3 November 2000
South America launch dates
Briefings in Buenos Aires, Santiago, São Paulo in November 2000

• Buenos Aires, Argentina - 23 November 2000
  Junin 1940, Capital Federal
  
• Santiago, Chile - 24 November 2000
  Edificio Naciones Unidas



• São Paulo, Brazil - 27 November 2000
  Universidade de São Paulo, Sala do Conselho Universitário
  

More information, contact: ngutman@dams.org

The World Commission on Dams (WCD), set up two years ago to find common ground in the fierce debate over dams and development, has completed its comprehensive work, fulfilling its mandate with unanimous agreement, on schedule and under budget.

South America is a cornerstone of the WCD's work. The Commission has just completed a comprehensive Case Study of Tucurui dam in Brazil and collected data on 13 dams in the region as part of its Cross-Check survey. It held a two-day regional consultation in Sao Paulo, Brazil. And it has read 116 written submissions from the region including a statistical compendium on the Inter-American Development Bank's experience with dams.

Now, to fulfil its mandate, the Commission will present its comprehensive global analysis, independent findings and authoritative criteria and guidelines for action in the cities of Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Sao Paulo, with a goal of helping to turn South America's controversies of the past into consensus for the future. South America is home to over 1,000 large dams - dams more than 15 metres in height - according to industry statistics Brazil has 594 such dams, Argentina 101 and Chile 88.

"All development must be people centred," said WCD Chair Kader Asmal. "Our report helps countries meet the day-to-day needs of our thirsty, hungry citizens without exhausting the waters that sustain us all. The measure of our progress is how practical and useful our collective work has been for all."

Prominent among the WCD Work Programme is the case study of the Tucurui Hydropower Complex in Brazil - an investment that will cost practically US$10 billion when Phase II is completed in 2006. As such Tucuruí exemplifies the larger issues in the debate on dams and development throughout Latin America. Among the economic, social and environmental impacts of the project identified by a Brazilian team of experts that undertook the case study are:

• Tucurui supplies 70% of power needs in Northern Brazil and with the connection to the southern grid and the doubling of capacity (as part of Phase II) is poised to make an important contribution to future power requirements of Sao Paulo and other urban/industrial centers of Brazil;



• the negative impact that cost-overruns can have on the otherwise promising power economics of very large hydropower projects and the scale of the subsidies that have been provided in the past to industrial consumers of hydropower;



• the potential for gross greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs to approximate those that were avoided by choosing hydropower over fossil fuel-based power plants;



• the potential for losses in downstream fishery production downstream from a dam to be more than offset by reservoir fisheries;



• the potential severity of unintended health impacts of dam projects such as the increase in malaria that began during the construction period, the plague of Mansonia mosquitos that started after filling the reservoir and the storage and concentration through the food-chain of mercury from gold-mining in the basin;



• the difficulty of applying a 'balance-sheet' approach to projects that involve not just construction costs and power benefits but many social and environmental impacts.

With regard to decision-making and compliance the Tucuruí report clarifies the ongoing disagreement between local communities and Eletronorte (the operating utility) regarding Phase II of the project. With construction of the $1.4 billion Phase II already underway, communities fear that subsequent changes in operational rules for the reservoir will lead to a repeat of the negative impacts brought on by the initial creation of the reservoir. However, regulators have ruled that Phase II is a continuation of a project planned prior to the law instituting environmental impact assessment in Brazil and thus exempt from this requirement -- and therefore the public hearings that would be held to discuss such matters have not taken place.

The frank and open discussions between the different parties at the closing meeting of the Tucurui case study held in Belém in January 2000 provided an opportunity for such a discussion. At the meeting Eletronorte maintained that no changes in the maximum operating level (which would flood additional lands) is contemplated. A representative of the state environmental agency clarified that such a change in operations would need approval of his agency as part of the Tucuruí annual operating license - and that major changes to operations could in turn trigger an EIA process under federal law. The communities were, in turn, doubtful that once the project was operational that such a ruling would be taken by state authorities. The case study team, meanwhile, suggests that regardless of whether the existing maximum operating level is maintained, the pattern of operation of the reservoir will be changed, as Phase II will double the power-generating capacity of the Tucuruí Complex - thus inevitably altering water quality and flows in the reservoir and downstream. The exact nature and extent of these impacts have yet to be systematically studied.

Finally, the Tucuruí report, and indeed the Brazilian experience, demonstrates the potential of royalty mechanisms as a means to share benefits with local communities - but also the need to learn from formative experiences. At Tucurui the national law on royalties puts money in the hands of local officials but this does not guarantee that those who have borne the costs of negative social, environmental and health impacts dam receive the benefits from subsequent public expenditures

But the Tucurui Study is merely one of ten reports selected across the world as part of a case study programme. And those case studies are a fraction of all the evidence prepared for the WCD, such as a global cross-check survey of 125 dams that included large dams in South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela.

The WCD has also compiled 17 working papers in specific issue areas. For example, information compiled as part of the work on economic and financial issues shows that large dams financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have, on average, cost 45% more than originally budgeted. These trends reflect those found in other regions as data for 250 dams compiled by WCD showed that average cost overruns came to 54%. At the same time, figures from the IDB and other major multilateral donors such as the World Bank show sharp reductions in funding levels for dams from the heydays of the 1970s, when the IDB was committing over $1 billion per year to dams in the region.

The Commission's Final Report goes beyond learning from the past and presents a new framework for decision making with clear directions and practical guidance. On November 23, 24 and 27 the WCD will not tell either the people of South America or the governments what to do. It will, however, provide the clear evidence, historic context and a step-by-step framework from which all parties can carefully develop lessons from the past to shape policies for their future.