Introduction

As part of the 2-year mandate of the World Commission on Dams, a review of the "development effectiveness" of large dams in the world is to be undertaken. Before launching the worldwide case studies program for up to 15 focal dams in the context of national and trans-national river basins, an initial pilot study on the Orange River was selected to test the concepts, methods, data collection procedures and means of interaction with the stakeholders. The experience with the pilot exercise will be used to formulate the terms of reference for the world wide case studies; and secondly, to provide a model or example report to guide the other in-country teams preparing the other case studies.

Gariep and Van der Kloof dams are key components of the Orange River Project launched in 1963. Completed in the early 1970s the project involves irrigation, water supply and power generation, and illustrates the complexity of inter-basin transfers in a semi-arid country.

The process initiated by WCD involves drafting a scoping paper that is submitted for review to a stakeholder meeting. Comments on the methodology and on the substantive issues to be addressed are recorded in the minutes, and built into the workplan for the study, as necessary. The study team is composed of Secretariat staff and South African consultants and will report back to a second stakeholder meeting planned for February 1999.

If you wish to contribute to this process you may submit your views and opinions on the Gariep/Van der Kloof dams by responding to any, or all, of the questions that are proposed in order to collect the views of different interest groups in a structured way. These will be considered in the final report.

REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF GARIEP AND VANDERKLOOF DAMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ORANGE RIVER BASIN, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA.

SCOPING PAPER

Summary:
A review of the development effectiveness of large dams in the world is to be undertaken as part of the 2-year mandate of the World Commission on Dams,. The WCD will draw upon three primary sources of information and experience for this work, including case studies, thematic reviews and inputs from interested groups and individuals received through the Commissioners and various outreach mechanisms. Conclusions about the past performance and development experience with large dams will be derived from this base of knowledge, and summarized as lessons learned, with convergent or divergent views noted. Subsequently the WCD will propose criteria and guidelines for future decision-making.

Before launching the worldwide case studies program for up to 15 national and trans-national river basins, an initial pilot study on the Orange River was selected to test the concepts, methods, data collection procedures and means of interaction with the stakeholders. The experience with the pilot exercise will be used to formulate the terms of reference for the world wide case studies; and secondly, to provide a model or example report to guide the other in-country teams preparing the basin case studies.

This scoping paper includes issues, ideas and comments received during the meeting of stakeholders and interested groups held on 17 November 1998 in Pretoria.

1. Background

1.1 Purpose of the Global Case Study Program

The mandate for the World Commission on Dams requires it "evaluate the development effectiveness of large dams". The purpose of the focal dam/river basin studies is to obtain information and elicit views on the performance and development effectiveness of a select number of large dams in different regions of the world. Information generated by the case studies and complementary parallel activities, such as the data base work comparing the experience with large dams, will be provided to the Commission members and incorporated in a Commission report on the Global Review of the Development Effectiveness of Large Dams.

The case studies work is co-ordinated by Secretariat staff on behalf of the Commissioners and has two inter-related parts. Firstly, the individual river basin/focal dam case studies will be prepared by inter-disciplinary teams consisting of in-country/regional institutions supervised by Secretariat staff. Secondly, Secretariat staff will develop a comparative database of 150+ large dams drawing information from the focus and non-focus large dams in the river basin case studies, and also drawing from a wider selection of large dams around the world including those suggested by interested parties and by opportunity sampling.

The four main lines of information collection for the basin/focal dam case studies will aim to provide:

a. Basin profile:
a profile of the full river basin (or major tributary) which will include descriptive level information on the basin characteristics including the main physical, socio-economic, cultural and environmental parameters; and also sketch the broader policy/planning context, non-dam options implemented in the past, decision-making context and institutional framework;

b. Focal dam assessment:
detailed information on the focal dam to prepare parameters and indicators to illustrate the performance efficiency, impacts and development effectiveness of the focal dam. This will include both quantitative and qualitative information;

c. Interactive effects of dams:
information to elicit and evaluate the interactions between the focal dam and the other existing large dams, to explore whether such issues were relevant in planning and decision-making stages, and to assess the cumulative impacts where relevant;

d. Data base information on the non-focal large dams:
information on the non-focal large dams in the basin for inclusion in the large dam comparison database as a separate exercise handled by Secretariat staff.

Standard check lists and data formats will be used in all the basin case studies. Examples of these will be presented at the meeting, based on the models pre-tested in the Orange River pilot in South Africa.

For the case studies the concept of "development effectiveness" is taken in the broader sense. This includes the relevance and appropriateness of large dams as a response to the needs that motivated their construction (e.g. irrigation, power, flood management, water supply). It further comprises the projected versus actual services and benefits, the costs associated with results obtained, the distribution of gains and losses among groups, and the general conditions under which they were built and are operated. This latter aspect relates to decision-making and consultative processes, and to the ex-post validity of the key assumptions upon which dam projects were originally developed.

1.2 Case study procedure

The Orange River case study is being undertaken as a pilot, and it is therefore important to briefly describe the procedure for the worldwide case studies which will be undertaken by the WCD. The attached figure illustrates the various steps to be undertaken for each case study. To a large extent, we wish to follow the general procedure in the Orange River pilot and then modify the procedure based on the experience in preparing the pilot.

1.3 Purpose and structure of the Scoping Paper

1.3.1 Purpose

The scoping paper is an important first step in the case study and follows the normal procedure for project-specific EIA's. The scoping paper identifies where the main issues surrounding the dam/river basin lie in relation to the objectives of the study; where to focus and mobilize resources in order to address these issues, and where key lessons can be learned as a contribution to the WCD process. The pilot is not intended to be a definitive study by itself, but an orientation tool that guides the process of methodology development.

The broad structure of the paper will also be mirrored in the final report, and some sections are therefore more relevant for this output than for the current scoping purpose (eg sections 10 and 11)

1.3.2 Structure

To structure the information collection, discussion and the assessment of development effectiveness to be provided in the report, six central questions have been identified that form a key component of the WCD work programme and methodology. These will be addressed in each case study and the scoping paper is structured around these questions. They are:

	What were the projected vs actual benefits, costs and impacts ? (section 4)
	What were the unexpected impacts ? (section 5)
	What was the distribution of costs and benefits - who gained and who lost ? (section 6)
	How were decisions made ? (section 7)
	Did the project comply with the criteria and guidelines of the day ? (section 8)
	How would this project be viewed in today's context ? (section 11)

The responses to these particular questions will be combined with additional development indicators gathered through the questionnaires and used to assess the "development effectiveness" of the dam and lessons learned (section 10).

Interlinkages within the basin, and interactions with other large dams, will also be reviewed. (section 9).

1.3.3 The study area

The area concerned by this scoping paper is the Orange River basin within South Africa from its origins in the east of the country, and Lesotho, down to the Orange River mouth on the Atlantic coast., with a particular focus on the Gariep and Vanderkloof dams. These dams are indissociable in their design and management, and operate in tandem. Other dams in the basin include the, Vaal, Bloemhof, Grootdai and Katse dams, the latter a key component of the Lesotho Highlands development project.

2. Country/regional context

2.1 Historical context

The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, and although formally the British government and parliament had reserve powers, de facto independence dates from 31 May 1910. Formally, South Africa's full sovereignty came after the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. (South Africa became a republic in 1961, but this only had the effect of changing the head of state and did not affect the independence/ sovereignty issue.)

At the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer war in 1902, the British had control over the entire area of South Africa: the Cape and Natal which were self-governing colonies the Transvaal and Orange Free State which were run directly by Britain the "High Commission Territories" or "protectorates" of Bechuanaland(now Botswana), Basutholand (now Lesotho), and Swaziland.

In 1906 and 1907 the Transvaal and the Free State were given responsible government. After constitutional negotiations culminating in a National Convention(excluding blacks), the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. However it was not strictly an independent country. Legislative powers were vested in the South African Parliament (a House of Assembly and Senate) and effective executive control through South African ministers (nominally vested in the King through the Governor-General). However, the Governor-General had the power to reserve the signing of Bills, and all South African laws were subject to the British Colonial Laws Validation Act.

After the First World War, the status of the dominions like South Africa changed and a report of the Imperial Conference declared that the dominions were equal in status and in no way subordinate to Britain. The Statute of Westminster 1931 put legal effect to this when the British Parliament gave up its right to legislate for the dominions. This was recognised in South African legislation by the Status of the Union Act 1934 which declared the Union a "sovereign independent state". So, although there were strong political links with Britain and although South Africa and Britain shared a common king, South Africa was an independent country by the start of the Second World War.

2.2. Context at conception of Orange River Development project

Construction of labor-intensive irrigation settlements along the Vaal and lower Orange Rivers began as early as the 1920s and 1930s. Initial surveys and investigations including drilling for potential sites for dams were initiated in 1944. Until the 1950s, no major storage was envisioned for the Orange River although diversion projects to the Fish and Sundays Rivers were considered. A project to pump water from Lesotho, which at the time had not achieved independence and was still Basutoland, to the Orange Free State in South Africa was mooted around 1955. The project was to be paid for by power generation and most likely would have provided water supplies to the growing Gauteng area and not the Orange Free State.

But during the late 1950s, the development of the entire Orange River had increasingly become a priority for South Africa. The reasons for this new direction are unclear, but there is some anecdotal evidence that interest groups such as the Northern Cape Development Association had begun to pressure authorities to support agricultural development in the region. Certainly, increasing population growth - particular in urban areas - and the associated increasing needs for food and water must have also created demand for rapid development of the region's resources.

The changing political economy of South Africa in the early 1960s gave a further impetus to the development of large dams in the Orange River Basin. First South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth. Second, there was increasing political turbulence within the country, as highlighted by the Sharpville massacre of 1960. As a result of this political change and instability, capital flight out of the South Africa became a major constraint on national economic growth. In response, the first official report on building a large dam on the Orange River was published in 1961.

The Orange River Project was first authorised by the South African Government in a White Paper of 1962-63. A primary, but unwritten, goal of the project was to restore national and international confidence in South Africa. The project was rapidly approved, and the planning for the project presented in the 1962-63 White Paper had fewer analytic underpinnings than would be acceptable today, although this was probably common practice at the time as illustrated by the Tennessee Valley approach. A series of modifications were made to the project design during the implementation period over the next decade.

South Africa financed the Orange River Project from the national budget during the 1960s and 1970s primarily through foreign exchange earnings from gold exports.

2.3 The Orange River basin

The Orange River Basin is the largest watershed in South Africa. The river (also called the "Gariep', Hottentot for 'Great River', or Dragon River by the Bushmen) is the largest in Africa south of the Zambezi, with a total catchment area in excess of one million square kilometers. More than half the catchment is in South Africa, spanning six of the country's nine provinces, with the remainder in Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. The Orange River's natural flow constitutes more than 22% of the South Africa's surface water resources.

The river originates in the Drakenberg Range, in the NE corner of Lesotho. After leaving Lesotho, the river flows westwards for 2100 kilometers through regions of steadily decreasing rainfall and increasing aridity, finally discharging its water in the South Atlantic Ocean near Alexander Bay. The rainfall at the source is in the order of 2000 mm per year, dropping to less than 50 mm per year near the mouth. Evaporation rates range between 2000 to 2500 mm per year, generally increasing from East to West.

The main tributaries are the Caledon River, which forms part of the western border of Lesotho, the Kraai River, and the Vaal River, which drains large parts of the Free State and southern Transvaal. Further downstream the Orange receives water from the Hartbees, Molopo and Fish rivers, the latter draining a large part of Namibia. Under natural conditions all these rivers fall dry several months of the year, even the Orange itself.

2.4 Institutional framework for the basin

There has never been a single overarching Orange River Basin authority. Within South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs has been the central government agency with authority to develop the basin's water resources. The importance of the 1956 Water Act in setting the legal framework in which the Orange River Project could be formulated and executed cannot be underestimated. Prior to this policy, the South African State's property rights over water resources were considerably weak in relation to private landholders. In addition the 1956 Act outlined the procedure by which large water projects could be sanctioned, including the approval by Parliament of investments in the sector proposed in the form of a White Paper.

3. Brief introduction to the focal dams

3.1 Gariep and Vanderkloof dams

The central objectives of the Gariep and Vanderkloof dams were to store and divert water to promote and stablilise irrigation along the Orange River and in the Eastern Cape. Secondary objectives included supply of water to urban centres and industries in the south-east, reduction of severe flood damage and electricity generation.

The Orange River is deeply incised in the surrounding country between the Lesotho border and Petrusville, preventing irrigation on a large scale in this area. Further downstream, particularly in the Prieska-Upington area, the land is low lying with large tracts of fertile flat land, suitable for irrigation. The first major intervention in the early twentieth century, a 32 km long irrigation canal, was built at Upington to take water from the river to new irrigation lands. The first time the Orange was dammed was in 1929, when Buchuberg Dam (Boegoeberg Government Water Scheme) was built, about halfway between Prieska and Upington.

The first official plan to divert part of the Orange water to the adjacent Great Fish River Valley came in 1928 from AD Lewis, Director of the Department of Irrigation (the forerunner of the present Department of Water Affairs and Forestry). He had inspected the Lower Orange as early as 1912 to determine the prospects for irrigation, and concluded that surplus water would be available for out-of-basin diversion. Dr Lewis suggested the construction of a tunnel to divert water from the Orange to the Great Fish River Valley, and from there to the Sunday River Valley. In both areas good agricultural land was available, partly already irrigated. However the five existing rather small man-made reservoirs were almost full of sediments, and new land was brought under cultivation, causing water shortages for downstream farmers.

Between 1944 and 1948 intensive field surveys, geochemical investigations and design work were carried out, and in 1948 a detailed technical report was presented to the Government proposing a diversion dam on the Orange, and a canal and tunnel to divert part of the Orange River water into the water deficient Great Fish River Valley, with a secondary diversion to the Sundays River Valley. In 1956 South Africa passed a new Water Act, which allows, inter alia, for diversions of water from one catchment into another, preparing the legal ground for the project. In 1959 a comprehensive study investigated the various proposals and combination of proposals for the development of the Orange River. These studies led to the formulation of the staged development plan set out in the White Paper of 1962.

The uprise in Soweto in 1960 and subsequent capital flight out of the country triggered a political decision to rapidly start the construction of what was called the Orange River Project (ORP). On March 23, 1962, it was officially announced that the first stage of the ORP was to be launched immediately.

The main purpose of the ORP was to provide water for irrigation and for urban and industrial purposes. The project would be developed in phases over several years with the following components :

	a storage dam to regulate the Orange River water at the Ruigte Valley (now called the Gariep Dam)
	the Orange-Fish Tunnel, to divert water from the Gariep Dam to the North Eastern Cape Province
	a high diversion dam at Van Der Kloof to enable gravity command over the Van Der Kloof and other areas in the Free State and Northern Cape Province
	the Van Der Kloof Canals System, which would feed water by gravity and by pumping to low rainfall regions in the Free State and the Karoo
	the Fish-Sundays Canals System with Cookhouse Tunnel to divert water from the Fish River into the Sundays River Valley
	various hydro-electric power stations, including one at Gariep and one at Van Der Kloof Dam and one at the outlet of the Orange -Fish tunnel
	the Welbedacht Dam on the Caledon River to provide water for the Caledon-Bloemfontein Water Scheme
	the Hennie Steyn Bridge, replacing two road and rail bridges inundated by the Gariep Reservoir.

3.2 Predicted benefits.

The White Papers of the time lay out the following benefits from the scheme:

	irrigation of some 310,000 ha (360,000 morgen) of land, and create employment for 40,000 workers, improving the livelihood of some 160,000 people (workers plus their dependents)
	the benefits of power generation from an installed capacity of altogether some 150 MW
	supply of water to the towns of Bloemfontein, Kimberley, De Aar, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Cradock, and many small towns in the southern Free State, North-Western Cape, and Eastern Cape Province.
	flood control along the whole course of the river downstream of the Gariep Dam, reducing the occurrence of damaging floods by 50 per cent.
	creation of tourist and recreational facilities, especially at the two man-made reservoirs.
	stimulation of rural development, including communication facilities, schools, hospitals, and road and railway extensions.

Although there were a substantial number of design changes as time passed by, the ORP has essentially been built as conceived. Details of these benefits, as they appear in official documents of the time are given in the annexes.

3.3 Other water resources schemes affecting the basin

Development of the Vaal River preceded the development of the ORP by decades due to the discovery of gold and the ensuing high rate of economic growth in that region. Currently the Vaal River is regulated by the major Vaal, Bloemhof and Grootdraai Dams together with several dams on tributaries.

As a result of the continued economic and population growth in the Vaal Basin supply area, the requirements for water by far outstrip the capacity of local resources. Water is therefore transferred to the Vaal Basin from various parts of the country where water resources are considered plentiful.

The latest such interbasin transfer scheme is the first phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which will transfer water from the upper reaches of the Orange River to the Vaal Basin and will reduce somewhat the net inflow into the Gariep Reservoir.

Recognizing the need to optimally exploit and use its precious water resources, the Government is currently completing the ORP Replanning Study in which all aspects of development are critically reviewed. Compared to planning work done in the 60s and 70s, much more attention is paid to environmental and social factors. Also the Orange River Replanning Study will take into consideration the new 1996 Water Law, which aims at more equitable water rights.

4. Projected vs. actual benefits, costs and impacts:

Question posed by the Commission

What were the projected vs. actual benefits and costs ?: This will consist in assessing the extent to which large dam projects have achieved their stated objectives. Expected responses, depending on the type of dams, include the comparison between: electricity production forecast and actually generated; projected and actual area of irrigated lands or production; forecast crop value and actual value; change in flood damages before and after project, actual and predicted costs and impacts for each phase, predicted impacts and their mitigation/compensation etc.

The Water Act 1956 did not provide for regular evaluation of performance from capital infrastructure, such as dams and irrigation systems. There are therefore no internal government documents of which we are aware that provide regular appraisals of performance, and hence provide a baseline for assessing development effectiveness. The data probably exist in government and local archives, but will have to be gathered together and synthesised.

4.1 Irrigation assessment

Global statistics identify the significance of irrigated agriculture in meeting the world's food needs. Irrigated agriculture produces 40% of food and agricultural commodities from approximately 17% of all agricultural land. Within the global figures of food production there is great variability in levels of national food security, local availability and nutritional status. South Africa provides an example of a country which both exports and imports foodgrain and exports higher value agricultural produce (including, fruit, hides, sugar, wool and wine). Exports account for approximately 50% of agricultural production. Currently, a surplus of more than 3 million tonnes of maize exists that can be used to export to regional food deficient countries and in 1998/99, a deficit of approximately 0.5 million tons of wheat will be covered by imports. At the same time, two thirds of those living in the former homelands are below the official poverty line.

There are three distinct irrigation areas commanded from the dam covering a total of approximately 150,000ha of irrigated land - the Orange River (70%), Fish River (22%) and Sundays River (8%). In the Orange River reaches, more than 66% of the area is for foodgrain with the balance orchard and fodder crops. In general the lower reaches of the Orange flow through arid lands that are only productive if irrigated. The variability in cropping pattern throughout the area is significant, with a predominance of fodder crops and field crops in the upstream areas changing through a concentration of orchards in the middle reaches back to field crops in the lower reaches. In the Fish river, fodder crops predominate while in the Sundays river 66% of the area is under orchard.

Parameters to be determined under the study include irrigated areas, production, net returns and the productivity of land and water. These are relatively standard parameters of performance and data is generally available, although not always at the desired level of aggregation. In overall terms, irrigation directly benefits farm families through improved nutrition and increased disposable income. The distribution of these benefits is a specific issue to be examined under the study (see Section Distribution of Benefits, below). The benefit stream from increased crop production leads in turn to benefits to the local, regional and national economies which will also be an important element of the study. Lower food prices as a result of irrigated production are also passed on to the urban consumer.

The speed with which the project was developed left little time for thorough delineation of the irrigation areas that could be served by the project. Some candidate irrigation schemes were only visually inspected and part of the predicted area of irrigation have not been realised due to only rudimentary surveying of the available areas before the WP of 1963. Many of these have since proved unsuitable for irrigation due to unsuitable soil types.

Multiplier effects and development impacts of irrigation include additional and more secure farm employment opportunities, marketing and other services, rural industries based on agro-processing, and crafts. Water use for non-irrigation purposes such as rearing of livestock and household uses can also be significant either in terms of monetary benefit or releasing time from water collection to other more productive tasks.

The overall rise in living standards leads to general area development including better education and health facilities and infrastructure. Providing employment opportunities in rural areas and localised industry also reduces migration to urban areas and the costs to society of a large unemployed or underemployed urban workforce. The non-direct benefits of irrigation are often not recognised at the time of system design and are rarely, quantified. One of the key elements of the study will be to develop a methodology for capturing the incremental, non-direct benefits of irrigated agriculture.

Box 1: Irrigation Issues to be addressed: 1. Assess actual irrigation releases vs. originally proposed. 2. Assess actual areas irrigated by dam vs. proposed 3. Review actual benefits by area and by year, (through selective sampling) compared to predicted benefits. 4. Predicted vs. actual annual operation and maintenance operating costs and requirements 5. Assess degree of cost recovery. 6. Number of jobs created; un- and under-employment indices. 7. Assess contribution of farm incomes to local regional and national economy.

5.1 Unplanned Irrigation

Stakeholders said this was not an unexpected benefit but a predictable one

In addition to the planned irrigation schemes, farmers took advantage of the regulated flows as a guaranteed irrigation source, requesting water permits and then irrigating from their own pumps. These permits operate outside the formal irrigation board areas. It is, however, estimated that 15 000 ha, or half, of the irrigated land between Boegoeberg dam and Aughrabie is affected, or potentially affected, by salinisation.

Box 8: Unplanned Irrigation Issues to be addressed : 1. Estimate numbers of permits officially issued and areas of actual irrigation without permits 2. What is agricultural production from informal irrigation (sample as necessary) 3. Are payments made for the water, if so how much & to whom ? 4. What is the level of cost recovery for water and electricity 5. What is the extent of pump fuel and water cost subsidies 6. How are salination & waterlogging addressed? Are additional capital investments required to resolve this?

4.2 Hydropower

The ORP development plan included the construction of hydropower stations at several places, including one at Gariep and one at Van Der Kloof Dam. No definite installed capacities are proposed in the original ORP report of 1962-63, but it mentions an installed capacity of 15.9 MW for Gariep, and 22.5 MW for Van der Kloof Dam. The 1962-63 Project Report states that 'since the primary purpose of the Project is the supply of water for domestic, irrigation and industrial use, releases of water from the storage dams will be determined by daily and seasonal water requirements......' and that '....hydro-electric power releases must be correlated with such release', arguing that 'this is in conformity with the practice in other countries where multi-purpose dams are harnassed, inter alia, for power development'.

The Supplementary Report, published in 1964-65, proposes that the two dams would be increased in height by 60 and 40 feet respectively, which would increase 'fourfold the power generation potential at the two dams during the first three phase of the project' and 'a substantial amount for electric power exists in many parts of the country, especially in the north-western and other areas of the Cape Province, and that the Electricity Supply Commission is interested and desirous to utilize the maximum amount of hydro-electric power capable of being generated under the ORP, for absorption in and distribution by its existing thermal networks'.

Investigations showed that the extra profit exceeded the extra cost. The average available capacities expected for Gariep and Van der Kloof were 61.7MW and 79.7 MW respectively. The installed capacities proposed by ESCOM were 120 MW for both Gariep and Van der Kloof, but the Dept of Water Affairs proposed a lower installed capcity of 90MW for Gariep.

Finally the 1971-72 White Paper proposes the increase of the installed capacity for Gariep to 320 MW (4x80MW), and that of Van der Kloof to 220 MW (2x110MW).

From the outset the hydro-electric stations were designed for the supply of peak power to offset expensive thermal generation. The ORP project itself needed power also, for pumping of water for irrigation and water supply, and It was recognized that this would 'offer an additional opportunity for exercising economy in that power for pumping can be taken at periods of low demand in the grid system and high-rated hydro-electric power can be fed back into the system at peak periods'. The predicted generation of the two dams recognizes that the output would decline as a result of increasing irrigation demands, which would lead to ever greater drawdowns of the reservoir, leading to a lower average head and increasing diversions directly out of the reservoirs, leaving less water for power generation.

The attached Annex shows the installed capacity and energy generation at both dams over time, as proposed in the White Papers of 1962/63 and 1964/65.

Box 2: Hydropower Performance Issues to be addressed: 1. Hydropower revenues of the project, both predicted and as actually happened. 2. Set actualized cost against actualized revenues 3. Compare revenues with alternative generation costs (coal- and oil-fired) and calculate Actual benefits (national level savings) 4. Compute reduced thermal plant emission as a result of the two hydropower plants 5. Attribute value to reduced emissions. 6. Compare costs and benefits again, now including benefit of avoided thermal plant. 7. Compute Greenhouse gas emissions foregone. 8. Comment on projected versus actual schedule

4.3 Municipal and industrial water supply

The project was expected to provide additional water resources for the development of urban centres in the Eastern Cape, particularly Port Elizabeth. This area has few alternative supply sources and economic development was potentially retarded by lack of water.

Box 3: Municipal and Industrial Water Supplies Issues to be addressed: 1. Predicted vs. actual growth in municipal water demand 2. Predicted vs.actual growth in industrial water demand 3. Predicted vs. actual cost recovery 4. Estimates of increased economic growth due to decrease in water scarcity 5. Changes in morbidity and mortality from improvements in water supply.

4.4 Flood control

The Supplementary report on ORP (1964-65) asserts that during the first stage "it may be maintained, incidentally that the construction of the Henrik Vierwoerd and the van der Kloof dams …. will also reduce the incidence of damaging floods along the lower Orange river by 50 per cent ".(Supplementary report on ORDP, 1964-65.)

Until recent years ESCOM was required to not exceed water levels at 80% of storage capacity to allow for flood attenuation. A recent modelling study of four major floods exceeding 4500 m3/sec at Upington (March 1967, February 1974, February 1988, March 1988) has shown that this operating regime for the dams has little impact on peak floods, as flood volumes are so large that the reservoirs fill up before the actual flood peak is reached. In other words: the outflow peak is the same whether the starting condition is an 80% or 100% full reservoir. The dam operators are now allowed to use the full storage capacity of the dam with the consequence of little flood alleviation. The dams are therefore largely ineffective in reducing severe flood damage.

Clearly this is partly linked to the way that the dam is operated and the priority given to storage for irrigation and power generation purposes. If the dam were to be operated solely for flood control then it probably would have a significant impact on peak flows. Although the flood control benefits were quoted in the planning documents as an additional advantage, the avoided damage was not included in the economic rationale for the dam.

Box 4: Flood Control Issues to be addressed : none currently identified

4.5 Predicted impacts and planned mitigation/compensation

4.5.1 Project affected people

Land-owners living at the reservoir sites were compensated for the official price of their land. Some farmers bought land elsewhere and moved, together with their workers. Others moved to cities, and the fate of workers is unknown. Downstream of the dam sites and reservoir areas, the project target communities were essentially white farmers. Apart from 6,000 morgen (5,200 ha) of land to be allocated to 600 (displaced ?) coloured families, they were the intended direct beneficiaries of the 310,000 ha planned to be irrigated under the Orange River Project.

Social issues are not addressed in the White Paper and it will be essential to assess the fate of the estimated several hundred families ousted by Gariep and Vanderkoloof dams. Several owners took up court cases against the state, with variable consequences. The views of those ousted by the Gariep dam are written up in a book by Joan Southey ("Footsteps in the Karoo").

Downstream impacts are addressed in section 5.

BOX 5: Downstream affected people Issue to be addressed: 1. Assess whether the land was effectively compensated for. 2. Assess the extent to which targeted beneficiaries (White and Coloured families) have actually benefited from the irrigation component of the Orange River Project. 3. Assess the extent to which projected race-based ratios have been respected.

4.5.2 Sedimentation and catchment management

The 1963 WP proposes that there should be catchment management to reduce inflows of sediment (estimated at 0.8% per annum) and some work was done through Ministry of Agriculture. These works reportedly reduced erosion, but also impacted on water yields and were discontinued some years after commissioning of the dam.

The costs of sediment accumulation on lost storage capacity were put at 400 000 R per year in 1972.

The Welbedacht dam upstream of Gariep has protected it from the predicted sediment inflows in the past, but is now nearly full. Data exists to check whether the ballpark figures predicted for inflows in the WP have proved correct. Soil erosion in the catchment is estimated at 1000 tonnes/ha/year (Rooseboom and Harmse 1979, in BKS Environmental overview).

Box 6: Sedimentation and Catchment Management Issues to be addressed : 1. Analyse relevant Ministry for Agriculture archives data (e.g., annual reports) to assess additional costs expended to reduce sedimentation. 2. Estimates of their effectiveness. 3. Assess the extent to which the costs of Welbedacht should also be set against benefits of Gariep since construction 4. Assess sedimentation control costs and benefits in Fish, Sunday and other relevant agricultural areas. 5. Assess watershed management policies and praxis since the Orange River complex was completed.

4.5.2 Residual impacts

As there was no EIA of the dam scheme the residual impacts, i.e. those that remain after mitigation measures have been taken, are included in section 5, below.

Box 7 : Residual impacts Issues to be addressed : none identified

5. Unexpected impacts

Question posed by the Commission What were the unintended costs and benefits ? Dams frequently have unanticipated costs and/or benefits which need to be factored in to the review. This will be done by assessing the real costs and impacts (including displacement costs; health impacts; compensation of unexpected losses; effects on production systems; environmental impacts, etc.). Unexpected benefits might include recreational values, improved access, informal agricultural expansion etc. Lessons can potentially be learned for dealing with uncertainty and unanticipated effects in future projects.

5.2 Recreation

White water rafting has been made predictable through more stable stream flow and is developing. There is, for the time being, little indication of whether the rafting business would be more or less attractive under pre-dam stream flow conditions as this activity has only developed since 1985 or so. This activity is therefore an example of a developing use of the river that could not have been foreseen during planning and construction.

Angling has been reduced due to reduction in key fish species (eg yellowfish) and some data on fishing permits exists in pre-dam conditions

Box 9: Recreation & Tourism Issues to be addressed : 1. Assess level (numbers, revenues, jobs created) of water-related recreation and tourism (e.g., rafters). Proxies include: distance traveled to exploit such resources; hotel person/nights. 2. Assess how operation of the dam promotes or constrains such activities. 3. Contact local angling associations and assess whether data are available to substantiate changes in angling attractiveness, then estimate costs. 4. Are taxes paid on such activities? Fishing permits, limits, constraints (e.g., seasonality). Are permit fees hypothecated back to manage the resource? 5. Assess recreation equipment suppliers (kayaks, canoes, zodiacs, outboards, nets, fishing tackle)

5.2 Power Releases affecting Irrigation

Power releases from the dams are concentrated in just a few hours per day, and depending on water availability the releases in other hours may be small. The wave created travels along the downstream river and gradually becomes flatter and flatter. The fluctuating water level used to cause considerable trouble for downstream farmers using pumps to irrigate their fields.

A total of 5 million Rand was invested soon after the dam became operational to overcome these problems by modifying the pump intakes.

5.3 Proliferation of the Black Fly

Blackfly, Simulium, populations have increased as a result of stabilisation of the flow regime. They are biting flies preying on livestock, and the annual cost to farmers is an estimated 33 million Rand (Environmental overview, BKS). Initially this problem was addressed by drawing down the river for 2 week periods to kill larvae, but the effect is indistinguishable 350 km downstream from the dam, and the lack of water in the river prevents farmers from irrigating at key times. This problem was also addressed with larvicides and is currently being treated by biological control (Bti).

Box 10: Black Fly Control Issues to be addressed: 1. Assess costs of damage to cattle and nuisance to humans 2. Assess benefits of control to cattle ranchers 3. Assess costs of the control program (e.g., larvicide spraying person/hours) 4. Assess any impacts on fish of larvicides in water and reduction of larval food sources

5.5 Fragmentation of Farms

Some farms were separated into two parts by increased flows in the headwaters of the Fish River after transfer from the Orange. These farms were expropriated, and resold to the framers who could repurchase both parts if they wished. The lower prices for repurchase reflected the reduced value of a property cut in two. In some cases bridges were built.

Box 11: Farm Fragmentation Issues to be addressed: 1. Assess extent to which fragmentation happened 2. Assess extent to which farm consolidation happened 3. Assess costs of fragmentation compensation payments

5.4 Downstream ecosystems and livelihoods

5.5.1 Ecosystem impacts

Negative impacts on the downstream system were not taken into account during planning or construction, indeed nowhere in the early project documentation(1960s) is environment mentioned. No EIA was undertaken as these were not common practice at the time. There are, apparently few downstream areas with sensitive wetland ecosystems as for long stretches the river runs in a narrow gorge and extensive floodplains or lakes are absent. Much of this area is desert and sparsely inhabited. Some areas of riparian bushveld have been identified as important, however it is not clear the extent to which their continued ecosystem value depends on annual or seasonal flooding.

There are 15 protected areas and a Ramsar site in the Orange River area. Those that surround the dam reservoirs were created from land purchased during dam construction and have no visitor access. Others, such as Richtersfeld and Augrabie falls have visitor facilities. In general, the values of these areas are not strictly linked to the wetland ecosystem importance of the river itself, however the reduced flows have impacted on the scenic beauty of the spectacular Augrabie falls, previously the sixth largest in Africa.

There were apparently no extensive floodplains, nor a large delta/estuary system with wetlands covering thousands of hectares. Much of the environmental value appears therefore to relate to the riverine flora and fauna and to the value of the Orange River mouth (sixth most important coastal wetland in South Africa), which has been extensively studied in recent years. This was not fully surveyed before the dam, so overall impacts compared to baseline conditions are difficult to assess. In addition the ecological problems of the river mouth are caused by a range of factors of which flood volume and timing is only one (others include coastal currents, winter storms, dyking, and pollution from mining activities)

No undammed river system with similar regime/ecology exists that can be used for comparing the current state of the Orange River. However it is estimated that there has been a loss of species diversity in sections of the river affected by daily level fluctuations due to power generation, and temperature variations affect riverine ecosystems up to 200 km downstream of Vanderkloof dam. In contrast, between Marksdrift and Vioolsdrift, 1000 km downstream, invertebrate populations showed little linear change.

A total of 22 species of fish are known, 16 are indigenous and 6 alien. 4 are abundant and 6 are rare or endangered, six are of conservation importance. The river also holds 7 endangered species of mayfly, and an endemic blackfly, Simulium gariepense whose abundance "may have been reduced by the present management of the river" (BKS Environmental overview of the Orange River). There are few data on the evolution of fish density or populations although there are some indications of evolving species composition. There is no major fishery on the river, perhaps due to its general inaccessibility.

Fish populations may have suffered due to lack of a strong spring flood and the associated flushing effect. This scours gravel beds and sand banks, and in its absence these areas have been colonised by benthic algae and reeds respectively. The favoured breeding areas for the fish have hence been lost.

In the early 1980s there was growing recognition of the need for water releases, and discussions centering on the needs of the Orange River mouth Ramsar site were initiated. The Orange river mouth can support 20 000 birds of over 50 species, of which 14 are threatened or endangered. The required releases have since been refined through a series of workshops to define instream flows for multiple purposes. Unfortunately little or no baseline data exist for the pre-dam situation so it is hard to attach values to what has been lost, or to define what instream flows should seek to maintain in terms of the natural, pre-dam processes. The problem is further confounded by a very limited understanding of how individual species respond to different regimes and water quality.

Extension of reed Phragmites australis has been noted, presumably as a result of stable flow regimes. Reedbeds are now thought to cover 83 000 ha. Their high productivity and nutrient stripping ability make this species a key structural ecosystem component. Their destruction by cutting and burning may increase organic matter inputs to the river that encourage blackfly productivity. They also provide a structural support for blackfly larvae. Views differ as to whether or not they constitute a good are a bad thing as they are also thought to aggravate floods through their resistance to the current.

Instream flow requirements are currently estimated at 200 million m3 per year. The cost of this is not estimated or specified, although the formal position of the Ministry for Water Affairs and Forestry is that ecosystem requirements should be deducted from annual flows at the outset as an environmental obligation. The rest of the water is available for diversion and use. A lot of effort has gone into discussing and designing the downstream flow component. This could be included as a cost to the dam project, however it is doubtful that it would exceed a few tens of thousands of dollars per year.

Box 12: Ecosystem Impacts Issues to be addressed: 1. Analyse incremental environmental impacts within the catchment 2. Review the data needs for determining instream flows 3. Has the instream flow regime met its objectives ? 4. Assess how the setting of minimum flows could have been improved with the benefit of hindsight. 5. What ecosystem values have been lost and can they be costed ?

5.5.2 Downstream livelihoods

There is very little information currently available on the peoples living in the downstream area at the time of dam planning and construction. Historical records recount the advance of British explorers and Boer settlers, skirmishes along the river valley in the late nineteenth century, and the presence of Hottentot herding communities. Some mention is made of fishermen and of hunters, although it is not clear the extent to which they constitute separate ethnic groups.

In the early and mid twentieth century the original local inhabitants were largely displaced by the arrival of settlers who steadily turned to agriculture where this was possible, or to livestock rearing. These also displaced any remaining wild game, which was once extremely plentiful according to early explorers, and which was hunted by the indigenous peoples.

Coloured and black communities who were not forcibly displaced (see below) and who continued to enjoy ownership and use rights over water and land areas dependent on the Orange river may have been affected by the impoundment of the river. In that regard, it will be necessary to assess how living conditions (and farming systems in particular) have been affected in former banthustans (Ciskei, Bophuthatswana) and in coloured reserves along the Orange river.

Despite this tumultuous historical activity, the Orange River Project Planning documents reviewed so far did not provide any information on downstream populations. Apart from some reference about areas already under irrigation the project did not explicitly take into account the potential impacts on downstream community life.

The WCD study will need to fill this information gap by trying to identify and locate the various communities and their livelihoods prior to the commissioning of the Garieb and Van Der Kloof Dams.

Box 13: Downstream Livelihoods 1. What was the origin, scale, and socio-economic system of downstream river valley inhabitants in the mid 1960s? 2. How did these communities depend on the Orange River ? 3. Were any of the original inhabitants vulnerable ethnic minorities? (e.g., Koranas of Gariep, Nama & Khubu near Richtesveldt National Park. 4. Where are such people nowadays? What is their current socio-economic status?

NB : impacts on communities in the downstream irrigation command area are addressed under 6.2

6. Distribution of costs and benefits - who gained and who lost?

Question posed by the Commission Distribution of costs and benefits - who gained and who lost? Equity aspects will be covered under this rubric. To the extent feasible, the information collected on the impacts of large dams will be disaggregated. This will give a clearer idea of losers and winners. Aspects to be covered include the distribution of costs and benefits based on age, gender, ethnicity, and residential status (urban vs. rural; upstream vs. downstream); as well as changes in roles, incomes/livelihoods among marginalised groups. In addition, social costs not internalized in analyzing the project feasibility will be identified, as well as compensations provided to groups negatively impacted. Along with these questions, changes in rights (ownership as well as use rights) over resources and their implications on social structures (hierarchies, institutions, and relationships) will be analysed.

The analysis of the distribution of the impacts of the project will be done at two levels:
reservoir and dam sites and the command areas.

6.1. Distribution of costs and benefits at the dam and reservoir sites

The documents reviewed so far did not provide information on communities living in the reservoir sites. In order to assess the way the construction of the dams have affected their livelihoods, it will be needed to collect more information on these communities.

Box 14: Distribution of benefits/equity Issues to be addressed: 1. How many people were living in the submergence areas of the reservoirs and what were their living conditions? 2. Were they all compensated and what did oustees think about the compensation package they received? 3. Were there other forms of rights -such as customary ownership or use rights-- over the area flooded by the reservoir? If yes, how were these rights addressed during the displacement process? 4. How were the livelihoods of communities living in the vicinity of the dam and reservoir sites affected?

6.2. Distribution of costs and benefits in the irrigation command areas

During the design phase of the project, 27,000 morgen (23,500 ha) of land were already under irrigation along the Orange River (Secretary of Water Affairs, 1962-63,17) . These areas were essentially situated between Boegoeberg and Aughrabie Falls. It will be necessary to obtain more details about the owners and exploiters of these irrigated farmlands and the way they have been affected by the Van der Kloof and Gariep dams.

Regarding the intended white farmer beneficiaries, it will be necessary to answer questions such as: Where did they come from? What were the procedures through which they accessed irrigated lands? Was access to irrigated land equitable within the white community?

It is also important to better understand how communities not targeted as beneficiaries have been affected by the implementation of the Orange River Project. This issue will be the most challenging aspect of the review of social impacts of the Orange River Project. In project documents reviewed so far, there is no reference to any riverine groups or any form of usage of the Orange river water and land resources. The only exception is the 27,000 morgen of irrigated land mentioned above.

The inception and implementation of the major elements of the Orange River Project (Garib and Van de Kloof dams) took place in the context of massive enforced displacements of populations in South Africa. The Surplus Population Project estimated that more than 3,5 million people had been displaced throughout the country from the early 1960s to the late 1970s (SPP, 1983, 1) . Despite that these forced removals have affected riparian provinces such as Northern Cape, Free State and Eastern Cape, the potential linkages between these measures and the dams built on the Orange river during the same period are yet to be established.

A third level of analysis of downstream social costs and benefits relates to employment generation both in irrigated farms in the command area of the Orange river and in the industrial and mining companies which have flourished in part because of improved water or energy supply. In this regard, it is important to note that among the estimated 1,089,000 people living in the catchment area of the Orange river, about 50 percent are black, and 36 percent coloured (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1995, 4-6, 4-7) .

Another areas which needs to be investigated is the current process of land claims and restoration of some of the land ownership rights in the command area of the Orange river. This process seems to show that some of the social costs of large dams are not always inherent outcomes of these undertakings. Prevailing policies also make a difference. The current restitution of land rights have the potential of attenuating the inequities of resources access along the Orange River. Therefore the current land claims and restitution process along the Orange River needs to be analysed.

Beneficiaries also include the farmers in the agricultural areas (Orange, Sundays and Fish catchments), urban societies in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. (These will be captured in section on Predicted benefits, above), and electricity consumers country-wide.

Box 15: Costs and benefits in command area Issues to be addressed: 1. Assess the extent to which different groups were positively or adversely affected by the project. 2. Prepare a profile of the population in project affected areas prior to the project, after construction and today. 3. Analyse the role of the Orange River Project, and especially its irrigation component, in the patterns and magnitude of displacements of coloured and black communities from the riverine zones of the Orange river. 4. Analyse current land claims and restitution processes taking place in the command area of the Orange River, and the extent to which these processes are/have been an effective way of correcting disparities in resources access along the Orange River.

NB : the distribution of unexpected costs and benefits on downstream communities is addressed in 5.5.2.

7. The Planning and Decision-Making Process

Question posed by the Commission How were decisions made? The case studies will document and analyze decision-making processes regarding the planning, implementation and monitoring of individual large dam projects, and of river basin development programs as a whole. The extent to which these processes have been demand-driven, democratic, and inclusive will be examined. The role of interest groups (community based NGOs, the media, elected authorities, government officials, donors, and the private sector) will be analyzed at all stages of the project cycle. Due consideration will be given to the analysis of conflict management mechanisms. A special emphasis will be placed on analyzing the roles of traditionally marginalised groups (women, lower caste groups, ethnic minorities) in decision-making processes. The way conflicting priorities at various levels (regional vs. national; national vs. local; community vs. individuals) are addressed or negotiated will be documented.

The case study of the Orange River Basin, and the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams in particular, will focus on the decision-making process that led to the identification, planning, approval, and implementation of the projects. These structures were planned as part of an integrated approach to water resources management, although it may be argued that this fell a little short of the kind of river basin planning operations in practice today. The river basin includes riparian territories - Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutholand (now Lesotho), and only recently have formal links been established at river-basin level. It is also relatively clear that although an option to pump water from a project to be built in Basutholand was investigated in the 1950s, a full options-assessment, or sectoral plan, was not common practice at the time. If it was undertaken, it did not form a key part of the planning process as would be more normal today.

The Orange River Project - which included both the Gariep and Vanderkloof dams -- was considered to be the beginnings of a broader development initiative for the parts of the river basin located in South Africa. The Department of Water Affairs of South Africa proposed and supervised the implementation of the project with the approval of Parliament. Whether there was significant parliamentary debate about the value of the Orange River Project at the time needs to be verified.

There was coordination between ESKOM (the national power utility for South Africa) and the Department of Water Affairs. ESKOM bought a share of the hydropower generated by the dams for which it paid in kind, as electricity wheeled through the ESKOM system to large pumping schemes for irrigation. ESKOM and the Department of Water Affairs decided to alter some design aspects of the projects to increase the hydropower produced, as reported in a White Paper of 1965. Other government departments and agencies did not to seem play a significant role in the project, although the Department of Land Affairs organised the expropriation of property, and the Ministry of Agriculture undertook erosion control measures in the catchment.

It was widely reported at the time that the decision to build the dams was taken to restore political stability and national confidence from the combined effects of such factors as the aftermath of the Sharpville Massacre in 1960, South Africa's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, and related flight of capital from the country. There is also some anecdotal information that South African farmer lobbies were pressuring for irrigation potential to be increased to support agricultural production in the vicinity of the Orange River. Up until this point farmers had organised their own irrigation systems (sometimes with a government subsidy) and large scale government operations were still relatively rare. More research is required to assess the role that these and other interest groups played in the decision-making and planning process with respect to the Gariep and Vanderkloof dams.

There is no mention in any of the White Papers, or supplementary reports on consultations with people to be affected by the projects. The large land-owning white families that were displaced by the Gariep dam were not consulted nor did they participate in the planning of the projects either. They were apparently offered what was deemed to be the market value for their lands based on the Water Act of 1956 because a national land act did not exist in South Africa at the time. Some farmers went to court over this issue with variable results.

Comprehensive planning of the dams did not really take place before, but after they were approved by Parliament. A consortium of 3 private South African and 2 French consulting firms was hired to complete the planning and design of the projects. Similarly, a consortium of private South African firms and 2 French companies was given the contract to construct the dams. Clearly, South Africa did not have enough indigenous technical capacity to execute the projects on its own. However financing of the projects were purely domestic, primarily from the sale of South Africa's abundant gold reserves.

As noted in Section 5.1, the negative effects of the downstream ecosystem were not taken into account during planning or construction and an environmental impact assessment was not conducted. For all practical purposes, most if not all of the environmental and social impacts can therefore be considered as unexpected or unintended consequences of the dams.

Very little is known at this point about the various decisions that were taken during the implementation process. Whether implementation delays resulted in time or cost overruns, whether project financing was ever in doubt, whether the various court cases had any effect on compensation packages or whether human rights were violated in order to move ahead with the project are questions which require further study.

Very little is known about the post-construction decision-making process at this point either. In particular, how did construction of the two dams alter development planning for the Orange River Basin and for South Africa more broadly. It is known that an assessment of the performance or development effectiveness of the dam projects has not been conducted, although parts of the recent Orange River Re-Planning Study do contain elements of such an evaluation. It would also be of interest to examine the process by which mitigation of unintended impacts has occurred. In particular did project authorities address these impacts independently or did civil society pressure play a role ?

Box 16 : Decision-making processes Issues to be addressed: 1. Analyze the decision-making process through historical records and structured interviews as appropriate.

8. Compliance with Laws, Policies, Criteria and Guidelines

Question posed by the Commission Did the project comply with the criteria and guidelines of the day? The case studies will assess the extent to which the criteria and guidelines that existed at the time were followed during the project cycle. Where applicable, these criteria and guidelines will be analyzed to determine their effectiveness, and identify incentives and institutional frameworks explaining their implementation. Decision-makers' and interest groups' awareness of other existing guidelines will be assessed.

The administrative framework for water resources development and management was relatively thin during period when the projects were proposed and executed compared to today. The policy framework that guided the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams was primarily the National Water Act of 1956. The importance of the Act cannot be underestimated because it created the legal basis under which water resources came under Government control as well as allowing for the possible diversion of waters out of the Orange River catchment.

Further research on the compliance of project planning and implementation with the National Water Act (which has been revised several times over the years) is required. As far as is known at this point, a national land law did not exist at the time to govern land acquisition and use from the project and national energy/electricity regulations were relatively unimportant to the projects.

The place of the Orange River Project in the national policy framework that existed at the time also requires further investigation. To what extent the two dams fit into national development planning, agricultural and industrial policies in terms of priorities established and resources available is not clear.

In terms of broader criteria and guidelines, very few existed at the time. No explicit requirements for environmental impact assessment and mitigation or for social impact assessment and mitigation were in effect. Specific criteria and guidelines for compensating project-affected persons, or more specifically for resettlement, were not available. Procedures for information disclosure and notification to project affected persons have not been found.

It would be of great interest to compare the evolution of laws, policies, criteria and guidelines from the 1960s through the 1990s. This would allow investigation of three questions: 1) did experience with the Orange River Project contribute to reforms in criteria and guidelines; 2) did subsequent reforms affect the functioning of the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams; and 3) how has formulation and implementation of more recent dams in the basin and the broader development of the river basin been affected by these reforms?

This is one way in which inter-linkages at the basin level can be addressed without diverting too much attention from the primary goal - assessing the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams - if resources permit.

Box 17: Compliance with the criteria of the day 1. Assess the extent to which the criteria, guidelines, policies, best practices that existed at the time were followed during the project cycle. 2. Analyze such criteria to determine their effectiveness 3. Identify incentives and institutional frameworks explaining their implementation. 4. To what extent were new criteria (e.g., requirements of EA/SIA) internalized after construction? 5. Assess the retrofitting of mitigation after construction (e.g., addition of conservation units around the reservoir)

9. Inter-linkages at the Basin-level

The primary objectives of the WCD pilot case study are to examine the performance, development effectiveness, options assessment and decision-making processes with respect to the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams while addressing the inter-linkages at the basin level to the extent possible given time and resources. Two additional caveats are in order before outlining the main work envisaged with respect to basin-wide dynamics. Firstly, the WCD case studies are not intended as comprehensive river basin studies but as focussed studies of particular focal dams in the context of river basins. Secondly the assessment of performance and development effectiveness can only really be achieved after five to ten years of operational experience with a large dam.

The avenues of inquiry that are possible in this area are at least four-fold. All four contribute to addressing how substantially the focal dam conditioned development of the river basin and how other developments within the river basin conditioned the development effectiveness of the focal dam.

First, to what extent did the construction of focal dam alter extant water and land practices in the basin. In particular were traditional practices negatively or positively affected by the dam project and what was the net effect of these changes? More broadly, what options were foregone because of the building of the focal dam?

Second, did the focal dam either depend on the construction of one or more other dams for its objectives to be realized or vice-versa? This question can be connected to the issue of whether a river basin master plan was available and whether or not the focal dam being studied were understood to be part of a broader development and management process for the basin. While there wasn't a river basin master plan for the Orange catchment during the 1960s and 1970s, the Orange River Project did include both the Gariep and Vandekloof Dams and associated infrastructure. Did the Orange River Project deliver on its promises and what were the cumulative impacts of the dams on the river basin during the 1970s and 1980s?

Conversely, and third, how did the construction of the two dams shape the future development trajectory of the basin? Did it pre-empt or create incentives for particular types of initiatives in the river basin because of its existence and functioning? In the case of the Orange River, for example, did the Gariep and Vanderkloof Dams increase the need for or likelihood of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project or other development projects in the basin?

It should be reiterated that the WCD will not be conducting an evaluation of the present need for, nor the value of, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. But it will try to examine the effects of the Orange River Project on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in the manner noted in the previous paragraph. The case study will also attempt to evaluate the changing institutional framework for decision-making by comparing the laws, policies, criteria and guidelines that existed at the time of that the Gariep and Vandekloof Dams were built with the governance structures that have shaped the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. This will be a test of whether it is feasible for the WCD to conduct similar cross-temporal analyses of decision-making process comparing focal dams with the latest dam building process in its other case studies around the world.

Box 19: Linkages within the basin Issues to be addressed: 1. Assess linkages within the basin and the degree of interaction between the dams of the basin 2. Assess the options foreclosed or promoted through selection of ORP. 3. Evaluate the evolving institutional framework for decision-making within the basin.

10. Assessment of development effectiveness and lessons learned

The qualitative and quantitative information gathered and presented in sections 4-9 provide a basis for understanding the predicted and unexpected development impact of the dam. To this information will be added a series of other indicators such as migration, health, income levels, nutritional status, infant mortality, stimulation of local economies, increased road access, etc These will be gathered through the questionnaires that form a second, and complementary data collection stream.

11. How would this project be viewed in today's context?

This issue will be addressed in the final report.

12. Bibliography and reference list

This is an initial list of documents located to assist the study. For the more scientific and technical references, extensive bibliographies are generally included so this gives access to the wider literature. These references are not presented here. Suggestions for other sources are very welcome.

The Department of Water Affairs reports

1.	Report on the Proposed Orange River Development Project (ORDP),1962-63
2.	Supplementary Report on the ORDP,1964-65
3.	Second Supplementary Report on the ORDP, 1968-69
4.	Third Supplementary Report on the First Phase of the ORDP, 1971-72
5.	Fourth Supplementary Report on the first phase of the ORDP: a protective works of rivers and road crossings below Orange Fish Tunnel: 1973-74
6.	Fifth Supplementary Report on the first phase of the ORDP, 1974-75
7.	Seventh Supplementary Report on the ORDP, 1986-87
8.	Eighth Supplementary Report on the ORDP (Lower Sundays River Govt. Water Scheme: extension of supply to Port Elizabeth),1990-91
9.	Report on the Lower ORDP (Kakamas extension), 1989-90
10.	Farming in South Africa, June 1963. Uct.
11.	Orange River Replanning Study - June 1997 · Agricultural Economic Analysis of the Orange and Fish River Basins · Social Overview of the E. Cape · Social Overview of the Orange River Basin · Comparative Economic Impact Analysis of Optimal Water Allocation · Existing Water Infrastructure in E. Cape · Regional Economic Assessment
12.	Beplanningskommittee: Benede-Oranjerivier finale verslag, 1971.
13.	Sedimentbalans in H.F. Verwoeddam, 1979.
14.	Background to the Orange River Environmental Impact Study, ? uct
15.	Water Act, 1956 (ammended), library

Social Aspects

1. Muller, D.J., 1953. The Orange River: from the confluence of the Vaal and Orange Rivers to the mouth of the Orange in the Atlantic Ocean: its history, industries and the people along its banks.(bibliography). Uct.
2. Klinghardt, G.P., 1990. "A historical perspective on patterns of settlement and land use in the lower Orange River Basin". Wrc.
3. Barnard, W.S., 1993. The lower Orange River area as a trans-boundary region. Wrc.
4. Groenewald, A. 1996. Landbou more herbeplan: besproeing. Wrc.

Governance (policies)

1. Farmer's Weekly, 1995. "This is the Gariep Dam now - what else will change?"

Environmental Aspects 1. McKenzie, R. S. & Roth C. (Water Research Commission), 1994. Report to the Water Research Commission: the evaluation of river losses from the Orange River downstream of the P.K. le Roux Dam.
2. Mafune, I.D., 1997. Review of the environmental assessment process for the small-scale semi-formal prospecting operations along the Gariep River in Namibia. Wrc.
3. Prins, J.G., 1990. Assessment of Environmental Water requirements for the Orange river mouth. Uct.
4. Palmer, R.W., 1996. Invertebrates in the Orange River, with emphasis on conservation and management. Uct.
5. EPM., 1993. Water requirements of riverine ecosystems: ecological impact. Uct.
6. van Zyl, B.J., 1991. The lower Orange River. Uct.
7. Petitjean, M. & Davies, B., 1989. Ecological impacts of inter-basin transfers: a case study of ORDP.

Economics 1. Van der Merwe, E. J. 1966. Enkele ekonomies aspekte van die Oranjerivierontwikkelingsprojek, uct.
2. van Walsem, D.J. (University of Stellenbosch), 1967. n Ekonomiese Opname van die Benede-Oranjerivier

Engineering and alternatives

1. Kriel, J. P., 1972. "The Role of the Hendrik Verwoed Dam in the Orange River Project".
2. Swanevelder, C.J., 1981. Utilizing South Africa's largest river - the physiographic background to the Orange River scheme. WRC
3. Swart, D.H et al., 1988. "A record of events at the Orange River Mouth during the March 1988 flood".
4. Robertson, T. C. 1962. Veldtrust, "How to tame a Dragon River".
5. Mabote, M.E. & Meadows, M.E. 1997. Sedimentology of terrigenous mud from the Orange river delta and the inner shelf off Namaqualand. Uct.
6. van Veelen, M. 1997. The Strategic Planning of major river systems: viewpoint. Uct.
7. Civil Engineering., 1997. The Orange river's water: future use: water solutions. Uct.
8. Lund, B.G.A., 1997. Water for all? Uct.
9. Zawanda, P.K., 1991. Scour and deposition in the Orange river flood palin: implications for land-use control in flood-plain areas.
10. Muller, J.R., 1970. Development of hydro-economic techniques for optimising hydro-plant capacity: (with particular reference to Hendrik Verwoed dam).
11. Von Malititz, P.M.J., 1979. The Theory of planning and models for the economic development of a region - the Orange-Fish River Project. Wrc.
12. De Swart, S.J., 1970. A Study of the Methodology of Benefit-Cost analysis in resource planning, with the emphasis on allocating farming areas, demonstrated y the ORDP. Wrc.

Irrigated

1. Biesheuvel, S., 1963. Orange River development conference: a summary of proceedings. Uct.
2. Ministry of Agriculture and provincial reports

General

1. Olivier, H., 1975. DAMIT, The ORDP: Hendrik Verwoed, P.K. le Roux Dams and the Orange Fish Tunnel)
2. Jooste, N.J., 1991. A historical analysis of the ORDP (1962-76). Wrc.
3. Davies, Bryan, 1988. Erratic Orange (water resource development). Uct.
4. Bunce,G., 1997. Damme in die Dorsland (Dambuilding in South Africa). Uct.
5. Olivier, H. 1976. Great dams in southern Africa. Uct.
1. 1975. Orange River Project. Uct.
6. Smith, A.B.,1995. Einiqualand: studies of the Orange river frontier. Uct.
7. Fisher, R & van Riet, W., 1996. The Orange River: comment - the 29th parallel.
8. Rightmire,G.P., 1993. Skeletons of contact: A study of proto-historic burials from the Lower Orange River Valley. Uct.
9. van Eeden, M., 1990. So is die magtige Oranje getem (development of the Orange River Project and features of the Hendrik Verwoed dam). Uct.
10. A Structural Analysis of the Water Allocation Mechanism of the Water Act 54 of 1956 in the Light of the Requirements of Competing Water User Sectors, Vol. I & II.

13. Draft ToR for all staff required

To be completed

Annexes

REVENUE IN MILLION RAND ACCRUING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS FROM ADDITIONAL POWER IN MILLIONS OF ELECTRICAL UNITS TO BE GENERATED AT DAMS AS A RESULT OF ACCELERATED CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME. (1964)

Year	Hendrik Verwoed Dam.		Van der Kloof Dam.
	Power generated.	Revenue	Power generated.	Revenue
1970	401	0.812	501	1.06
1971	401	0.812	501	1.06
1972	401	0.812	501	1.06
1973	401	0.812	501	1.06
1974	401	0.812	501	1.06
1975	367	0.772	463	1.01
1976	367	0.772	463	1.01
1977	367	0.772	463	1.01
1978	367	0.772	463	1.01
1979	367	0.772	463	1.01
1980	367	0.770	308	0.82
1981	366	0.770	308	0.82
1982	366	0.770	308	0.82
1983	366	0.770	308	0.82
1984	366	0.770	308	0.82

Revised power generation predictions (Supplementary report 1964-1965)

Year	Hendrik Verwoed Dam.		Van der Kloof Dam.
	Average Mega-watts, New Proposal.	Additional Mega-watts, with raised Dams, according to New Proposal.	Average Mega-watts, New Proposal.	Additional Mega-watts, with raised Dams, according to New Proposal.
1970	61.7	45.8	79.7	57.2
1971	61.7	45.8	79.7	57.2
1972	61.7	45.8	79.7	57.2
1973	61.7	45.8	79.7	57.2
1974	61.7	45.8	79.7	57.2
1975	52.9	41.9	64.0	52.9
1976	52.9	41.9	64.0	52.9
1977	52.9	41.9	64.0	52.9
1978	52.9	41.9	64.0	52.9
1979	52.9	41.9	64.0	52.9
1980	48.4	41.8	52.4	35.2
1981	48.4	41.8	52.4	35.2
1982	48.4	41.8	52.4	35.2
1983	48.4	41.8	52.4	35.2
1984	48.4	41.8	52.4	35.2
1985	43.2	Nil	35.6	Nil
1986	43.2	Nil	35.6	Nil
1987	43.2	Nil	35.6	Nil
1988	43.2	Nil	35.6	Nil
1989	43.2	Nil	35.6	Nil
1990	43.2	Nil	25.6	Nil
1991	43.2	Nil	25.6	Nil
1992	43.2	Nil	25.6	Nil
1993	43.2	Nil	25.6	Nil
1994	43.2	Nil	25.6	Nil
1995	42.2	Nil	16.7	Nil
1996	42.2	Nil	16.7	Nil
1997	42.2	Nil	16.7	Nil
1998	42.2