irrigation practices have also served to further reduce fish populations. Due to agricultural diversions, many Columbia River tributaries have dried up during low water periods, reducing the amount of habitat available for spawning populations (Mighetto and Ebel 1994: 30)

Cumulative and indirect effects

Given available scientific knowledge, it is virtually impossible to desegregate the specific impacts of the Grand Coulee Dam and the CBP on anadromous fish populations. Between 1953 and 1968, nine new dams on the Columbia and the Snake Rivers were constructed, which further disrupted fish runs. In addition, extensive irrigation works from the CBP were brought on line in the 1950s and 60s, which removed significant volumes of water from the river during key migratory periods.

Super-saturation of river waters with nitrogen gas can occur when water released from a reservoir plunges down a spillway. As discussed previously, this condition is deadly to fish. When dams are constructed so closely together that excess nitrogen cannot sufficiently dissipate by natural means, the problem becomes especially problematic (Mighetto and Ebel, 1994:89). The adverse impact of dissolved gas super-saturation on fish populations was unanticipated; scientists did not discover the link between the phenomenon and fish mortality until the mid-1960s, about 20 years after the Grand Coulee Dam was built.

Between dams, the slow-moving water in reservoirs also makes passage to the sea more difficult. Instinctively, wild salmon expect a rapid and relatively effortless journey, helped along by seasonal runoff. Juveniles in the Columbia now have to swim through a series of lakes that are up to 4 degrees warmer and up to 10 times slower than the natural river and this reduce survivorship. Additionally, changes in aquatic ecosystems (e.g., water temperature and sediment load) caused by dams and dam operations can also adversely affect the fish.

Other factors affecting salmon decline

In addition to the negative effects of dams, irrigation, and farming practices on fish populations, other factors, including over-harvesting, logging, and urban sprawl, are also thought to have contributed to species decline since the early part of the century.

Numerous studies have been conducted by a myriad of marine biologists, ecologists, and natural resource economists to determine the causes and solutions to declining fish populations. To date, however, there has not been a study that all relevant interest groups have been able to agree upon. The complex life cycle of the fish makes controlled experiments virtually impossible, so it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the effect of individual factors on species decline. A salmon run can collapse due to impacts that occur anywhere in its life cycle, from the gravel bed where it is born, to the inland river that it uses to migrate to the ocean and returns to spawn, to the ocean where it matures to adulthood.

4.5.3 Unexpected Impacts: Other Ecosystem Effects

Creation of new lake fisheries and wetlands

Construction of the Grand Coulee Dam, while it eliminated a large portion of habitat for anadromous fish, created a new kind of ecosystem in Lake Roosevelt: a managed fishery. The reservoir created by dam construction is home to a variety of native and non-native fish species. Native fish include kokanee salmon (land-locked sockeye), rainbow trout, bull trout, white sturgeon, and a variety of whitefish, minnow, sculpin, and sucker species. The following species have been introduced: brook trout, brown trout, walleye, yellow perch, largemouth bass, smallmouth bass, black crappie, white crappie, sunfish, and yellow bullhead (National Park Service, 1998: 86). As described in Section 4.6, recreational fishing is popular in the Lake Roosevelt area. The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Spokane Tribe manage the fishery. In addition to Lake Roosevelt, the Columbia Basin Project has created other lake fisheries valued by anglers in areas such as Potholes Reservoir, Moses Lake, and Billy Clapp Lake. In addition to man-made lakes, a side effect of CBP operations was that new wetlands and riparian areas were created. The recreational use of these newly created ecosystems is discussed in Section 4.6

Downstream ecosystem impacts

Apart from concern for anadromous fish, the potential negative effects of the Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project on downstream systems were not seriously considered during project planning or construction. No environmental impact assessment was undertaken, as these studies were not required in the U.S. until the early 1970s. At this point, we are not aware of significant downstream ecosystems (other than those linked to anadromous fish) that were damaged or destroyed as a result of the project.

Upstream ecosystem impacts

We currently have little information on the influence of the Grand Coulee Dam and the CBP on upstream terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. The most prominent effect will likely be the loss of salmon habitat caused by dam construction. Loss of migrating and dying salmon also reduced nutrient inputs into the upper river system (which is naturally nutrient poor) and depleted the amount of food available to wildlife such as bears and eagles.

4.5.4 Issues to be addressed

Anadromous fish: planned versus actual benefits, costs, and impacts

1. Describe the expected impacts of Grand Coulee on fish and the pre-project fish mitigation plans for the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP.
2. Compare, to the extent possible, the planned versus actual capital and operating costs and benefits of implementing fish mitigation efforts related to the CBP.

Anadromous Fish: Unexpected Impacts

1. Identify and comment on activities associated with the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP that have contributed to anadromous fish population declines. It will be impossible to disaggregate the effects of this project from all other factors contributing to the decline in anadromous fish populations.

Expected and unexpected Impacts

1. Review project authorisation documents to determine if federal fish and wildlife agencies conducted assessments of baseline ecosystem conditions and/or predicted post-project ecosystem conditions (excluding anadromous fish); to the extent feasible, compare this data with actual impacts.
2. Based on available information, compare planned versus actual costs, benefits, and impacts of implementing ecosystem mitigation efforts related to the Grand Coulee Dam and the CBP (excluding anadromous fish).
3. Summarise available information on how operations of the Grand Coulee Dam and CBP affect lake fisheries in the project area.
4. Summarise data on the values of new wetlands and riparian areas created by CBP water.

4.6 Recreation

4.6.1 Projected Versus Actual Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

Recreation was not specifically identified as a project purpose when the Grand Coulee was authorised in the 1930s. Because they were not included in authorisation documents, the recreational amenities created by the project-largely comprised of reservoirs, seep ponds, and wetlands-are considered to be unanticipated.

4.6.2 Unexpected Benefits, Costs, and Impacts

While recreation was not specifically identified as a project use in the original project planning and authorisation documents it later became a major source of unanticipated benefits for the residents of the Pacific Northwest. Within the Columbia Basin Project, there are 27 designated recreational sites (including 5 major reservoirs) that recorded a total annual attendance in 1994 of approximately 3 million people. In 1990, government officials estimated the total number of visitor days to Lake Roosevelt at 1.5 million, 500,000 of which were attributed to visiting the Grand Coulee Dam. CBP-related recreational areas currently in use cover almost 390,000 acres.
 
The recreational benefits of the project stem from the formation of planned and unplanned reservoirs and wetlands. Planned reservoirs include Lake Roosevelt, the largest reservoir in the project area, as well as Banks Lake and Potholes Reservoir. Filling the Potholes Reservoir and irrigating nearby farmlands caused numerous seep lakes and marshes to develop in the area just below the reservoir. Before the project, there were 35 lakes, now there are more than 140. Lake Roosevelt is the centrepiece of the recreational system, stretching for 151 miles and offering more than 600 miles of shoreline. Lakes and wetlands created by the project provide an excellent habitat for many species of fish, birds, and other wildlife. The most popular type of recreational activity is fishing, followed by picnicking, sightseeing, and hunting. Other uses of the project area include camping, water-skiing, boating, canoeing, kayaking, hiking, swimming, jet skiing, wildlife observation, horseback riding, rock hounding, scuba diving, photography, and bird watching.

Several federal, state, and tribal organisations manage different parts of the recreational area. The National Park Service administers the Coulee Dam National Recreation Area, which includes about 75% of the reservoir and shoreline. The remainder of the area is under the responsibility of the Colville Confederated Tribes and the Spokane Tribe of Indians. Several other states and federal agencies manage the facilities other than Lake Roosevelt, including the Washington State Department of Wildlife, Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The Washington State Department of Wildlife is responsible for most of these areas. The U.S. Department of the Interior also sponsors a Youth Conservation Corps that builds nesting platforms, creates dikes for fish spawning grounds, maintains trails, and engages in other conservation-oriented activities.

Fish and Wildlife

Fishing is the most popular recreational activity enjoyed on project lands. In 1994, it is estimated that visitor days for fishing related activities totalled almost 1.4 million Co-operative planning among several agencies has made this one of the most popular outdoor recreation areas in the Northwest. Year round fishing is available on project reservoirs, subject to State of Washington regulations. Most project lakes are stocked with game fish such as rainbow trout and kokanee salmon.

Seep ponds and wetlands created by the project were discovered by migratory waterfowl using the Pacific Flyway. In 1956, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service took over management of the 28,000 acre Columbia National Wildlife Refuge where 100,000 birds pass through annually. Officials and visitors have reported seeing over 150 different songbirds, shorebirds, hawks, waterfowl, and other birds. Waterfowl and upland game bird hunting is popular. A study conducted by Olsen (1996: Table 5) estimated that total visitor days to the CBP area for the primary activity of hunting was over 47,000. The presence of abundant wildlife also attracts birdwatchers, photographers, and nature study groups to project areas.

Grand Coulee Dam National Recreation Area

The Grand Coulee National Recreation Area includes Lake Roosevelt, Grand Coulee Dam, and surrounding areas. Lake Roosevelt, is the largest recreational facility in the system, extending 151 miles from the dam to the Canadian border. The recreational area houses over 30 campgrounds, 10 swimming beaches 18 boat ramps, and 28 boat docks. Six major facilities operated by the Colville Indian tribe offer houseboat and fishing boat rentals, fuel, and food. The recreation area also offers a self-guided tour of the dam, its power plants, and its pump-generating plant. It also houses a visitor centre and holds laser light shows. Tourists visit this attraction from all over the world, and in 1994, almost half a million people toured the dam.

Facility Utilisation

The high season for recreational activities in the project area is the summer months of July, August, and September. Peak season at Lake Roosevelt runs from mid-June to mid-September. Appendix E provides estimates of visitor days for 23 of the major recreational area in the system. As Appendix shows, Lake Roosevelt and the Grand Coulee Dam are, by far, the most popular visitor attractions accounting for about half of the total visitor days in 1994. Near full reservoir levels are the best conditions for reservoir use. At these levels, users can access all facilities and the water level creates an aesthetically pleasing shoreline, or beach.

Drawdowns for hydropower flood control, and fish migration purposes can adversely affect the use the reservoirs for two reasons. First, some activities (e.g., boating) may become infeasible if water levels are too low (e.g., dry boat ramps). Second, reduced scenic quality caused by extensive, barren areas of shoreline makes the zone less visually attractive. The U.S. National Park Service determined that a reservoir elevation of 1,288 (2 feet below full pool) was ideal for the recreational season. At 1,287 feet, negative affects on the use of recreational facilities occur. At 1, 285 feet, use of all recreational facilities is impaired, and at 1,280 feet, many facilities are unusable. Typical dam operations ensure that lake levels are between 1,285 and 1,290 by July 31 of each year (US DOI, 1993:12-5).

Over time, use of the recreational facilities in the project area has increased significantly. In 1985 attendance exceeded 500,000 visitor days in the project area and attendance increased to approximately 3 million in 1994.

Direct and Indirect Economic Benefits

Few comprehensive studies exist that focus specifically on recreational benefits in the project area. However, a 1996 study by Olsen (1996)⁵ presents estimates of total direct net value (i.e., net economic value derived from primary uses of recreational facilities), and secondary economic benefits of recreational purposes served by the project area. In his analysis, the total direct net value of recreational benefits was between $21 and 70 million annually (based on 1994 activity levels). This estimate does not include all forms of flat-water recreational activity such as motor boating. In addition, Olsen estimated secondary economic benefits (e.g., lodging, food, gas) to be $22 million annually. Recreation-related businesses are an economic mainstay for many communities located on or near the major reservoirs.

⁵ Olsen used a variety of data collection and analysis methods in his investigation including: minimum standard recreation value estimates developed by the federal government, estimates of recreational activity (e.g. from Army Corps of Engineers Systems Operations Review), and estimates of recent studies conducted for similar types of recreational activity.

4.6.3 Issues to be Addressed

Recreation: unexpected impacts

1. Verify that recreational benefits generated by Grand Coulee and CBP facilities were unanticipated at the time of project authorisation.
2. Summarise available data on levels of recreational activities (e.g., fishing, hunting, sightseeing, tourism) associated with Columbia Basin Project for selected years.
3. Summarise available studies on the direct and indirect economic benefits generated by provision of recreational facilities created by the Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project.
4. Describe how operation of the Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project promotes or constrains recreational activities.
5. Based on available data, characterise the nature of the people and groups who use the project's recreational facilities.